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that constant attention which it is necessary to pay to men's tempers, and to those pretensions and rights upon which such an order of things is grounded, must produce a much more frequent departure from the exact letter of those unbending rules. It is this fact which renders the task of government so much more difficult in those states than in any others. Any man can, if he has memory to recollect the principles of rule, be a despot, or a despot's deputy; but far different qualities are required where the minds of those under authority are of a freer and bolder stamp: over such a society those alone are fit to rule, who, fully informed of all its component parts, can judge the periods when the temporary departure from an established principle will effect more in the cause of authority than its rigid observance; when lenity is more powerful than severity, and mildness and moderation tend more to restore order and to maintain tranquillity, than all the force of a violent government.

It is a remarkable fact, that the officers who had signed the charges against Colonel Munro, were, on reflection, and from learning the sentiments of the Judge-Advocate-General, so convinced that the charges they had made were either groundless or illegal, that they wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to suspend the prosecution of them. This certainly proves that there could have been no doubt of the result of a court martial, grounded on the state of general feelings, as far as that regarded the charges against Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; for if the accusers themselves had shown they distrusted the cause they had so rashly adopted, there could, assuredly, be no apprehension of the judgment of thirteen officers of rank giving a biassed or unjust sentence. The Government of Madras, in their dispatch to the Court of Directors upon this subject, draw a directly opposite conclusion from this fact, which, they say, "proves in itself the inexpediency of their having had recourse to such a proceeding;" but they state no grounds for this conclusion. In the whole course of this affair they appear to have been much, if not solely, guided by the opinion of their law officers: and no man can peruse the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith upon this subject, without a just respect for the talents and extensive legal knowledge of that public officer. But those that think great, numerous, and obvious evils resulted from the decision of Government on the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, will not immediately perceive the necessity of its having been governed by rules of law in its decision on a question which clearly involved the most serious considerations of state policy. They will think, and with justice, this was a question not for lawyers, but statesmen; who, in the exercise of their legitimate discretion, are in the situation in which Mr. Burke has so well described legislators; and therefore, like them, "ought to do what lawyers cannot, for they have no rules to bind them but the great principles of reason and equity and the general sense of mankind; these they are bound to obey and follow: and rather to enlarge and enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason, than to fetter and bind their high capacity by the narrow constructions of subordinate artificial justice."

Several months previous to General McDowall's departure for England, that officer had been called upon by the Governor to repress a Memorial to the Governor General, on the subject of late reductions, which was stated to be in agitation at the principal stations of the army. General McDowall had written circular letters to forbid such proceedings; and nothing further appeared upon this subject till that officer, on the 23d of January 1809, forwarded and strongly recommended to notice a Memorial to the Honourable the Court of Directors signed by a number of the officers of the army, and containing, in moderate and not disrespectful language, a statement of what they deemed their grievances, which chiefly referred to the equalization of their allowances with the Bengal establishment, the hardship of the several reductions of emolument which they had lately sustained, and the partiality in appointment to commands which they conceived was still shown to his Majesty's officers. General McDowall forwarded, at the same time, another Memorial, which was also addressed to the Court of Directors, and signed by a number of officers commanding native corps, regarding the injury they conceived they had sustained by the abolition of the tent contract. The principle of both these Memorials was strongly condemned by the Government. The former, they informed the Commander-in-Chief, would be sent to the Governor General in Council; and the latter was returned, as relating to a subject which had already been decided.

The next event of consequence, was the publication of a general order, under date the 28th January, by the Commander-in-Chief, censuring Lieutenant-Colonel Munro for his appeal to the civil Government against his decision; an act which General McDowall deemed destructive of subordination, subversive of discipline, and a violation of the sacred rights of the Commander-in-Chief. There can, I should conceive, be little doubt regarding the character of this order. It is certainly indefensible. It in substance arraigned the exercise of an act of authority, the legality of which General McDowall had recognised by his obedience a few days before, and in this view was highly disrespectful to Government, who were justly incensed at the proceedings; and who, in an order under date the 31st of January, removed General McDowall from the command of the army, which it appeared he had not then resigned, though on his way to Ceylon for the purpose of proceeding to England. The links that bound the cause of General McDowall to that of the officers of the Company's army on the coast, were neither strong nor durable: a common feeling of discontent against Government had united them for a moment, but there was no cohesion either from similar objects or interests; and the Government order, as far as related to General McDowall, could have given rise to no serious consequences: but the suspension from the service, in the same order, of Major Boles, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, on the ground of his having given currency to the obnoxious order of the Commander-in-Chief, had an immediate and electric effect over the whole army. There was hardly an officer in either the King's or Company's service that did not doubt the justice of this measure, or that did not feel that it inflicted a vital wound on the first principles of military discipline; and the universal clamour and indignation that it excited, was no doubt the proximate and direct cause of the rebellion that ensued.

The merits of this unhappy act of power have been fully investigated in England; and the general opinion seems decidedly against the Government of Fort St. George. The wisdom and expediency of the act is defended by none; and some of the first law authorities in England doubt its justice. The subject has been completely exhausted; and I shall say no more upon it, than that there, perhaps, never was so complete a want of knowledge displayed of the character of military feeling, as in the attempt made to prevail upon Major Boles to degrade himself in his own profession, by making an apology for having performed what he deemed his duty, and what he could not have expressed regret for having done, without an admission of guilt. The urgency with which this apology was sought, is of itself a proof that the Government had been precipitate. How much more manly, wise, and dignified, would it have been to have rescinded the resolution which had been taken, on the plain ground of a conviction that Major Boles had erred from want of knowledge, and without intention of offence; and such must have been the actual sentiments which were entertained of his conduct, or Government could never have professed itself ready to accept a slight apology. But a little stickling spirit about supposed dignity, more worthy of a wrong-headed individual engaged in an affair of honour, than a great Government, prevented this obvious measure, and produced irremediable mischief to the state.

