Read Ebook: The Railroad Question A historical and practical treatise on railroads and remedies for their abuses by Larrabee William

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eretofore had, had a very limited territory for the sale of his products well realized that he could with the aid of a railroad enlarge his territory and increase his output, and with it his profits. The pioneer merchant found that he could no longer compete with former rivals in adjoining towns, since the iron horse had reached them and lowered their freights, and he also became a convert to the new order of things and clamored loud for railroad facilities. Railroads seemed the panacea for industrial and commercial ills, and every inducement was held out and every sacrifice made by communities to become participants of their blessings. So great was the estimate of the conveniences afforded by them and so strongly was public opinion prejudiced in their favor that it is no exaggeration to say that railroad companies as a rule were permitted to prepare their own charters, and that these charters almost invariably received legislative sanction.

To such an extent was the public mind prepossessed in favor of railroads that any legislator who would have been instrumental in delaying the granting of a railroad charter for the purpose of perfecting it, to protect the people against possible abuses, would have been denounced as a short-sighted stickler and obstructor of public improvements. Anxious for railroad facilities, the people were deaf to the warnings of history. Their liberality knew no bounds. National, State and county aid was freely extended to new railroad enterprises. Communities taxed themselves heavily for their benefit, and municipalities and individuals vied with each other in donating money, rights of way and station buildings. This was especially true of the West, whose undeveloped resources had most to gain by railroad extension. So large were the public and private donations in several of the Western States that their value was equal to one-fifth of the total cost of all the roads constructed. To still more encourage promoters of railroad enterprises, general incorporation laws were passed which permitted companies to be formed and roads to be built practically without State supervision. In their admiration for the bright side of the picture, the people entirely overlooked the shady side.

Besides this, there was virtually an absence of all law regulating the operation of railroads. It was, under these circumstances, not strange that abuses early crept into railroad management which, long tolerated by the people and unchecked and even encouraged by public officers, finally assumed such proportions as to threaten the very foundation of free government. Great discoveries that add rapidly to the wealth of a country tend to overthrow a settled condition of things, and organized capital and power, if not restrained by wholesome laws and public watchfulness, will ever take advantage of the unorganized masses. The people of those regions which the railroad stimulus had caused to be settled thrived for years so well upon a virgin soil that they gladly divided their surplus with the railroad companies. They looked upon the railroads as the source of their prosperity and upon railroad managers as high-minded philanthropists and public benefactors, with whom to quarrel would be an act of sordid ingratitude, and they paid but little attention to the means employed by them to exact an undue share of their earnings. Railroad men did whatever they could to foster through their emissaries this misplaced adoration. They posed before the public as the rightful heirs of the laurels of Watt and Stephenson, insisting that their genius, capital and enterprise had built up vast cities and opened for settlement and civilization the boundless prairies of the West. These claims have been persistently repeated by railroad men, though they are so preposterous that they scarcely deserve refutation. The railroad, gradually developed by active minds of the past, and greatly improved by the inventions of hundreds of men in the humbler walks of life, is the common inheritance of all mankind, though no class of people have derived greater benefits from it than railroad constructors, managers and manipulators. Railroad managers are no more entitled to the special gratitude of the public for dispensing railroad transportation at much more than remunerative rates than is the Western Union monopoly for maintaining among us an expensive and inefficient telegraph service. No one believes that the disbanding of the Western Union would leave us long without telegraphic communication. In like manner railroads will be built whenever and wherever they promise to be profitable. If one company does not take advantage of the opportunities offered, another will. That large cities have been built up by the railroads is true, but it is equally true that these cities by their commerce and manufactures administer to the prosperity of the railroads as much as the railroads administer to theirs. Commercial centers in days gone by existed without railroads, but railroads could not long exist without the stimulating influence of these busy marts of trade. The same argument applies with still greater force to the agricultural sections of our country, especially the great Northwest. The dry-goods merchant might as well boast of having clad the public as the railroad manager of having built up farming communities by selling to them transportation.

And yet the American people have never ceased to be mindful of the conveniences afforded to them by this modern mode of transportation. On the contrary, they have been but too prone to credit railroad men with being benefactors, when they were but beneficiaries, and this liberality of spirit made them overlook, or at least tolerate, the abuses which grew proportionately with the wealth and power of the companies.

