Read Ebook: In the Morning of Time by Roberts Charles G D Sir

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Advancing on this plan, these armies would present a line exposing, save as regarded the first of them, no flank open to attack. Indeed, the first object of the echelon is to render both a frontal and a flank attack upon it difficult.

Had the plan succeeded as designed, we should have had this position of affairs: the eight armies would have extended across France from Paris to Verdun by the valley of the Marne, the great natural highway running across France due east to the German frontier, and one having both first-rate road and railway facilities. It was hoped that by the time the first and strongest formation of this chain of armies had reached Paris and had fastened round it, the sixth, seventh, and eighth armies would, partly by attacking the fortified French frontier on the east, but chiefly by enveloping it on the west, have gained possession of the frontier defence works.

The main French army must then have been driven westward from the valley of the Marne, across the Aube, brought to a decisive battle in the valley of the Seine, defeated, and, enclosed in a great arc by the German armies extending round from the north and by the east to the south of Paris, have been forced into surrender.

There is a common assumption that the German plan was designed to repeat the manoeuvres which in the preceding war led to Sedan, and almost with the same detail. That is rating the intelligence of the German General Staff far too low. They could not but know that the details of one campaign cannot be repeated in another against an opponent, who, aware of the repetition, would be ready in advance against every move.

The reason was that if an assailant takes two main lines of advance simultaneously and has to advance along the valleys of rivers converging to a point, as the Oise, the Marne, and the Seine converge towards Paris, his advance may be effectively disputed by a much smaller defending force than if he adopts only one line of advance, provided always, of course, that he can safeguard his flanks and his communications.

Bear in mind the calculation that the main French army would never in any event be strong enough successfully to resist an invasion so planned. Bear in mind, too, that an echelon formation is not only supple and difficult to attack along its length on either side, but that it can be stretched out or closed up like a concertina. To maintain a formation of that kind with smaller bodies of troops is fairly easy. To maintain it with the enormous masses forming the German armies would be difficult. But the Germans were so confident of being able to compel the French to conform to all the German movements, to stand, that is to say, as the weaker side, always on the defensive, leaving the invaders a practically unchallenged initiative, that they believed they could co-ordinate all their movements with exactitude. This was taking a risk, but they took it.

It is a mistake to suppose that they entered on the campaign with every movement mapped out from start to finish. No plan of any campaign was ever laid down on such lines, and none ever will be. The plan of a campaign has to be built on broad ideas. Those ideas, by taking all the essentials into consideration, the strategist seeks to convert into realised events. In this instance, there can be very little doubt that certain assumptions were treated as so probable as almost to be certainties. The first was that such forces as France could mobilise in the time would be mainly drafted to defend the fortified frontier. The next was that such forces as could be massed in time along the boundary of Belgium would be too weak seriously to impede the invasion. The third was that in any subsequent attempt to transfer forces from the fortified frontier to the Belgian boundary the French would be met and defeated by the advancing echelon of German masses. The fourth was that such an attempted transfer, followed by its defeat, would leave the fortified frontier so readily seizable, that German armies advancing swiftly into the valley of the Marne would fall upon these defeated French forces on the flank and rear. Besides, that attempted transfer would be the very thing that would promote the German design of envelopment.

If Paris could be reached by the strongest of the chain of armies in eight days, then the mobilisation of the French reserves would still be incomplete. Under the most favourable conditions, and even without the disturbance of invasion, that mobilisation takes a fortnight. Given a sudden and successful invasion with the resultant upset of communications and the mobilisation could never be completed. All, therefore, that the 1,680,000 men forming the invading hosts would have to encounter would be the effectives of the French regular forces, less than half the number of the invaders.

When we speak of twenty-eight army corps moving in echelon, approximately like so many squares placed diagonally corner to corner, it is as well not to forget that such a chain of masses may assume quite sinuous and snake-like variations and yet remain perfectly intact and strong. For example, the head of the chain might be wound round and pivot upon Paris, and the rest of the chain extended across France in curves. This gigantic military boa-constrictor might therefore crush the heart out of France, while the defenders of the country remained helpless in its toils.

Such in brief was the daring and ambitious scheme conceived and worked out by the German General Headquarters Staff, and worked out in the most minute detail.

It will be seen from this summary that so far as its broad military features are concerned, the plan promised an almost certainly successful enterprise. There were concealed in its calculations, nevertheless, fatal flaws. What they were will appear in the course of the present narrative. Meanwhile it is necessary to add that possible opposition from Belgium had not been overlooked; nor the possibility, consequent upon that opposition, of intervention by Great Britain. From the military standpoint, however, it was never calculated that any British military force would be able to land either in France or in Belgium promptly enough to save the French army from disaster. In any event, such a force would be, from its limited numbers, comparatively unimportant.

FOOTNOTES:

Despatch from Sir John French to Earl Kitchener of September 17th, 1914. For the text of this see Appendix.

This phrase is that of General F. von Bernhardi.