On the 1st of February, the day subsequent to that on which Major Boles was suspended, an order was issued, suspending the Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, for the same offence, that of being concerned in circulating the offensive order of the Commander-in-Chief. The only difference in the facts of this case from that of Major Boles, , was, that Colonel Capper, the moment he heard of Major Boles's suspension, made a declaration, that the circumstance of his being with General McDowall was the sole cause that had led to Major Boles's name being affixed to orders which it was his duty to sign; and that he considered all responsibility connected with the office of Adjutant-General rested solely with him, as principal. The generous object of this gallant and meritorious officer , was to exculpate his deputy. He did not, however, succeed in that object; and his free avowal of the principal share he had in the circulation of the order was instantly taken as the ground for inflicting a similar punishment on him.

From the hour that these measures were adopted, the state of the army underwent a complete revolution. The most discontented had, till this period, been cautious in their measures, and aimed at no more than obtaining some attention to what they deemed their grievances. There is no doubt, that before these orders were issued a very general spirit of dissatisfaction prevailed; but there was no danger of that taking any mutinous or rebellious shape. Many, and among these some of the most respectable officers in the army, had up to this date taken no concern in those proceedings that had offended Government: but the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles effected a complete and dangerous change in the general temper. All seemed to be actuated by the same resentment at measures which they deemed arbitrary and unjust; and many officers of the highest rank and first respectability, both in his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service, joined in reprobating the principle upon which it was adopted. The subsequent efforts made to prevail upon Major Boles to sign an apology, and the letter circulated by the commanding officer of the forces, General Gowdie, which condemned that officer for not having acceded to this proposition, had the double effect of increasing the indignation at Government and the popularity of Major Boles, who was, after this act, deemed an honourable martyr in a cause which it was the duty of every military officer to support. Before the more moderate, and with them all those officers of his Majesty's service who had given way to their first feelings, had recovered from their error, numbers of the more violent in the Company's service were irretrievably pledged to violent and guilty proceedings, into which there is no doubt they were deluded by the force of example, and the assurance that the cause in which they were engaged was general. The first of their acts which attracted the notice of Government, was the agitation and preparation of an address to the Governor General, remonstrating against the acts of the Government of Fort St. George, and soliciting the removal of Sir George Barlow; and an address, or letter, to Major Boles, conveying to that officer a contribution for his support during what the addressers deemed his unjust suspension. The Government, in an order dated the 1st of May, 1809, suspended Captain J. Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, on the ground of their being principally concerned in preparing the Memorial addressed to the Governor General; and the same punishment was inflicted upon Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Arthur St. Leger, on the ground of his having promoted the circulation of the Memorial in the corps under his command. Major J. de Morgan was suspended for nearly similar reasons. Captain James Grant, commanding the body-guard of the Governor, had signed the address to Major Boles; and, from a feeling congenial with his candid and gallant character, he deemed concealment of this act dishonourable, nor could he reconcile to his mind the propriety of continuing to hold his appointment with the line he had pursued. He wrote, therefore, a private letter to Major Barclay, stating the reasons that had led him to resign the command of the body-guard, and desiring that Sir George Barlow might be informed of his motives; and he enclosed a copy of the letter to Major Boles. He was suspended on the ground of having signed the address to Major Boles; which document, it was stated in the order, he had forced on the attention of the Governor in Council. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bell, the commanding officer of the artillery, was removed from all military charge and command, on the ground of his having promoted the circulation of a paper similar in substance among the officers under his command. Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers was removed from his immediate command, on the charge of not having reported to Government, or exerted himself to repress, the exceptionable proceedings of the officers under his orders: and Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage was removed, on the same ground, from the staff situation of Adjutant-General, to which he had been appointed: while Captain Coombes was deprived of his staff office of Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Mysore, on the general grounds of being concerned in these reprehensible proceedings. This order concluded by a panegyric upon the discipline and fidelity which the troops in his Majesty's service had invariably shown, and by a compliment to all those of the Company's service who had not taken a share in these reprehensible proceedings, but particularly the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the conduct of which was stated to have been most satisfactory and exemplary.

Though the right of suspending officers from the service till the pleasure of the Court of Directors was known, is one that has been very properly vested in the local Governments of India, they possess no power which should be exercised with such extreme caution. It never can be wisely exercised in any cases but those of most clearly established guilt, where trial would either endanger the authority of Government, or expose its dignity to the highest insult and degradation; which is indeed one, and perhaps the most effectual, mode of endangering its existence. Every officer is conscious, when he enters the public service, that he subjects himself to military law, but not to arbitrary power. There are, however, , extreme cases, which create exceptions that interfere with his right to this jurisdiction: but when the ruling power is compelled to act contrary to usage, it is bound, in all such cases, to establish the necessity of its so acting, by an exposure both of the nature of the crime and of the proof of its having been committed. The King of England may, no doubt, strike any officer's name out of his army without assigning any reason; but his adviser would incur serious responsibility; and an inferior authority exercising this great power should be still more cautious, lest the very purpose for which it was granted be perverted, by the destruction of that general confidence in the justice of their rule, upon which the power of departure from ordinary forms of law is grounded. No sense of expedience, or desire to strike terror, can warrant the slightest deviation from principles so essential to preserve the temper and order of a military body under this alarming though legal departure from its usual rights and privileges.