The first railroad acts of England had contemplated to make the roads highways, like turnpikes and canals. These roads were established by the power of eminent domain. Companies were empowered to build and maintain them and to reimburse themselves by the collection of fixed tolls. Had the owners of the roads from the beginning been deprived of the privilege of becoming carriers over their own lines, the system might have so adjusted itself as to become entirely practicable; but as they were allowed to compete with other carriers in the transportation of passengers and merchandise, they were soon able to demonstrate, at least to the satisfaction of Parliament, that the use of the track by different carriers was impracticable and unsafe. A number of circumstances combined to aid the railroad companies in their efforts to monopolize the trade on their lines. In the first place, when the early railroad charters were granted, but few persons had any conception of the enormous growth of commerce which was destined to follow everywhere the introduction of railways. The tolls as fixed in the charters soon yielded an income out of proportion to the cost of the construction and maintenance of the roads. Their large margins of profit enabled the owners of the roads to transport goods at lower rates than other carriers and to thus compel the latter to abandon their business. Another defect of the original charters worked greatly to the disadvantage of independent carriers. They contained no provision as to the use of terminal facilities. The railroad companies claimed that these facilities were not affected by the public franchise and were therefore their personal property. This placed independent carriers at a great disadvantage and made in itself competition on a large scale impossible. These carriers were thus at the mercy of the railroad companies for the transportation of their cars, and the companies never permitted their business to become lucrative enough to induce many to engage in it. It soon became apparent that under the charters granted to the railroad companies such competition as existed on turnpikes and canals was out of the question on their roads. In England the great abundance of water-ways exercised for many years a wholesome control over the rates of railway companies, until these companies, greatly annoyed by such restraint, absorbed many of the larger canals by purchase and made them tributary to their systems. These companies have also acquired complete control over many important harbors.

In the United States the people depended from the beginning of the railroad era on free competition for the regulation of railroad charges. This desire to maintain free competition led to the adoption of general incorporation acts, it being quite generally believed that such competition as obtains between merchants, manufacturers and mechanics was possible among railroads and would, when allowed to be operative, regulate prices and prevent abuses. The remedy was applied freely throughout the country, but for once it did not prove successful. Stephenson's saying, that where combination was possible competition was impossible, was here fully verified. The great ingenuity of the class of men usually engaged in railroad enterprises succeeded in thwarting this policy of commercial freedom. The opportunities for those in control of railroads to operate them in their own interest, regardless of the interests of their patrons or stockholders, were so great that men of a speculative turn of mind were attracted to this business, which indeed soon proved a most productive field for them. One road after another fell into the control of men who had learned rapidly the methods employed to make large fortunes in a short time.

As the roads multiplied, transportation abuses increased. A considerable number of people early favored State control of railroads as the best means of regulating transportation, but a majority looked upon the existing abuses as being merely incidental to the formative period, and hoped that with a greater expansion of the railroad system they would correct themselves. And this doctrine was industriously disseminated by railroad managers and their allies. They lost no opportunity to impress upon the people that State regulation was an undue interference with private business and that such a policy would soon react against those who hoped to profit by it, inasmuch as it would prevent the building of new roads and would thus hinder, rather than aid, in bringing about the right solution of the railway question, viz., regulation by competition. They contended, in short, that State regulation would be destructive to railroads as well as to every other class of property.

Railroad sophistry for many years succeeded in preventing the masses from realizing that an increased supply of transportation does not necessarily lower its price, or, in other words, that railroad abuses do not necessarily correct themselves through the influence of competition. A large capital is required to build and maintain a railroad, which must necessarily be managed by a few persons. Besides this, the construction of a railroad practically banishes at once from its field all other means of land transportation. The railroad has thus a practical monopoly within its territory, and its managers, if left to follow their instinct, will despotically control all the business tributary to it, with unlimited power to build up and tear down, to punish its enemies and to reward its friends.

It is not true that State control checks railroad building. While it may prevent the construction of useless lines and discourage speculation, it will encourage the building of roads for which there is a legitimate demand. Stockholders as a whole do not participate in the management of the roads and do not profit by railroad abuses, the origin of which may almost invariably be traced to selfish designs on the part of a few entrusted with the management of the property. Where through wise legislation these abuses are prevented, the roads are managed in the interest of all the stockholders, develop business and enjoy lasting prosperity.