Of the remaining corps, five were posted along the frontier of East Prussia to watch the Russians. The rest were held chiefly at Mainz, Coblentz, and Breslau as an initial reserve.

The now definitely ascertained facts regarding the military strength of Germany appear to be these:--

In addition, there were raised 12 corps of Ersatz Reserve, and there were also the Landsturm and the Volunteers, whose numerical strength is uncertain. These troops, however, were not embodied until later in the campaign.

The leading army, that of General von Kluck, consisted of 6 corps; and the second army, that of General von B?low, of 4 corps. The others were formed each of 3 corps, making an original total of 28 corps.

Following the disaster at Li?ge, however, the army of General von Emmich was divided up, and the view here taken, which appears to be most consistent with the known facts, is that it was, after being re-formed, employed to reinforce the armies of Generals von Kluck and von B?low. That would make the strength of the German force, which marched through northern Belgium, 780,000 men.

A German army corps is made up, with first reserves, embodied on mobilisation, to 60,000 men. Twenty-eight army corps, therefore, represent a total of 1,680,000 of all arms.

WHY THE PLANS WERE CHANGED

Let us now pass from designs to events, and, reviewing in their military bearing the operations between August 3, when the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier, to the day, exactly one month later, when the German plans were apparently changed, deal with the question: Why were the plans changed?

The Germans entered Li?ge on August 10. They had hoped by that time to be, if not at, at any rate close to, Paris. In part they were unable to begin their advance through Belgium until August 17 or August 18, because they had not, until that date, destroyed all the forts at Li?ge, but in part, also, these delays had played havoc with the details of their scheme.

Dislocation of the plan, however, was not all. In the attempts to carry the fortress of Li?ge by storm the Germans lost, out of the three corps forming the army of General von Emmich, 48,700 men killed and wounded. These corps, troops from Hanover, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, formed the flower of the army. The work had to be carried out of burying the dead and evacuating the wounded. The shattered corps had to be reformed from reserves. All this of necessity meant additional complications.

Then there was the further fighting with the Belgians. What were the losses sustained by the Germans between the assaults on Li?ge and the occupation of Brussels is, outside of Germany, not known, nor is it known in Germany save to the Government. To put that loss as at least equal to the losses at Li?ge is, however, a very conservative estimate.

Meanwhile, the French had advanced into Belgium along both banks of the Meuse and that further contributed to upset the great preparation.

We have, therefore, down to August 21, losses, including those in the fighting on the Meuse and in Belgian Luxemburg, probably equal to the destruction of two reinforced army corps.

Now we come to the Battle of Mons and Charleroi, when to the surprise of all non-German tacticians, the attacks in mass formation witnessed at Li?ge were repeated.

To describe that battle is beyond the scope of this narrative. But it is certain that the estimates so far formed of German losses are below, if not a long way below, the truth.

There is, however, a reliable comparative basis on which to arrive at a computation, and this has a most essential bearing on later events.

At Li?ge there were three heavy mass attacks against trenches defended by a total force of 20,000 Belgian riflemen with machine guns. We have seen what the losses were. At Mons, against the British forces, there were mass attacks against lines held by five divisions of British infantry, a total roughly of 65,000 riflemen, with machine guns, and backed by over sixty batteries of artillery.

Now, taking them altogether, the British infantry reach, as marksmen, a level quite unknown in the armies of the Continent. Further, these mass attacks were made by the Germans with far greater numbers than at Li?ge, and there were far more of them. Indeed, they were pressed at frequent intervals during two days and part of the intervening night. The evidence as to the dense formations adopted in these attacks is conclusive.

What, from facts such as these, is the inference to be drawn as to losses incurred? The inference, and it is supported by the failure of any of these attacks to get home, is, and can only be, that the losses must have been proportionally on the same scale as those at Li?ge, for the attacks were, for the most part, as at Li?ge, launched frontally against entrenched positions. Though at first sight such figures may appear fantastic, to put the losses at three times the total of the losses at Li?ge is probably but a very slight exaggeration, even if it be any exaggeration at all.

There is, however, still another ground for such a conclusion. While the British front from Cond? past and behind Mons to Binche allowed of the full and effective employment of the whole British force, even when holding in hand necessary reserves, it was obviously not a front wide enough to allow of the full and effective employment on the German side of a force four times as numerous. It must not be forgotten that troops cannot fight at their best without sufficient space to fight in.

But to employ in the same space a force no greater than the British, considering the advantage of position given with modern arms to an army acting on the defensive on well-chosen ground, would have meant the annihilation of the German army section by section.

That in effect, apart from the turning movement undertaken through Tournai, and the attempt at Binche to enfilade the British position by an oblique line of attack, was the problem which General von Kluck had to face. His solution of it, in the belief that his artillery must have completely shaken the British resistance, was to follow up the bombardment by a succession of infantry attacks in close formation, one following immediately the other, so that each attack would, it was thought, start from a point nearer to the British trenches than that preceding it, until finally the rush could not possibly be stopped. In that way the whole weight of the German infantry might, despite the narrow front, be thrown against the British positions, and though the losses incurred must of necessity be severe, nevertheless, the British line would be entirely swept away, and the losses more than amply revenged in the rout that must ensue. Not only so, but the outcome should be the destruction of the British force.