It was a remarkable fact, relative to the orders issued on that date, that no proof of the guilt of any of the others was brought forward. They were, indeed, almost all suspended, removed, and disgraced, on the grounds of private information; which, supposing it true, could not, from its nature, and the resentment to which it would expose individuals, be publicly stated. The consequence was, that many of the individuals who had been thus condemned and punished without a hearing, loudly declared their innocence, and brought strong presumptive evidence to support their assertion. They were generally believed; and a sense of their particular wrongs, added to the alarm caused by the sweeping use which Government had on this occasion made of its right of suspending officers without trial, greatly aggravated the discontented, who felt an almost maddening motive to action in the immediate contemplation of the ruin and disgrace which threatened some of the most honourable and distinguished of those that had taken any share in their proceedings.

The obvious and acknowledged source of the crimes which Government had at this moment to punish, was its own act--the recent suspension of Lieutenant-Colonel Capper and Major Boles; and it ought to have been evident, that the orders of the 1st of May would aggravate, in the highest degree, the general agitation which that measure had produced; and almost every paragraph of this order would appear as if intended for that object. The thanks given in it to his Majesty's troops were no doubt merited, but invidious; and, being so, could never have been desired by that body; many of whom, though they had been led to renounce every share in the proceedings of the discontented officers in the Company's service, still participated in their feelings: but the useless irritation of this part of the order appears a trifling error when compared to that eulogium which it so unfortunately bestowed on the Hyderabad force, whose officers, however much circumstances might have prevented their coming forward, could not possibly, as a body, have a separate interest from the rest of that army to whom they were on this occasion held forth as a corps on whose fidelity Government had peculiar confidence. The operation of such praise was inevitable: the Company's officers at Hyderabad were not only exposed to the reproach of inaction in what were deemed objects of common interest, but to the accusation of being in part the cause of the ruin of some of the most popular officers of the army: for the discontented argued, that if Government had not thought it could rely on their support, it never would have had recourse to so bold and arbitrary a course of measures. Correct information regarding the temper of this force would have satisfied Government that there was no good ground for this eulogium; and the slightest reflection on the common motives of human action would have prevented its being made. The Company's officers at Hyderabad treated the praise bestowed upon them with scorn, disclaimed all right to it in an address to Government, and, abandoning that moderation which had before characterized their proceedings, they commenced with all the zeal of converts in their new career. In their ardour to make amends for the past, they took the lead in violence. Their numbers and apparent unanimity inspired them with fatal confidence: and this force, who were excited to action by a weak and unwise attempt to divide them from the rest of the army, became the most active promoters of sedition, and gave an example of opposition to Government, in which their repentance came too late to prevent the ruin of many of those who were betrayed, by a reliance on them, into the adoption of the same unjustifiable course.

The general spirit of indignation which the orders of the 1st of May were calculated to excite, must have been foreseen; but it was perhaps expected, that the terror struck by so decided and vigorous a proceeding would repress the effects of this spirit, and alarm even the most violent into order and obedience. If such was the intention, the measure was certainly inadequate to the end proposed. When we bear in mind the inflamed state of the minds of a great majority of the officers of the coast army, was it reasonable to expect, that the suspension from the service, and the removal from their commands, of a few of the most popular officers in the service, would strike a panic in a body of men so agitated? Was it not more likely that they would deem this a repetition of what they had before considered injustice, and rush on the extreme of violence? It could have no other effect; and therefore, if it had been resolved to take no steps to conciliate or restore the temper of the army, this was the period that a severe and wise Government would have chosen to come to issue; and, had the danger been fully met at this moment, those consequences which resulted from the line pursued would, in all human probability, have been avoided: but if the object of the Government of Fort St. George had been the ruin of its own army, no measures could have been more calculated to effect that object than those pursued. The character of its acts till the 1st of May has been fully shown. It would be as tedious as useless to dwell upon the many trifling but irritating measures to which it had recourse from that period till the 26th of July. These measures were, if not oppressive, all marked by a spirit of the most provoking suspicion, and never contained one particle of that generous feeling of noble confidence, which, by exalting the character of authority, attaches those that are wavering, reclaims the insubordinate to their duty, and, by giving a motive in which they have a pride, recalls the most guilty to the path of honour and virtue. A bare catalogue of a few of the expedients to which the Government resorted will be sufficient to show the nature of the whole. Some officers were removed from the command of corps, and sent to distant stations, without any reason being assigned; others were insulted, by being ordered away from the Presidency and other places at a few hours' warning, upon the ground of private information regarding their conversation or actions. Leave to visit the Presidency was refused to all officers. An institution of cadets was dissolved, because they had a quarrel with one of their comrades in consequence of his going to Lady Barlow's ball. A corps was removed to a distant and unpleasant station, because its officers refused to dine with the Governor. But the conduct of the officers of the European regiment at Masulipatam, in consequence of a dispute about a toast at their mess-table, and the measures that precipitated a mutiny in that garrison, forms one of the completest examples of the character of that system of irritation pursued by the Government of Fort St. George, during this short but important and eventful period. In viewing this system, we ought not to take any single case, but look at the whole; and we shall find it, as such, fully adequate to the end which it effected, of making a brave and meritorious though mistaken body of men rush upon their own ruin; and of greatly weakening, if not destroying, by its probable operation on the attachment and allegiance of our native army, the most essential of all those principles, on the preservation of which must depend the future safety and existence of our empire in India.

Though a violent agitation certainly existed at this time throughout almost all ranks of the officers of the Company's army, this agitation had a variety of shades, which it is of importance to consider. Many officers in the Company's service had no share whatever in those proceedings which had met with the disapprobation of Government: but these, though they severely condemned the conduct of the disaffected, and regretted their errors, could not but be alive to the character and reputation of the army to which they belonged; they were, of course, anxious for measures that would retrieve the service from that disgrace and ruin with which it was threatened: and it was the natural wish of this class that Government should endeavour to reclaim the discontented to their duty by some act that mixed as much consideration and indulgence for the errors into which they had fallen, with a vigorous exertion of its authority as it was possible to mix, without a sacrifice of its strength and dignity.