It may be laid down as a general rule that the policy which best subserves the interests of the patrons of a road is always the best policy for its owners. Injustice to a railroad will interfere with its usefulness; injustice to shippers depresses production and consumption; and in either case both the road and its patrons will suffer. State control is therefore as much needed in the interest of the owners of railroads as in the interest of their patrons. What should be the nature of such control will be discussed hereafter. A full understanding of the question at issue, however, makes necessary an inquiry into the various abuses which unrestrained railroad management of the past has developed. Perhaps no better presentation of the evils and abuses of railroads and their consequences can be found than that contained in the report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, submitted by Senator Cullom, in 1886. This report charges:

Under the operation of the Interstate Commerce Law some of these evils have, so far at least as interstate commerce is concerned, disappeared, and others have been considerably mitigated. It cannot be expected, however, that a bad system of railroad management, to the development of which the ingenuity of railroad managers has contributed for two generations, could be entirely reformed in a few years. It is a comparatively easy task for shrewd and unscrupulous men, assisted by able counsel and unlimited wealth, to evade the spirit of the law and to obey its letter, or to violate even both its letter and spirit, and escape punishment by making it impossible for the State to obtain proof of their guilt.

It is a humiliating spectacle to see the self-debased railroad officials confessing their own guilt by refusing to testify before the Interstate Commerce Commission on the ground that they would thereby criminate themselves. Congress should have sufficient respect for this commission and for itself to provide a way to punish such recusant witnesses who are willing to degrade themselves in so base a manner. Whether the law will eventually be respected by all depends upon the vigilance and courage of the people.

That our railroad legislation is not yet perfect even its friends will admit; and as under a free government the demand of an enlightened public opinion is the first step toward the enactment of a law, it behooves the intelligent citizen to study the various railroad problems and to then exert his influence toward bringing about such a solution of them as justice and wisdom demand.

In discussing the various evils of railroad management, the author will commence with and dwell more particularly upon those abuses which maybe said to be the cardinal ones, viz., discrimination, extortion, combinations and stock and bond inflation. When these are once effectually eradicated, other abuses of railroad management which have been the subject of public complaint will not long survive them.

One of the strongest arguments that could be adduced by the founders of the American Constitution in favor of the establishment of a more perfect union was that the inequality of taxes placed upon commerce by the various States was a serious obstacle to its free development. Much as the individual States dislike to give up a part of their sovereignty to a central or national power, the demand for a common and uniform system of commercial taxation was so great that they were forced to yield and ratify the new Constitution. Our forefathers thus considered it a dangerous policy to permit a single State to lay any imposts upon the commercial commodities which passed over its borders. They were rightly of the opinion that industrial and commercial liberty was as essential to the welfare of the nation as political freedom and that therefore interstate commerce should not be hemmed in or controlled within State lines, but that the power to regulate it should be lodged in the supreme legislative authority of the nation, the Congress of the United States. For over half a century Congress alone exercised the power thus conferred upon it by the people. After the introduction of railroads, however, their managers gradually assumed the right to regulate the commerce of the country in their own interest through the adoption of arbitrary freight tariffs. Freight charges are practically a tax which follows the commodity from the producer to the consumer. An arbitrary and unjust charge is therefore an arbitrary and unjust tax imposed upon the public without its consent. It is a well-established rule of society that laws should be equitable and just to all citizens. Congress never assumed the role of Providence by attempting to equalize those differences among individuals which superior intellect, greater industry and a thousand other uncontrollable forces have ever created and will ever create. It has been reserved to railroad managers to demonstrate to the public that a power has been allowed to grow up which has assumed the right to counteract the dispensations of Providence, to enrich the slothful, to impoverish the industrious, to curtail the profits of remunerative industries and revive by bounties those languishing for want of vitality, to humble proud and self-reliant marts of trade and to build up cities in the desert. It will scarcely be claimed even by railroad managers that their policy of thus arbitrarily regulating commerce originated in philanthropic motives. They are forced to admit that it grew out of an attempt to increase the income of railroads by the extension of favors to naturally weak enterprises and to recoup by overtaxing stronger ones.

