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Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case prior to the outbreak of hostilities, in the following terms:--

Farther on in the German Official White Book it is stated that the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone:--

Here, then, we have the plain admission:--

That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and France.

That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the calculated extent of starting a great European war.

That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany "could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to Italy in this Official document.

FOOTNOTES:

The German White Book . Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5.

Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons. Jules Cambon says:--

"Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"

ITALY'S POSITION.

FOOTNOTES:

See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.

Cd. 7860.

GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.

The British representatives were away from both Berlin and Belgrade.

M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other Ministers were away electioneering.

The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs."

The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La France."

The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get things done in time.

The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular time:--

Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be humiliated, whilst Austria--Germany's ally--would be strengthened by the conquest of Serbia; and

Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.

On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth as follows:--

FOOTNOTES:

Cd. 7717, No. 18.

See Appendix "B."

PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.

The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion--that both countries were determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict, they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with which they were blocked in Berlin:--

On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian Charg? d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note." How Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made plain in the despatch from the Russian Charg? d'Affaires at Berlin on the same day:--

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold" "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Serbia."

When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The Austrian Ambassador explained that:--

"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."

As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charg? d'Affaires at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--

"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State."

The following day , Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Charg? d'Affaires in Berlin:--

"The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed."

But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be seen in the Despatch from the British Charg? d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--

"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.

"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this."

On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence being effective was:--

"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening."

Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the following effect:--

"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference."

" Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable."

Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:--

"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of discussion."

How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--

Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, 1914:--

"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."

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