The next, and a very principal if not a numerous class, were officers of some rank and influence, who had gradually, and without reflection, involved themselves in proceedings, the scope and extent of which they had never contemplated till they had gone too far to retract. They had persuaded themselves that Government would yield to the representations of the army; and the hope of success, added to the fear of being accused of defection, had hitherto kept them firm to the general cause: but these men, at the period of which I speak, contemplated their situation with affliction and horror; they saw themselves borne away in a tide that they could not resist: they conceived, from a false but imperious sense of honour, which, from a singular but powerful principle of human nature, was felt to be the more binding because at variance with duty, that they were pledged to support the rest; or, more properly speaking, not to abandon them. They were sensible too late of having lost their authority and control over the younger and more violent part of the service, and regretted their proceedings; but at the same time saw, under the rigid course pursued by Government, no safety but in union. This class of men would have rushed to any door that had been opened to their retreat; they would have made a stand on any ground that the clemency or generosity of Government had afforded them; and would not only have reclaimed themselves, but the rest; for they were, generally speaking, of that rank and character who had the chief influence with the troops; and, if extremes had been resorted to, with them on the side of Government, the others must have submitted, as their efforts at resistance would have been quite hopeless. The last and most numerous, though certainly the least powerful party among the officers of the coast army, were those who, unfortunately for its reputation, had the chief management of all the criminal proceedings. This party, which consisted of a few wrong-headed and violent old officers, and almost all the junior part of the service, completely took the lead in their correspondence and deliberative committees; in both of which a very violent and indecent tone of proceeding was adopted; and the authority of commanding officers of corps was apparently suspended by the principle of equality introduced in their proceedings. But this loss of power was more apparent than real; for, though the commanding officers may have had little more influence in the committee than the youngest officers, their military authority remained, and that must have given them, whenever they had the courage to exert it, a very commanding influence over the whole: and this circumstance establishes what has been before stated, that the most numerous, clamorous, and violent, were in fact the least powerful party in the army, though they have assumed a style in the written documents, as if they were the undisputed and uncontrolled leaders of the whole of the Company's army.

The objects of the different classes of officers were, of course, as various as their feelings. The first could have no wish, but such a settlement as should vindicate the dignity of Government, and, as far as possible, spare the character and reputation of the service. They were too well aware of the nature of those causes that had led the discontented astray, not to hope that every effort might be made to reclaim the misguided; but they were prepared, if such efforts failed, to have acted with a forward and animated zeal in support of lawful authority, and to have contributed their efforts to reduce men who had shown themselves unworthy of kindness and indulgence. The next class that has been described required more aid from the consideration of Government, before they could disentangle themselves from those unfortunate pledges into which they had entered. They felt that, after having proceeded so far, they would have been disgraced if they had, by their retreat, left their associates to be punished. These officers thought they could not abandon the cause before it was at least ascertained none should suffer for what had passed; but they had become fully sensible of the deep guilt in which they were involved: and though many of this class had entered into a pledge to have obtained what was termed a redress of grievances , they were not disposed to persevere to the extent of disobedience in the pursuit of this object: and had Government, in addition to an act of amnesty, held out the slightest prospect that the officers of the army would, by an immediate return to good order and duty, acquire a claim upon the clemency and consideration of the Court of Directors, which might operate favourably to those officers who were suspended, and who were the object of their painful solicitude, this class would have used their utmost efforts to reclaim the more turbulent, and, in the event of those efforts failing, have employed all their influence and authority with the troops, to have prevented any injury to the state, from the violence or insanity of the rest.

It is difficult to say what were the objects of the last class among the officers of the coast army. This, it has been stated, were the most numerous and most violent, but the least powerful; though it was probably judged otherwise by Government, from this party having throughout conducted the proceedings of the committees, and correspondence, and having always exaggerated its means, and assumed, from a desire to intimidate, a tone as if it spoke the sentiments of all the officers of the army.

Such was the diversified temper of the numerous officers of the Company's army on the coast when the test was proposed for universal subscription. In describing that measure, it is perhaps more essential to attend to the mode in which it was carried into execution, than its substance. The Government of Fort St. George had, in consequence of the information which I gave them from Masulipatam, assembled a field force near Madras. The majority of this camp was formed of his Majesty's troops: but the senior officers of the Company's troops, who composed a part of this corps, were men of whose violence, in whatever situation they were placed, Government could entertain no apprehension; and every thing might have been expected, under the slightest management, from their good sense and moderation. Sir George Barlow, it is true, sent for some of these officers, and appeared to treat them with confidence in some discussions he had with them on the state of the army: but one fact will suffice to show the character of this confidence, and the general impressions which his conduct on this occasion was likely to make. Lieutenant-Colonel Rumley received, during this period, an extraordinary communication from Major Russel, of an attempt to excite the native officers of the cavalry against their European commanders. It appears of importance to insert this written report, as drawn up by the Major himself. It is as follows:

Colonel Rumley was naturally indignant at a proceeding which he was convinced could not have his sanction, and which he deemed, at the moment, to be an impolitic and dangerous expedient of a person who, enjoying a large share of his confidence, might have acted on this occasion without his knowledge. With these impressions, he hastened to give full information of the circumstance to Sir George Barlow; but his report was received without either emotion or surprise; and he was forced to conclude, from no notice being taken of it, that the measure of which he complained had been adopted by authority. The circumstance became public after Colonel Rumley returned to camp, and the minds of most of the officers were greatly inflamed at this glaring instance of what they deemed unmanly duplicity.

A short account of the mode in which the test was proposed to the officers at Fort St. George and the camp near the Mount, will convey, better than any general detail, the character of the measure. The following is a copy of that remarkable document:--

"We, the undersigned officers of the Honourable Company's service, do in the most solemn manner declare, upon our word and honour as British officers, that we will obey the orders and support the authority of the Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, agreeable to the tenor of the commission which we hold from that Government."