The practical operation of this system soon showed to railroad managers their power and to the patrons of railroads their dependence upon those who dispensed railroad favors. The former soon discovered that their power might be used to further their private interests as well as those of the roads, and unscrupulous patrons were not slow to offer considerations for favors which they coveted. When such favors were once granted by the officials of one road, rival roads would grant similar ones in self-protection. Thus this vicious system grew until the payment of a regular tariff rate was rather the exception than the rule, and special rates became an indispensable condition of success in business.

We may distinguish three classes of railroad discriminations, viz.:

Discrimination between individuals is the most objectionable, because it is the most demoralizing of all. Where such discrimination obtains, every shipper is in the power of the railroad corporation. It makes of independent citizens of a free country fawning parasites and obsequious sycophants who accept favors from railroad managers and in return do their bidding, however humiliating this may be. The shipper, realizing that the manager's displeasure or good will toward him finds practical expression in his daily freight bills, finally loses, like the serf, all self-esteem in his efforts to propitiate an overbearing master. He is intimidated to such an extent that he never speaks openly of existing abuses, lest he lose the special rates which have been given him, or, if he is not a participant of such privileges, lest additional favors be given to his rivals and they be thus enabled to crush him. Intimidation of shippers prevailed to such an extent previous to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Law that when, in 1879, the special committee on railroads appointed by the legislature of New York invited all persons having grievances against railroads to come before them to testify, not one shipper testified voluntarily. On the contrary, they all insisted upon being subpoenaed, hoping that the railroad managers would not hold them responsible for any statement which they might be compelled to make under such circumstances. The report of that committee stated that the number of special contracts in force within the period of one year on the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad alone was estimated by the railroad people at 6,000. Mr. Depew, when he made the statement: "In territories comparatively new, and with little responsibility on the part of the managers to distant owners, they became in many cases very arbitrary and exercised favoritism and discriminations, which led to popular indignation and legislation," had probably not heard of this. The committee's report further stated that these special rates conformed to no system and varied without rule, that every application for a special rate was judged by itself and with reference to its own peculiar circumstances, and that it depended upon the judgment, or rather caprice, of the officer to whom the application was made, whether and to what extent a special rate should be granted. The reductions made to privileged merchants often amounted to more than what would be a fair profit to the dealer on the commodities shipped. The privileged dealer was thus enabled to undersell his rivals and eventually force them out of business or into bankruptcy. It was not at all uncommon for railroad companies to allow discounts amounting to 50, 60, 70 and even 80 per cent. of the regular rates. The New York Central gave a Utica dry-goods merchant a special rate of 9 cents while the regular rate was 33 cents on first-class freights. The lowest special rate granted at Syracuse was as low as 20 per cent. of the regular tariff rate on first-class goods. David Dows & Company and Jesse Hoyt & Company, by means of a grain rate from 2-1/2 to 5 cents lower than those given to other firms, were enabled to control in the winter of 1877 the grain trade of New York. The railroad even extended its fostering aid to A. T. Stewart & Co., giving them a special rate "to build up and develop their business." The testimony given by Mr. Goodman, assistant general freight agent of the New York Central, in reference to the principle by which he was guided in granting special rates, is of sufficient interest to be given a place here:

Question. You made the rate for A. T. Stewart & Company? Answer. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that to build up and develop their business? A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was the object? A. That was one of the objects.

Q. January 11th, 1879? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You thought that business was not yet sufficiently built up and developed? A. No, sir; not the manufacturing part of it.

Q. How long had the factories of A. T. Stewart & Company been in existence? A. The one at Duchess Junction about three years, I think; it isn't completed yet.

Q. And they were languishing and suffering? A. To a great extent; yes, sir.

Q. And you acted as a fostering mother to A. T. Stewart & Company to build it up? A. Yes, sir; I added my mite to develop their traffic; we wanted to carry the freight; boats might have carried it in the summer.

Q. Do you know anything of G. C. Buell & Company? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You wanted to develop their business? A. Yes, sir; they are at Rochester--wholesale dealers.

Q. Do you know H. S. Ballou, of Rochester? A. I do not.

Q. He seems to be a grocer there? A. A small concern, perhaps.

Q. Small concerns are not worth developing, according to your opinion? A. Our tariff rates are low enough for them at Rochester.

Q. That is to say, a small concern ought to pay 40, 30, 25 and 20, as against a large concern, 13; that is your rule? A. Well, if he is a grocer, most of his business is fourth-class freight.

