Read Ebook: British Policy in the Illinois Country 1763-1768 by Carter Clarence Edwin

Font size: 10 px 15 px 20 px 25 px 30 px 35 px

Background color: BlackWhiteGrayLight GrayDark GrayDim Gray

Text color: BlackWhiteGrayLight GrayDark GrayDim Gray

Apply/Save settings

Ebook has 211 lines and 29841 words, and 5 pages

Under the French regime the western Indians and their trade had been managed with greater success than had the tribes living under English influence. The success of France was due largely to her policy of centralization combined of course with the genial character of the French fur trader and the influence of the missionary. The English, on the contrary, had managed their relations with the Indians through the agency of the different colonies, without a semblance of union or co-operation: each colony competed for the lion's share of the trade, a policy which resulted disastrously to the peace of the empire.

In 1755 the English government under the influence of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, took over the political control of the Indians, and superintendents were appointed by the crown to reside among the different nations. A little later in 1761 the purchase of Indian lands was taken out of the hands of the colonies and placed under the control of the home government. No further change is to be noted until after the issue of the war was known, when the whole question was taken under consideration. The most important step yet taken respecting the Indian and his concomitant, the fur trade, appeared in the Proclamation of 1763, issued in October following the treaty of cession. Some of its provisions for the West have already been noted. In addition to reserving for the present the unorganized territory between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi River for the use of the Indians, the government guaranteed the Indians in the possession of those lands by announcing in the Proclamation that no Governor or Commander-in-chief would be allowed to make land grants within their territory, and further all land purchases and the formation of settlements by private individuals without royal consent were prohibited. Trade within this reservation was made, however, free to all who should obtain a license from the Governor or Commander-in-chief of the colony in which they resided.

The policy was now for the central government to take the Indian trade under its management; and in the course of the year following the issuance of the Proclamation an elaborate plan was outlined by Hillsborough comprehending the political and commercial relations with all the Indian territory.

According to the proposed scheme British North America was to be divided, for the purpose of Indian management, into two districts, a northern and a southern, each under the control of a general superintendent or agent appointed by the crown: the Ohio River being designated as the approximate line of division. In the northern district, with which we are here concerned, the regulation of such Indian affairs as treaties, land purchases, questions of peace and war, and trade relations were to be given into the hands of the superintendent who was to be entirely free from outside interference: without his consent no civil or military officer could interfere with the trade or other affairs of any of the Indian tribes. Three deputies were to be appointed to assist the superintendent and at each post a commissary, an interpreter, and a smith were to reside, acting under the immediate direction of the superintendent and responsible only to him for their conduct. For the administration of justice between traders and Indians and between traders themselves, the commissary at each post was to be empowered to act as justice of the peace in all civil and criminal cases. In civil cases involving sums not exceeding ten pounds an appeal might be taken to the superintendent. The Indian trade was to be under the direct supervision of the general superintendent. Traders who desired to go among the Indians to ply their trade could do so by obtaining a license from the province from which they came. The region into which the trader intended to go was to be clearly defined in the license and each had to give bond for the observance of the laws regulating the trade. The superintendent, together with the commissary at the post and a representative of the Indians were to fix the value of all goods and traders were forbidden to charge more than the price fixed; for the still better regulation of the trade, it was to be centered about the regularly fortified and garrisoned forts. Regulations for the sale of land were also proposed; outside the limits of the colonies no individual or company could legally purchase land from the Indians unless at a general meeting of the tribe presided over by the superintendent.

The plan thus outlined by the ministry was never legally carried into effect, although the superintendents used the outline as a guide in their dealings with the Indians. The original intention had been to levy a tax on the Indian trade to defray the expense of putting the scheme into operation, but it was found that the budget was already too greatly burdened; and the Stamp Act disturbance which soon followed illustrated the possible inexpediency of imposing such a duty.