This test was sent to the commanding officer of the forces assembled at Fort St. George and the Mount, and it was accompanied by a circular letter to the commanding officers of divisions, which was read to the officers of the Company's service before their signature was required.

The substance of this letter was an order to assemble the Company's officers at each station, to propose the test to them, and instantly to remove from their corps all such as declined to sign it. They were directed to be sent to such stations as the commanding officer chose, and that they should there receive their allowances until the situation of affairs and the temper of their minds should admit of their being employed with advantage to the state.

This was, it must be recollected, the first public appeal that had been made to the officers of the Company's service by the Government of Madras since the orders of the 1st of May; and it certainly was not of a character calculated to flatter the feelings of those to whom it was addressed. It spoke to their sense of duty, and pride as officers; but in the same breath told them they were not trusted, and that they were to be coerced into order and submission. The high praises that were given in this letter to the fidelity and loyalty of his Majesty's troops were perfectly just; but quite unnecessary, as far as regarded the allegiance and obedience of that part of the service; and could therefore serve no purpose but to exasperate the feelings of the officers of the Company's army. But the mode in which this measure was carried into execution was the most characteristic of the Government by whom it was adopted, and of itself was sufficient to account for its complete failure, and indeed to make it very doubtful if it ever was wished or intended that it should succeed.

No previous effort whatever was made to dispose the minds of the senior and more reflecting part of the Company's officers in favour of this measure, though such a step seemed essential to its success. A short and peremptory summons was sent to every Company's officer of the garrison of Fort St. George, to attend at the quarters of Colonel Conran, the commanding officer. That officer read the circular letter to which I have alluded to the astonished officers whom he had assembled; and then, presenting the test, informed them they must either sign immediately, or go to Pulicat, the place fixed for their banishment. Can any man the least acquainted with the human mind be surprised, that an almost general and indignant rejection was the result of such a proceeding? Five regimental officers only could be prevailed upon to sign it at this meeting; and the remainder were immediately sent to Pulicat. At the Mount the rejection was still more general. Colonel Hare had the day before removed his tents across the bridge of Marmalon, where all the officers were summoned at an equally short notice. When Colonel Hare read the circular letter, presented the test for signature, and told them that those who refused their signature would not be allowed to return to camp, they refused with one general sentiment of indignation at the manner in which they had been treated, and were immediately separated from their corps.

The test was signed by all the staff-officers at the Presidency, and by some officers who were there on leave: at Trichinopoly twenty-two signed it, but few others at any other station of the army. In short, the whole number of signatures did not amount to one hundred out of about one thousand two hundred, which is near the number of officers on the coast establishment in India.

The almost total failure of this expedient will not surprise any man the least acquainted with human nature, and with the temper of those to whom the measure was proposed. Those officers, who had never departed from their duty in thought, word, or deed, felt this test, which was a mere repetition of the obligation of their commission, as at least an act of supererogation; and it was painful, as it had a taint of suspicion in it. Others, who were in some degree pledged to support their brother officers, conceived that this was an indirect mode of obtaining their individual pledges to act against them; and concluded, from its being proposed, that every hope of an amnesty was at an end; whilst the more violent only saw in it the pursuit of plans which banished every expectation from their minds of obtaining personal security, much less the object they had in view, through any means but successful resistance.

The most moderate among these officers argued, that no opportunity whatever had been given to the Company's army of retrieving itself; and, guilty as it might have been, they said the memory of its former fame merited some consideration; and an appeal to its loyalty and duty, combined with an act of amnesty, would, they thought, if it had been made to the officers of the Company's army with that confidence which inspires attachment, have secured the fidelity of a great part of them: and if it had been possible for Government to have gone further, and to have promised, "that in the event of the conduct of the army meriting such favour, they would recommend the case of the officers who had been suspended to the indulgent consideration of the Court of Directors," they were confident all would have been reclaimed to their duty. But had efforts so worthy, in their opinion, of the clemency and greatness of Government failed in bringing all to reason, they would have acted with the most ardent zeal against men whom they should in such event not only have considered as rebels to their country, but as destroyers of the reputation of the army to which they belonged. There can be no doubt these were the sentiments of many respectable officers of rank and influence: and had Government adopted, on the 26th of July, any such measures of conciliation, it would have been completely successful; and not only the hazard of a contest, but all those disastrous consequences which were certain to be the inevitable consequence of complete success, would have been avoided. And can there be a doubt in the mind of any rational being but it might have taken such a line, at the very moment that which has been described was adopted, without any substantial sacrifice of either its strength or dignity, and certainly with the greatest benefit to the interests of the British nation in India?

The measure that was taken was supposed, by almost all the discontented, to be a completion of that design which the Government of Fort St. George had from the first entertained, of relying solely on the King's troops; and they concluded, from the substance as well as the mode in which the step taken on the 26th of July was carried into execution, that the Company's military establishment on the coast was meant to be destroyed at the first blow; and all were therefore included in one general mass, as fit objects of suspicion and disgrace.

Government had, no doubt, a right to expect success in the execution of this measure; it had a just reliance on the fidelity and attachment of his Majesty's troops. A few regiments, who composed part of the British army, could not have joined in such a confederacy without incurring certain and indelible disgrace: and it had been the policy of the Government of Fort St. George, from the first appearance of dissatisfaction and discontent, to court the allegiance and flatter the feelings of this branch of the service. And though no man can calculate the temper that was lost, or the consequent evils that have been produced by this proceeding, the limited object was undoubtedly attained.