Q. And he ought to pay 20, as against 13? A. Yes, sir.

Q. That small man has no right to develop? A. He has the same chance that the other man has.

Q. At 20 against 13? A. Oh, yes.

Q. Do you call that the same chance? A. About the same chance, yes, sir.

Q. You consider it the same chance? A. Yes, sir.

Many reasons were assigned by railroad men in justification of their practices. It was claimed that special rates were given to regular shippers, but it has been proved that not all regular shippers had special rates, and that persons who made only single shipments were often fortunate enough to obtain special favors. It was further claimed that special rates were given to those who, starting out new in business or developing new enterprises, needed aid and encouragement. But it was shown on the other hand that the aid and encouragement thus given to some bankrupted others, and in the end deprived the companies of more business than their policy of discrimination brought them. Railroad managers also argued that they could afford to make lower rates on large shipments than on small ones for the same reasons that the wholesale merchant can sell his goods for less than the retailer. But while this may be a good reason why rates on car-load shipments should be lower than rates on shipments in less than car-load lots, it is certainly no good reason why five car-loads belonging to one shipper should be transported the same distance for less than five carloads belonging to five shippers. In the case of local shipments the car is scarcely ever loaded to its full capacity; one shipment after another is taken from it as the train moves along, and the car perhaps reaches its final destination nearly, if not entirely, empty. The terminal charges are here also largely increased, and it is but just that the shipper should pay the additional cost of carrying and handling the goods. The case is entirely different when the railroad company carries five full carloads from one station of its line to another. Whether they have been loaded by one or five persons, whether they are consigned to one or five persons, matters little to the railroad company. It merely transports the cars, and in either case its responsibility and its services are the same. The car-load must therefore be accepted and is now generally accepted by the best railroad men as the unit of wholesale shipments, and any discrimination made in favor of large wholesale shippers is arbitrary and unjust. In the shipment of some commodities, such as wheat, flour and coal, a small advantage in rates is sufficient to enable the favored shipper to "freeze out" all competitors. It is certainly not to the interest of any railroad company to pursue such a policy; for by driving small establishments out of the business it encourages monopoly, which almost invariably enhances prices and decreases consumption. The railroad thus suffers in common with the public the consequences of its short-sighted policy. That even railroad managers realize that these practices cannot be defended upon any principle of justice or equity is apparent from the fact that one of the never-varying conditions of special rates is that they be kept secret. A specimen of a special rate agreement which was placed before the New York investigating committee is here presented to the reader:

"This agreement, made and entered into this eighteenth day of March, 1878, by and between the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, party of the first part, and Schoellkopf & Mathews, of the city of Buffalo, N.Y., party of the second part:

"Witnesseth, That said party of the first part hath promised and agreed, and by these presents does promise and agree to transport wheat from the elevator in Buffalo, reached directly by said first party's tracks, except at such mills as time said tracks may be obstructed by snow or ice, to the which said second party may erect or operate at Niagara Falls, N. Y., at and for the rate of one and a quarter cents per bushel.

"And further, that said first party shall and will at all times give, grant and allow to said second parties as low rate of transportation on all property shipped by them from their said mills at Niagara Falls, and as favorable facilities and accommodation in all respects as are afforded by the party of the first part to the millers of Buffalo and Black Rock. And also that the said party of the first part will transport for said second party all of their east-bound New York freight at and for the price or rate of forty-seven per cent. of the current all-rail through rates, via the route of party of the first part, from Chicago to New York, at the times of shipment, adding thereto three cents per barrel for flour and one and one-half cents per hundred pounds for mill feed or grain, as a terminal charge, to provide for the incidental expenses attending local transportation.

"And will transport their freight to Boston and all points in New England, taking Boston rates at the same rate as to New York, with ten cents per barrel added for flour and five cents per hundred pounds added for mill feed or grain.

"Provided, however, and this agreement is made upon the express understanding and consideration, that said second party shall regard and treat this agreement as confidential, and will use all reasonable precaution to keep the same secret.

"And upon condition also that said second party shall ship by the first party's road all the product from their mill at Niagara Falls destined to all points in New York, Pennsylvania and New England, reached by said first party, directly or by connections with other routes.