The foregoing considerations serve to indicate the importance the ministry attached to the Indian trade in general. But what of the trade in the Illinois country? This region had been one of the great centers of the Indian trade under the French regime; and, in addition, the French inhabitants had been one of the main supports of New Orleans since its foundation early in the century. The commercial connection between the Illinois villages and New Orleans had never been broken, and at the time of the occupation of Illinois in 1765 French fur traders and merchants still plied their traffic up and down the Mississippi River. Now that the title to this trade center passed to England it was expected that the volume of trade would be turned eastward from its southerly route. The necessity for this was patent if any solid benefits were to accrue to the empire from the cession.

The home and colonial authorities early saw the importance of the redirection of the trade. They hoped and expected that a trade would be opened with the Indians in and about the Illinois country immediately after the active occupation by the English troops. A large number of individual traders were early aware of this and representatives of some of the large trading corporations of the East were also preparing to take advantage of the early opening of the trade. In 1765 Fort Pitt became the great rendezvous for this element, and when the army reached Fort Chartres in October, 1765, it was followed as soon as the season of the year would permit, by the traders with their cargoes to exchange for the Indians' furs. Among the more important figures was George Morgan, a member of the firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan of Philadelphia, and the firm's personal representative at the Illinois, where he first appeared early in 1766, remaining there the greater part of the next five years. Other representatives of this company left Fort Pitt in March of the same year with a large cargo of goods, which reached Fort Chartres during the summer. Firms such as Franks and Company of Philadelphia and London and Bently and Company of Manchac also traded extensively in the Illinois during the following years: all the larger British companies becoming rivals for that portion of the Indian trade which the English were able to command.

Other and perhaps greater sources of profit to the English merchants lay in the privilege of furnishing the garrison with provisions and the Indian department with goods for Indian presents. Although the houses of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, and Franks and Company were usually competitors for the former privileges, the latter company generally had the monopoly. On the other hand, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan derived their greatest profits from the sale of enormous quantities of goods to the government through the Indian department for distribution among the Indians accustomed to assemble at the Illinois. But whether all these houses received profits commensurate with the risks undertaken is problematical. In the Indian trade, in which all the merchants were interested, they not only had to compete with each other and with independent English traders, but with the French and Spanish who had not ceased to ply their trade among their old friends the Indians. This continuance of foreign traders in British territory was probably the most serious problem in the trade situation. Not only did it affect English traders but the interests of the empire itself were seriously threatened by the presence within its limits of unlicensed foreign traders.

It is therefore evident that the close of hostilities between France and England in 1763 and the formal transfer of Canada and the West to Great Britain by no means closed the intense rivalry between the fur trading elements of the two nations for predominance in the western trade: it rather accentuated it. As has already been suggested, France, until cession of the West, had naturally possessed the sphere of influence among the savages of the Mississippi Valley and Canada, and consequently the monopoly of the fur trade accrued to her subjects. In the upper Ohio river region and among the tribes bordering on or living within the limits of the English colonies, the British, during the first half of the eighteenth century, were either strong rivals of the French or were completely dominant. And it was generally expected that after the cession of the West the British would inherit the influence of the French among the Indians and succeed to the monopoly of the fur trade just as Great Britain had succeeded to the sovereignty of the territory itself. But the Conspiracy of Pontiac, due in large part to the machinations of the French traders, postponed for a considerable period the entry of the British traders, during which time the French became more strongly entrenched than ever in the affections of the savages.

The character of the French fur traders has already been noted. Their methods had from the beginning been different from those pursued by their neighbors and rivals: they lived among the Indians, affected their manners, treated them kindly and respectfully, and supplied all their wants, while the missionary, the connecting link between the two races, was ever present. This association of religion was one of the causes of the success of the French in gaining such a permanent foothold in the affections of the Indians, but was entirely absent in the British relation with that race. The English traders were in general unscrupulous in their dealings with the savages and deficient of that tact which enabled Frenchmen to overcome the natural prejudice of the Indian and acquire an interest with him which would be difficult to sever. In that section of the Indian country where the influence of Great Britain was such that her traders could go among the Indians, there was always considerable dissatisfaction on account of the methods employed by the large number of independent and irresponsible traders. Many carried large quantities of rum, some dealing in nothing else. English traders frequently attended public meetings of Indians, gave them liquor during the time for business and defrauded them of their furs. This abuse was one of the great causes of complaint against British traders. Indeed, wherever they participated in the trade, its condition was deplorable. Many of the independent traders had little or no credit so that the legitimate merchants suffered as well as the Indians. They adopted various expedients to draw trade from each other, one of which was to sell articles below first cost, thus ruining a large number of traders. Fabrications dangerous to the public were frequently created to explain the price and condition of goods. But probably more injurious still to imperial interests, was the fact that whole cargoes of goods were sometimes sold by English firms to French traders thus enabling the latter to engross a great part of the trade, depriving the empire of the benefit of the revenue accruing from the importation of furs into England. This practice was probably followed to a greater degree in the farther West, where the French continued to have a monopoly in the trade.