Sir George Barlow appears to have had great confidence in the attachment of the native troops to Government; which, I believe, he always thought was paramount to their attachment to their European officers: and this was consequently calculated upon as one great means of carrying his measures into prompt and successful execution: but certainly the fulfilment of this hope depended upon the course pursued by the European officers who commanded these men. There could be no ground to make such a conclusion upon any general principles applicable to military bodies, and much less so from the constitution, character, or history of the native branch of the military establishment in India. The difficulty that a body of officers have in any service, is to keep soldiers to their duty: there is little in debauching them from it. They are led by example: and to follow that of their officers, is both a principle and a habit. The native troops of India are perhaps more attached to their European officers than any others. These officers are to them the only representatives they know of the Government they serve; they are the sole link in the chain of their attachment; and, with rare exceptions, their men are completely devoted to them. The Governor might, perhaps, expect, that though this feeling would operate in the first instance, it would soon give way to a fear of losing all those solid benefits that the service of the Company offers; and that the sepoys would never continue to attach their fortunes to so desperate a cause as that of the officers must soon appear. This is a natural conduct for a sensible and reflecting man: but do soldiers think, or reflect deeply? Would not the increased pay which their officers would be likely to give, or, what is still more attractive to men like them, a latitude to plunder, have more effect than twenty proclamations to recall them to their duty. Besides, had this dreadful contest continued, the passions would have had their way, and a few months might have changed the character of our native soldiery, and rendered them more formidable than all the enemies we ever had to encounter in India.

It will at least appear, from what has been said on the subject, that Government had no right to look to the fidelity and attachment of the native troops, as a certain means of coercing their European officers to obedience. But the fact was, that the sure ground of success, and that on which the Government had more right to calculate than all others put together, was the action of the virtuous feelings and loyal principles of the Company's officers themselves, and the total want of object, accord and combination, in the execution of the indigested plans of the most violent. It was well known that many of those officers had never brought their minds to contemplate disobedience to the state: and the most guilty even, at first proceeded on the idea that such an extreme would never occur. They certainly had hoped that Government would yield, to avoid it: and when they latterly found that result was not likely, they shuddered at the crisis which they had precipitated. They had no object in view that could justify to their own minds the extremes in which they were involved; they found themselves on the point of being placed in the situation of rebels, with minds altogether unsuited to act that part which can alone give a hope of success to the cause of rebellion. They could not bring their minds to believe they were enemies to a revered King and beloved country; and they consequently wished to reconcile the incompatible principles of opposition to the local Government, with a spirit of fidelity to their employers, and loyalty to their sovereign. There could be no doubt of their sincerity in these feelings: and, from the clashing of such opposite principles of action, Government had a right to expect irresolution, division, and distraction in their councils and measures. It was certain that many would not join in any act of disobedience, and that those who ventured on opposition would proceed with alarm; and every moment of reflection would make them view with increased horror the guilt in which they were involved, and produce a wavering and hesitation that must soon have the effect of losing them the confidence of their followers and of each other.

Under such circumstances, there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government in the measures adopted for subduing the refractory European officers of the army. We shall now examine the dangers by which these measures were likely to be attended. These were numerous, and all of an alarming political magnitude. The greatest, was the shock which was given by this proceeding to that attachment between the European officer and the natives under his command, which, from the first establishment of the Company in India to the present moment, had been looked upon as one of the principal, if not the chief, sources of our strength in India. This body of officers has been hitherto justly considered as the great means by which British India was conquered, and by whose fidelity, knowledge and courage, it was to be maintained. They were comparatively a few persons, through whom a large foreign army was not only disciplined, but attached to the present state. Their station was one of more than ordinary trust, their duties very sacred, and they had for a long period of years been distinguished by the manner in which these had been performed. A part of them had been seduced, and misled into error, and ultimately hurried away, by their passion and resentment against individuals in authority, to the most criminal extremes. They certainly had merited, in the strictness of military law, the most serious punishment; and it was, no doubt, as far as the principles of that law were concerned, most desirable, for the sake of example, that punishment should be inflicted, particularly as those officers had in this instance endeavoured to pervert that complete obedience which their men owed them, into an engine of faction and revolt; and to render the attachment of those under their command, which had been so long considered the safety of their country, its future bane and danger. That any body of officers should have, or conceive they had, the power of furthering their own views or interests by means so desperate, and so entirely subversive of the foundations of all order and government, was, no doubt, an evil of great magnitude: but it should have been recollected, that the connexion between the native soldiers and their European officers is the cherished plant of a hundred years: and before we can account those men wise who laid the axe to its trunk, it must be proved that the existing spirit of insubordination among the European officers was attended with dangers as imminent and as incapable of remedy, as the evil that has been embraced by the deliberate dissolution of this great bond of our strength and safety. Some persons, who refer to a former occasion on which the Indian army are supposed in some degree to have overawed the Government into a redress of their grievances, and viewing only one side of this great question, may argue, that it was rather desirable to adopt a measure that would prevent the European officers from having such reliance on the support of their men, and teach the latter that they have a duty paramount even to their obedience to their officers, in that which they owe the state: but it is a great fallacy to conceive that such a feeling can ever exist as an operative principle in the minds of such a class of men; and if it did, it must weaken a devotion and attachment that are quite essential to the preservation of our power in India.

The next positive evil that was certain to attend this course of measure, was the destruction of that harmony which it had been the labour of years to introduce and maintain between his Majesty's and the Company's service, and which had so greatly contributed to our military successes in India. It could hardly be expected that these would serve together again with those sentiments towards each other which before inspired them: and nothing can be so dangerous to our interests in India, as feelings of irritation and jealousy being kindled betwixt the two services. Those who have cast away this harmony, which has so long been deemed one of the chief sources of our permanent strength, would perhaps see more security to the Government of India in an irreconcileable division between the King's and Company's troops. But there is no danger of an error, in predicting that the date of our rule over India will be short, if our Government in that quarter can only be supported by such weak and wretched expedients as that of keeping up a principle of division among its own officers.