"And this agreement shall be and remain in force for the term of five years from and following the first day of September, 1878, after which period it may be terminated by sixty days' written notice from either party.

"In witness whereof, the parties hereto have signed these presents the day and year first above written.

It will be noticed that this agreement was based upon the expressed condition that Schoellkopf & Mathews treat it as "confidential," and use all reasonable precaution to keep it secret. It is difficult to account for this strong injunction of secrecy except upon the assumption that the managers of the road, conscious of the great wrong which they inflicted upon the body of the people by their discriminations, hoped to escape public criticism by adopting a policy of secret dealing. Much as special rates were sought after, but few shippers to whom they had been granted were contented with their lot, for none was confident that his rivals did not have better rates than himself.

Discriminations between localities had their origin in the natural desire of competing roads to increase their business at the expense of their rivals. When two or more railroads touched the same point each would attempt to secure the largest possible share of the through business by holding out every possible inducement in rates to the shippers of that place. Indeed, the freight rates at competitive points were often so low that railroad managers found themselves placed in a rather unpleasant dilemma. They either had to admit that the rates charged by them at non-competitive places were exorbitant or that they were carrying the freights of competitive points at a loss and were thus squandering the money of their stockholders. They preferred as a rule to admit that they were doing competitive business at a loss, but asserted that, inasmuch as they were compelled to run their trains, they could better afford to do competitive business temporarily at a loss than not to do it at all. The same logic might with equal propriety be employed by the grocer. To draw to him distant customers, he might offer to sell to them at cost or even at a loss; and then, to recuperate, he might advance the prices of his goods for his regular customers. If there is any difference between the grocer and the railroad company, it lies in the fact that the former's old customers would soon find relief at a rival store, while the patrons of the railroad at non-competitive points are like the traveler in the hands of a highwayman, without immediate redress. The railway company which discriminates between competitive and non-competitive points forgets that its line is a common highway for all points tributary to it; that all have equal rights, and that the only differences in tariff which the principles of the common law permit are those which arise from a difference of service and cost. All other differences that railroad companies may make are unjust discriminations in violation of their charter and expose them to a forfeiture of the franchises conferred upon them.

The nature and extent of the discrimination practiced between different places are often such that no interest of the company can possibly be subserved by them, and the conclusion is forced upon us that the advantages granted by railroad managers to certain places are designed to serve chiefly personal and selfish interests. The great fortunes amassed in a brief period of time by railroad managers can in almost every case be traced to stock, real estate, commercial and other speculations directly or indirectly connected with railroad construction or management. And where other than personal interest cannot be shown, this is the only basis upon which the many apparent absurdities of railroad discrimination can be harmonized.

It is claimed by railroad men that transportation by water is a regulator of railway rates which they must respect. It is contended, for instance, that, although the cities situated on our large lakes enjoy superior commercial advantages which are mainly due to their having at their disposal water communication with the Atlantic Ocean, inland towns have no cause to complain against the railroads for not equalizing those differences which nature has largely created. It might be more difficult to meet this argument if, owing to peculiar combinations, these water rates were not made to extend their influence to almost every inland city north, east and south in the Union, and if those cities were not given much lower rates than hundreds of places much nearer the lakes. The teamster who, half a century ago, found it impossible to compete with the canal, river or lake boats, simply surrendered the field to them and confined his operations to such a territory as could give him assurance of a profitable business. Let the railroads do likewise. No company has a right to destroy a rival route, water or rail, by adopting special tariffs for competing points. There are at points accessible to water transportation certain freights requiring speedy carriage which will go to the railroads at profitable rates, but the heavier freights, as coal, lumber and even certain kinds of grain, should go to the carrier by water if he can afford to transport them at lower cost.

There have been but few legislative investigations of railroad abuses in this country, but the disclosures which they have made to the public are astounding. The most noteworthy of these were made by the Hepburn committee, of New York, to which reference has already been made. It is difficult to understand how a free and enlightened community could so long and so patiently bear railroad despotism. Individual discrimination might, under the veil of secrecy, long escape notice, but that a system of open and widespread discrimination affecting every non-competitive and even many a competitive point in the State, doing visible and irreparable injury to thousands of shippers, and infringing upon the rights of millions, should long be borne by a free and enlightened people, is a strange phenomenon of democratic endurance.

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