It had been expected that the Illinois villages would be the center of trade for the English side of the upper Mississippi Valley just as it had been one of the centers during the French regime. But, except for the few tribes of Illinois Indians in the immediate vicinity, very few savages found their way to these posts for trading purposes. English traders, on the other hand, did not trust themselves far beyond this narrow circle. But their French and Spanish rivals from Louisiana, many of whom formally lived in the Illinois, carried on a trade in all directions, both by land and by water. They ascended the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois rivers and crossed the Mississippi River above the Illinois River, plying their traffic among the tribes in the region of the Wisconsin and Fox rivers. This was probably the most productive area in the Mississippi Valley in the supply of fur bearing animals. The Mississippi River from its junction with the Illinois northward was also considered especially good for the peltry business: the otter, beaver, wolf, cervine, and marten were to be found in abundance. But the British traders dared not venture into that quarter. The loss of this trade, however, can scarcely be attributed to their misconduct, for the French had never allowed it to pass from their own hands. The latter continued to intrigue with the Indians throughout the greater part of this period just as they had prior to 1765. As we have seen they pointed out to the savages how they would suffer from the policy of economy practiced by the British government. Thus by giving presents and circulating stories and misrepresentations the French subjects of Spain attempted to checkmate every move of the English. The Indians were constantly reminded of the bad designs on the part of the English, and were encouraged with unauthorized promises of aid in case they took up the hatchet in defense of their hunting grounds.

This state of affairs continued throughout the greater part of the period, although it was probably modified to some extent after 1770, for in that year O'Reilly, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, issued an order to all the commandants in that colony to prohibit the inhabitants crossing the river in the pursuit of trade and whenever any excesses were committed satisfaction was to be given the English commandant according to the laws of nations.

During the first years of the British occupation there was considerable friction in the contact between the two alien peoples in the Illinois villages. In spite of the fact that the French who remained became subjects of Great Britain there was for several years sharp competition between the English and French residents in the vicinity of the villages. The latter were on terms of friendship with the savages and could go into any part of the country without difficulty and those Indians who came to Fort Chartres to trade generally preferred to deal with their trusted friends. The French often carried the packs of furs thus obtained across the river to St. Louis or transported them directly to the New Orleans market. Although the British merchants were occasionally to pool their interests with French residents, such cases were exceptional prior to 1770. In that year, however, General Gage informed the home government that "the competition between his Majestys' old and new Subjects is greatly abated & must by degrees subside, for if carried to extremes it would be very prejudicial to both."