The last positive and immediate evil which could not but attend this measure, was that effect which it was calculated to produce among the natives of all ranks and classes. Our strength in India has hitherto greatly rested upon the supposed impossibility of any civil commotion among ourselves: and the dissolution of this charm will give rise to a thousand doubts regarding the stability of our power; and, in all human probability, excite ambitious projects to assail it. This effect is of a magnitude that in itself required every exertion should be made to avoid an extreme that could not but make so general and dangerous an impression regarding the character of our power in India. It must show our enemies in that quarter that we are not exempt from those internal divisions and civil wars which have accelerated the fate of the other conquerors of the East.

But the fact is, the Government of Fort St. George never appear to have taken any view of this subject, that comprehended those considerations which have been stated. They seem to have decided every question, as it arose, upon its own narrow ground, and to have always been fettered in the forms of their own proceedings. The order for the imposition of the test which was prescribed to the Company's officers, was positive, and vested no discretion. In stations where the superiority of his Majesty's troops was decided, this character of the order could do no mischief: but few of those acquainted with the circumstances can doubt, that to the wisdom and forbearance of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Patrick Stuart, of his Majesty's 19th regiment, who took upon himself to suspend the execution of this positive order, and to give time for the action of reason upon minds under the sole dominion of passion, may be attributed not only the safety of that corps, but the tranquillity of Travancore. A similar conduct was observed by Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, of his Majesty's 80th regiment, who commanded in Malabar; and by Colonel Gibbs, of the 59th regiment, at Bangalore: and the evidence of these respectable officers must be conclusive with regard to the actual temper of the Company's officers under their command, on the day they received the orders of the 26th July, and prove to the most incredulous, how easily men under the influence of such feelings as they describe, might have been reclaimed by means far short of that baneful measure which was adopted.

The force at Hyderabad continued but a short period in a state of resistance; and they committed no act of violence. The impression which Colonel Close's effort had made upon both the minds of European officers and natives, the effect produced by the perusal of an order issued by Lord Minto on the 20th of July, and the knowledge that his lordship was hourly expected at Madras, deprived rebellion of its chief motive--personal hatred to Sir George Barlow. And these circumstances, aided by the unremitted conciliatory efforts of the commanding officer, Colonel Montresor, and the Resident, Captain Sydenham, made a complete change in the sentiments of this corps, who upon the 12th of August signed the test: and as their example encouraged many corps of the army, but particularly those that formed the garrison of Seringapatam, in a rebellious resistance to Government, their defection from the cause put an end to this horrid and unnatural contest: and Lord Minto, who arrived a few days after this event, found a complete and unreserved submission to his authority. Had he arrived a month earlier, he would have saved an army from disgrace and ruin: and as it was, it is not easy to calculate the good which his presence effected: but it is not unreasonable to conclude, that the report even of his approach went farther to terminate the partial rebellion that had occurred, than all the violence of the Madras Government.

The whole of these proceedings ought to be held in constant remembrance by all parties in future times. "As they have existed for our shame, they ought to exist for our instruction."

To the officers of the Indian army they are awfully instructive. They will not consider a few remarks on the nature of that instruction as unbecoming in one who has served with them for near twenty-eight years; who came among them in childhood; whose fortune and character have been acquired with them; whose affection and pride are, and always must be, deeply interested in their reputation.

If they dispassionately consider these events, they will clearly perceive the danger of the first approaches towards a military combination, intended only to solicit a Government, but necessarily tending to influence, to overawe, and to coerce it. The purity of intention affords no security against this progress. Men who deliberate and confederate with arms in their hands soon become impatient of the slow course of redress by regular means. Indignant at refusals, or even delays, which they deem unjust, they become familiar with the dangerous idea of seeking more summary justice. They assemble, their passions are kindled by communication of grievances, they are emboldened by a sense of collective strength, and proceed from solicitations to threats, disguised in the form of predictions apparently flowing from an anxious desire to avert the evils foretold.

Such addresses bring upon them censure and harsh imputation, which they resent the more because they are not yet distinctly conscious of intentions which merit them. Their language becomes still more indecorous and violent; and some of their most conspicuous leaders are punished. They have then unhappily placed themselves in a situation where they are pushed forward on the road of guilt by the most virtuous impulses of the human heart--fidelity towards each other, honourable attachment to the distinguished members of their body become sufferers in their cause, and indignation against what they regard as insupportable tyranny, impel them onward with irresistible force. Youth, with all its generous feelings, its inexperience and its impetuosity, assumes the lead in their councils. The prudent and the moderate are either banished as traitors, or compelled to be instruments of the more inconsiderate and daring. They find that they have forfeited all expectation of a tolerable pardon. They see no hopes of safety but in victory; and they are hurried on by fear and despair, as well as anger and resentment, to rebellion.

Any event of such a rebellion would be most unfortunate to those engaged in it, but success would be the greater misfortune, and indeed the most severe punishment with which the justice of Providence could visit their guilt.

Success would every where be a dreadful calamity to a body of British officers betrayed into military rebellion against the civil authorities of their country. Their success would be the destruction of every source and guard of their own security, and of every thing of which the defence peculiarly ennobles and endears the profession of arms to a British soldier. In India, however, this misfortune of success would have very bitter aggravations. As soon as British officers had oppressed the lawful authority, they would quickly discover what, in the tumult of dissension, their passions had concealed from them, that they had, though unknowingly, raised their arms against their country, which must espouse the cause of her delegated authorities. They would thus be proscribed and exiled by a country, the hope of revisiting which is the basis of every plan and expectation of their lives.