That this is as near the truth as any explanation which can be offered is hardly doubtful. The conclusion is consonant, besides, with what have been considered the newest German views on offensive tactics. To suppose that General von Kluck, or any other commander, would throw away the lives of his officers and men without some seemingly sufficient object is not reasonable.

Here we touch one of the hidden but fatal flaws in the German plan--the assumption that German troops, if not superior, must at any rate be equal in skill to any others. The German troops at Mons, admittedly, fought with great daring, but that they fought or were led with skill is disproved by all the testimony available. It is as clear as anything can be that not merely the coolness and the marksmanship of the British force was a surprise to the enemy, but the uniformity of its quality. Of the elements that go to make up military strength, uniformity of quality is among the most important. The cohesion of an army with no weak links is unbreakable. It is not only more supple than an army made up of troops of varying quality and skill, but it is more tenacious. Like a well-tempered sword, it is at once more flexible yet more unbreakable than an inferior weapon.

Against an inferior army the tactics of General von Kluck must infallibly have succeeded. Against such a military weapon as the British force at Mons they were foredoomed to failure. Assuming the British army to be inferior, General von Kluck threw the full weight of his troops upon it before he had tried its temper.

Studying their bearing, the importance of these considerations becomes plain. Powerful as it was, the driving head of the great German chain had yet not proved powerful enough inevitably to sweep away resistance. That again disclosed a miscalculation. It is true that the British force had to retire, and it is equally true that that retirement exposed them to great danger, for the enemy, inflamed by his losses, was still in numbers far superior, and what, for troops obliged to adopt marching formations, was even more serious, he was times over superior in guns. Few armies in face of such superiority could have escaped annihilation; fewer still would not have fallen into complete demoralisation.

Naturally the enemy used every effort to throw as large forces as he could upon the flanks of the retiring British divisions. He especially employed his weight of guns for that purpose. On the other hand, the British obviously and purposely occupied all the roads over as broad an extent of country as was advisable. They did so in order to impose wide detours on outflanking movements. While those forces were going round, the British were moving forward and so escaping them.

The difficulties the Germans had to contend against were first the difficulty of getting close in enough with bodies of troops large enough, and secondly that, in flowing up, their mass, while greater in depth from van to rear than the British, could not be much, if anything, greater in breadth. The numerical superiority, therefore, could not be made fully available.

It was by such tactics that the British General so far outpaced the enemy as to be able to form front for battle at Cambrai. Here again some brief notes are necessary in order to estimate the effect on later events.

On the right of the British position from Cambrai to Le Cateau, and somewhat in advance of it, the village of Landrecies was held by the 4th Brigade of Guards. Just to the north of Landrecies is the forest of Mormal. The forest is shaped like a triangle. Landrecies stands at the apex pointing south. Round the skirts of the forest both to the east and to the west are roads meeting at Landrecies. Along these roads the Germans were obliged to advance, although to obtain cover from the British guns enfilading these roads large bodies of them came through the forest.

The British right, the corps of General Sir Douglas Haig, held Marailles, and commanded the road to the west of the forest.

Towards the British centre a second slightly advanced position like that of Landrecies was held to the south of Solesmes by the 4th Division, commanded by General Snow.

The British left, formed of the corps of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was "refused" or drawn back, because in this quarter an attempted turning movement on the part of the enemy was looked for. In the position taken up, the front here was covered by a small river continued by a canal.

On the British left also, to the south of Cambrai, were posted the cavalry under General Allenby.

These dispositions commanded the roads and approaches along which the enemy must advance in order to obtain touch with the main body, and they were calculated both to break up the unity of his onset and to lay him open to effective attack while deploying for battle. They were, in fact, the same tactics which, in resisting the onset of a superior force, Wellington employed at Waterloo by holding in advance of his main line Hugomont and La Haye Sainte for a like purpose.

Sir John French had foreseen that, taught at Mons the cost of a frontal assault against British troops, General von Kluck would now seek to employ his greater numerical strength and weight of guns by throwing that strength as far as he could against the flanks of the British, hoping to crush the British line together and so destroy it.

That, in fact, was what General von Kluck did try to do. In this attack five German army corps were engaged. The German General concentrated the main weight of his artillery, comprising some 112 batteries of field guns and howitzers, against the British left. The terrific bombardment was followed up by infantry attacks, in which mass formations were once more resorted to. Evidently it was thought that against such a strength in guns the British could not possibly hold their lines, and that the infantry, completely demoralised, must be so shaken as to fire wildly, rendering an onslaught by superior forces of the German infantry an assured and sweeping victory.

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