We have seen in the foregoing study how the British traders were handicapped in the prosecution of the trade by their French rivals. Naturally the large quantities of furs and skins obtained by such contraband traders as well as by the French residents of Illinois were taken directly to New Orleans and there embarked for the ports of France and Spain. These foreign interlopers, however, only followed the course they had long been accustomed to take. On the other hand it was expected by the government that the traders who carried English manufactured goods down the Ohio River would return by the same route with their cargoes of peltry for the purpose of transporting them to England. In this the aim of the ministry miscarried. English traders and merchants followed the line of least resistance: the route down the Mississippi to New Orleans was easier and quicker than up the Ohio and across the country to the sea-coast. Moreover, the New Orleans market was attractive, for peltries sold at a higher price there than in the British market. The tendency of the English traders and merchants to follow this course was discovered soon after the occupation. In a communication to Secretary Shelburne in 1766 Gage informed the government that "it is reported that the Traders in West Florida carry most of their Skins to New Orleans, where they sell them at as good a price as is given in London. As I had before some Intelligence of this, the Officer commanding at Fort Pitt had Orders to watch the Traders from Pensilvania who went down the Ohio in the Spring to Fort Chartres; & to report the quantity of Peltry they should bring up the Ohio in the Autumn. He has just acquainted me that the traders do not return to his Post, that they are gone down the Mississippi with all their Furrs and Skinns under the pretense of embarking them at New Orleans for England." A few weeks later he wrote again in a similar strain: "That Trade will go with the stream is a maxim found to be true from all Accounts that have been received of the Indian Trade carried on in that vast Tract of Country which lies in the Back of the British Colonies; and that the peltry acquired there is carried to the Sea either by the River St. Lawrence or River Mississippi." Gage seemed to believe that the part which went down the St. Lawrence would be transported to England; but that the peltry passing through New Orleans would never enter a British port. "Nothing but prospect of a superior profit or force will turn the Channel of Trade contrary to the above maxim."

It seems impossible to figure exactly what the loss to imperial interests was under these conditions. Furs and skins, however being among the enumerated commodities some loss certainly accrued to British shipping and to the government through loss of the duty, as well as to English manufacturers. While practically no peltries reached the Atlantic ports from the Illinois region, enormous quantities were carried to New Orleans. The few who have left any estimate of the amount of peltries exported to New Orleans agree in general that from 500 to 1000 packs were shipped annually from Illinois. According to the usual estimate 500 packs were worth in New Orleans about 3500 pounds sterling. At New Orleans, where the western trade finally centered, it was estimated that peltries worth between 75,000 and 100,000 pounds sterling were sent annually to foreign ports.

It became apparent to those in a position to understand the situation that those solid advantages which the Government had expected would accrue in return for the expense of maintaining establishments in the West would not be forthcoming, unless some effective though expensive measures be taken. The rivalry of the French who monopolized the larger part of the trade and who naturally followed their old road to New Orleans, and the action of the English traders in turning the channel of their trade down the stream effectually deprived the empire of any benefits. Conditions grew no better as the years went by. In 1767 we find General Gage complaining that "as for the Trade of the Ilinois, and in general of the Mississippi, we may dispose of some manufactures there, but whilst Skins and Furrs bear a high price at New Orleans, no Peltry gained by our manufactures, will ever reach Great Britain, and if our Traders do not return with the Produce of their Trade to the Northern Provinces, by way of the Ohio or Lakes, it will not answer to England to be at much expence about the Mississippi." Not only were the officials in America, who were in close touch with western affairs, convinced of the impossibility of obtaining any immediate commercial benefits from the country, but one of the leading members of the ministry, Lord Hillsborough, Secretary for the colonies, took a similar view, in an argument against the planting of western colonies. "This Commerce cannot be useful to Great Britain otherwise than as it furnishes a material for her Manufactures, but it will on the contrary be prejudicial to her in proportion as other Countries obtain that material from us without its coming here first; & whilst New Orleans is the only Post for Exportation of what goes down the Mississippi, no one will believe that that town will not be the market for Peltry or that those restrictions, which are intended to secure the exportation of that Commodity directly to G. Britain, can have any effect under such circumstances." Though there seems to have been a unanimity of opinion respecting the commercial inutility of the Illinois and surrounding country under existing conditions, there were those, however, who believed that with the adoption of certain measures the western country could be made of intrinsic commercial value. Whether any adequate steps could have been taken to turn the channel of trade eastward and to exclude foreign traders is uncertain.