Apprehending mutiny among their soldiers, revolt among their subjects, irruption from their Asiatic neighbours, or conquest by some European state, no longer guarded by their own country, but the objects of her just hostility, they would find themselves alone and unprotected in the world. In this friendless situation they could be supported by no generous enthusiasm, the child of patriotism and honour, which could awaken no feeling in their bosom but shame and remorse. Their numbers could only be kept up by adventurers, the refuse of the military profession in Europe. The civil wars, inevitable in such a state of things, would be not so much the consummation of their evils, as a refuge from such intolerable calamities.

Happily for the British officers in India, no such calamity is probable. They are sure of being haunted by so many "compunctious visitings of nature," from the thoughts of their friends, of their Sovereign, of their beloved country, as to impair that criminal energy necessary for the success of desperate enterprizes. Theirs is not a country, or a state of manners, or a system of religion and morality, which trains men to revolutionary sternness and ferocity. Their failure was, and ever will be, certain. But such convulsions bring dreadful consequences:--the loss of that collective character which was the source of pride to each individual, long regret and remorse, their hearts taught to dread generous and social feeling; and the most distinguished of them, if not condemned to death, still more unhappily abandoned to a dishonourable life.

In their native land they will meet little or none of that sympathy which supports the sufferers for a general cause. Their discontent appears to spring only from the most ignoble sources. Those who have not visited India will not easily conceive that a pecuniary retrenchment is chiefly felt as a degradation, by an army already sufficiently excluded from the higher rewards of valour: first shut out from military honours, and then from that compensation for them which they had found in the prospect of returning home to the exercise of generous virtue. Last, and worst of all, they find that their more glaring and dangerous guilt has almost effaced the remembrance of that misconduct which produced it, and given popularity and character to those they deem their enemies.

They will feel, that the difficulty of their policy respecting the army will always be increased at moments when the necessities of the state require extensive retrenchments. A wise Government will prepare the way for such retrenchments, by evidently showing that they are necessary, and that they are equitably imposed on all classes: they will not disdain more particularly to satisfy those distinguished members of an army, whose influence over their brethren is a principle of natural discipline. They will redouble their vigilance to distribute military honours and rewards with the strictest equity; and they will be solicitous to display the appearance as well as the reality of kindness towards the individuals of a body who are about to suffer.

When the passions of the moment have subsided, no man will believe that a Governor, confessedly unpopular, introducing or maintaining systems of retrenchment, necessary indeed, but most severe, and without preparation, without public precaution or private conciliation, did not, by these circumstances, most materially contribute to the unhappy crisis which followed. The total omission of all those means which make reformation popular, or even tolerable, will assuredly be regarded as a great political offence. It will be considered as ridiculous to call for particular proof that a cold and unfeeling manner tended to make privations be felt as insults. No man of common sense will doubt that a popular Governor may reconcile men to retrenchments, which, under a Governor of an opposite character, may produce the most fatal effects. A recent example might be found at no great distance from Madras, of a Governor who had imposed greater retrenchments than Sir George Barlow, and who, without any sacrifice of dignity, left his government, universally beloved. But it will not be doubted that the Government of Madras thus contributed their share towards maturing the discontents of the army previous to the orders of General McDowall. Still less can it be doubted, that by the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles the spark was struck out which fell on the combustible materials.

In the circumstances of the case, and after the restoration of the surviving officer by his superiors, it is very mild language to call this suspension an act of very doubtful justice. And it is most certain, that an act of authority so harsh, and of such doubtful justice, against officers who had such a fair appearance of mere military obedience, and whose very fault, if they had one, must have sprung from a zeal for military privileges, was of a nature to vibrate through every nerve of an army. When the Government once did an act which made two officers of rank at least appear to suffer unjustly for the army, they entirely changed the character of the disputes. They drove the generosity, honour, and justice of the army into rebellion. They supplied the discontented with the colour of right, without which no leaders are ever able to seduce multitudes to resistance. They exalted pecuniary grievances into the feelings of generous sympathy and wounded honour. They made it be thought disgraceful to abstain from taking a part in a combination to prevent injustice. The moderate, the disinterested, the loyal, even the timid and circumspect, were forced into opposition,--by shame, by fear, by sympathy, by that tumultuous combination of causes, generous and mean, which recruit the ranks of insurgents, and change the murmurs of a few into the mutinous clamour of the many. Whatever the evil intentions of a few may be, it is always an act of real or supposed injustice which throws the multitude into the hands of the ill-affected leaders. Before the suspension there existed only discontents; after it, general disaffection, conspiracy, and sedition.

The necessity of vesting the power of dismissing or suspending officers in the Government will never be questioned by thinking men: but when it is considered, that the operation of the general orders of the 1st of May was, considering the rank and number of the suspended officers, not a much less exertion of authority than if his Majesty were to strike a tenth part of his general officers out of the list of the army, it will not be wondered that this example of the precarious and degraded tenure by which military rank was held, should have diffused universal dismay, and reinforced resentment by despair.

The dispassionate observer, after remarking with wonder that every expedient was omitted or rejected which could detach the misguided from the ill-affected, or open a creditable retreat for the penitent, will pause before the sword was drawn, to consider whether general submission would then have been too dearly purchased by an amnesty which should not have excluded from hope even the officers suspended on the 1st of May.

It will be acknowledged, that the example of a sedition proceeding so far without punishment, is an evil: but it was to be balanced against other evils;--against the calamities of civil war; against the mischief of rendering one part of our military force in India the enemies of the other; against the evils of a victory which must be gained over the spirit of the army, and consequently over the strength of the Government.

It will be ascribed to the unbending temper of Sir George Barlow, that he did not perceive the probability of amnesty being at length granted, after open resistance, by the humanity of the British Administration in India and England, almost as general as that of which, before the sword was drawn, he treated the proposal as every thing but a crime.

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