The original intention of the British government had been to use Fort Chartres to guard the rivers in order to prevent contraband trading; but its inefficiency was soon apparent. Although well constructed, its location was not strategic; it commanded nothing but an island in the river. An indication to the Indians of British dominion and a place of deposit for English merchants was about the sum total of its efficiency. In order to make the Illinois country effective as a bulwark against foreign aggression and to keep the trade in English hands, thus insuring material advantages to the empire, it seemed imperative to many who were familiar with the situation to adopt measures looking toward the closure of those natural entrances into the country, the mouths of the Illinois and Ohio rivers. Almost all the correspondence of the time relating to Illinois, contains references to the practicability of erecting forts at the junctions of the Illinois and Ohio rivers with the Mississippi; in most cases this was insisted upon as the only measure to be adopted to make the country of value. All were further in agreement that until such plan was carried out no benefits would arise from the possession of that territory. Suggestion were also offered relative to the erection of a fort on the Mississippi River above its junction with the Illinois for the protection of that section of the country. Perhaps the most novel suggestion emanated from General Gage, who declared that in order to gain all the advantages expected it would be necessary to amalgamate all the little French villages lying between the Illinois and Ohio rivers into one settlement, which would also be the centre of the military establishment; detachments could then be sent out to guard the rivers and prevent British merchants from descending the stream to New Orleans and also watch for foreign interlopers.

The failure of the government to manage successfully the western trade previous to 1770 was not the only reason the ministry hesitated to do any thing further. Any measure would have meant the expenditure of large sums of money with no absolute certainty of an adequate return. The problem of the western trade confronted the ministry at a most unfortunate time. Questions of graver import were arising and demanding immediate attention. Instead of seeking new schemes upon which to lavish money, every opportunity was seized upon to curtail expenses. The government failed to put into full operation the plan of 1764 because of the added financial burden it would entail and in 1768 the management of the Indian Trade was transferred from the crown to the colonies to further reduce the budget. The western question had become subordinated to that of the empire. Furs were important to the manufacturing monopoly of Great Britain, but at this time of rising discontent and dissatisfaction in the colonies any new projects entailing further expense were out of the question.

COLONIZING SCHEMES IN THE ILLINOIS.

Although prior to the Seven Years War France was in nominal possession of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, the English colonies on the sea-board viewed that territory in a different light. The old sea to sea charters still possessed a potential value in the eyes of British colonists and little or no respect was accorded the claims of France. Gradually toward the middle of the century the more enterprising and farsighted of the colonists, who appreciated the future value of the region, began to lay plans for its systematic exploitation. As early as 1748, shortly after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Ohio Company, composed of London merchants and Virginia land speculators obtained from the crown a grant of land south of the Ohio river. This was the precursor of several companies formed for similar purposes. In 1754 the question of western expansion had become of sufficient importance to engage the attention of the Albany Congress, the plans for the creation of western colonies were discussed by that body. The following year Samuel Hazard of Philadelphia outlined a proposition looking toward the formation of a western colony,--probably the first which comprehended the Illinois country.

The treaty of cession of 1763 gave a new impulse to the colonizing spirit which had lain dormant during the early years of the war. The English now believed that they were free to occupy at will the unsettled lands as far westward as the Mississippi River. Early in the summer of 1763, before the British ministry had had time to consider and determine its policy toward the new acquisitions, there was formed an organization known as the Mississippi Land Company, for the purpose of planting a colony in the Illinois and Wabash regions. In this scheme some of the most prominent inhabitants of Virginia and Maryland were interested,--indeed membership in the organization was drawn almost entirely from those two colonies and from London. The Company was eventually to be composed of fifty members who were to contribute equally towards the maintenance of an agent in England, to whom was intrusted the duty of soliciting from the crown a grant of two million five hundred thousand acres of land on the Mississippi and its tributaries, the Wabash and Ohio rivers. The proposed grant was to be "laid off within the following bounds beginning upon the East side of the Rivers Mississippi one hundred and twenty miles above or to the northward of the confluence of the River Ohio therewith. Thence by a line to strike the river Wabash or St. Ireon eighty miles above the union of Ohio and Wabash, and abutting on the main branch of the River Cherokee or Tennessee one hundred fifty mile above the junction of Cherokee River with Ohio and proceeding thence Westerly in a line to strike the River Mississippi seventy miles below the union of Ohio with that River; thence upon the said River to the beginning." The subscribers were to be free to retain their lands twelve years or more at the pleasure of the crown without the payment of taxes on quit rents. Within the same period also the company was to be obliged to settle two hundred families in the colony, unless prevented by Indians or a foreign enemy. In order to insure against any such interruption, it was hinted that the government might establish and garrison two forts,--one at the confluence of the Cherokee and Ohio rivers, and the other at the mouth of the Ohio.

In their petition the memorialists enumerate the advantages they expect the empire to receive in case the land be granted, special emphasis being laid on two points of view,--commerce and defence. "The Increase of the people, the extension of trade and the enlargement of the revenue are with certainty to be expected, where the fertility of the soil, and mildness of the climate invite emigrants to settle and cultivate commodities most wanted by Great Britain and which will bear the charges of a tedious navigation, by the high prices usually given for them,--such as Hemp, Flax, Silk, Wine, Potash, Cochineal, Indigo, Iron, &c., by which means the Mother Country will be supplied with many necessary materials, that are now purchased by foreigners at a very great expense."

From the point of view of both trade and defense, the company proposed "that by conducting a trade useful to the Indians on the borders of the Mississippi they will effectually prevent the success of that cruel policy, which has ever directed the French in time of peace, to prevail with the Indians their neighbors to lay waste the frontiers of your Majestie's Colonies thereby to prevent their increase."

Lastly, the establishment of a buffer colony would effectually prevent the probable encroachments of the French from the West side of the Mississippi, and cut off their political and commercial connection with the Indians. They would "thereby be prevented from instigating them to War, and the harrassing the frontier Counties as they have constantly done of all the Colonies."

The plan received its first official check in the year of its inception, when in October, 1763, the British ministry announced its western policy in a proclamation according to which all the territory lying north of the Floridas and west of the Alleghanies was reserved for the use of the Indians. Thereafter the colonial governors were forbidden to issue patents for land within this reservation without the consent of the crown. However, the enounciation of this policy did not deter this and similar companies from pressing their claims upon the Board of Trade. The more far-sighted of the Americans had probably correctly interpreted the proclamation as temporary in character and as promulgated to allay the alarm of the savages. The Mississippi company therefore continued to solicit the grant until 1769, when it was decided that on account of the temper of the ministry towards America, it would be advisable to allow the matter to rest for a time in the hope that a change in the government would bring a corresponding change in policy. But at no time does it appear that the promoters of the colony received the slightest encouragement from those in authority.

About the time of the Mississippi company in 1763, General Charles Lee outlined a scheme for the establishment of two colonies, one on the Ohio River below its junction with the Wabash, and the other on the Illinois River. It was his plan to organize a company and petition the crown for the necessary grants of land. A portion of the settlers were to be procured in new England, and the remainder from among Protestants of Germany and Switzerland. In narrating the probable advantages which he thinks would be derived from such settlements, Lee takes practically the same point of view as the Mississippi company, adding the suggestion that a new channel of commerce would be opened up through the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. This proposal suffered the same fate as its contemporary in being objected by the ministry, whose policy of allowing no settlements in the country beyond the mountains had been too recently adopted.

Thus far there seems to be no indication that the above mentioned colonizing schemes received encouragement from any one in close touch with the government. Apparently the authors of those projects did not have the ear of those members of the ministry, whose general attitude gave some ground for the belief that in the end plans for western settlements would be adopted. The most prominent among these was Lord Shelbourne, whose personal attitude favored carving the West into colonies. Possibly his friendship with Dr. Franklin influenced him in part to throw the weight of his prestige in favor of a new plan for a colony, promoted this time by prominent merchants and land speculators of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. It was in 1766 that the next definite scheme appeared, although it is probable that there were many others, for during those years half of England was said to have been "New Land mad as every body there had their eyes fixt on this Country." Pamphlet literature was printed and disseminated throughout England and America from 1763 on advocating the feasibility of settling the new lands, which doubtless had considerable influence. It is hardly probable that the few definite propositions of which we have recorded were the only schemes projected during this period.

The plan of 1764 had its origin we may safely say as 1764. In January of that year the Board of Trade received a communication from one of the promoters of the plan, George Croghan, who was then in England, asking their Lordships "whether it would not be good policy at this time while we certainly have it in our power to secure all the advantages we have got there by making a purchase of the Indians inhabiting the Country along the Mississippi from the mouth of the Ohio up to the sources of the River Illinois, and there plant a respectable colony, in order to secure our frontiers, and prevent the French from any attempt to rival us in the Fur trade with the Natives, by drawing the Ohio and Lake Indians over the Mississippi which they have already attempted by the last accounts we have from Detroit."

Franklin's letter to his father explains very clearly the steps in the development of the plan up to that time. It is necessary, however, to examine other sources in order to ascertain details concerning the proposition. The Articles of Agreement as outlined by Governor Franklin contains the tentative proposal that application be made to the crown for a grant in the Illinois country of 1,200,000 acres or "more if to be procured." Provision was also made in the original draft for ten equal shareholders, the stipulation to be subject to change in case others desired to enter the company. The original draft was sent to Sir William Johnson who was requested to consider the proposals and make any alterations he saw fit. The articles were then to be returned to Governor Franklin, with Johnson's recommendations to the ministry. Through Franklin the papers were to be forwarded to Dr. Franklin in London, to whom was intrusted the task of negotiating with the ministry.

In his recommendations Johnson urged upon the ministry the adoption of the proposals and in addition offered a number of suggestions among which the following are of interest. 1. The crown should purchase from the Indians all their right to the territory in the Illinois country. 2. A civil government should be established. 3. The proposed land grants should be laid out in townships according to the practice in New England. 4. Provincial officers and soldiers who served in the French war should receive grants. 5. The mines and minerals should belong to the owners of the land in which they may be found, except royal mines, from which the crown might receive a fifth. 6. In every township 500 acres should be reserved for the maintenance of a clergyman of the Established Church of England. 7. Finally the lands of the colony were suggested as follows:--From the mouth of the Ouisconsin River down the Mississippi agreeable to Treaty, to the Forks, or Mouth of the Ohio. Then up the same River Ohio to the River Wabash, thence up the same River Wabash to the Portage at the Head thereof. Then by the said Portage to the River Miamis and down the said River Miamis to Lake Erie. Thence along the several Courses of the said Lake to Riviere al Ours and up the said River to the Head thereof, and from thence in a straight Line, or by the Portage of St. Josephs River & down the same River to Lake Michigan then along the several Courses of the said Lake on the South and West Side thereof to the point of Bay Puans, and along the several Courses on the East Side of the said Bay to the Mouth of Foxes River, thence up to the Head thereof and from thence by a Portage to the Head of Ouisconsin River, and down the same to the Place of Beginning.

Benjamin Franklin exerted every effort to advance the project in England, but with little success. Lord Shelburne, who was at this time Secretary of State for the southern department, was also ready and anxious to see the new colony established, and he was able to influence the ministry to take a favorable view. Others in authority, however, and particularly members of the Board of Trade, were opposed to the proposition. In 1768, the Board, under the presidency of Hillsborough, reported adversely and the question of the Illinois colony was dropped. Attention of land speculators was now called to the new Vandalia colony in the upper Ohio region.

EVENTS IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY, 1765-1768.

In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to point out certain general aspects relating to the West and to the Illinois country, with special reference to the governmental status of the old French settlements after the conquest, the extension of the English law to the conquered territory, some of the problems of the Indian and trade relations, and finally attention has been called to some of the projects for the colonization of the Illinois country after 1763. What were the actual events taking place in the Illinois after the occupation has always been problematical. Previous writers have almost without exception dismissed with a sentence the first two or three years of the period. Indeed the whole thirteen years of British administration have generally been crowded into two or three paragraphs. Although the available historical material relating to the material to the period in general has recently been considerably augmented, there yet remain gaps which must be bridged before a complete history of the colony under the British can be written.

Among the first duties of the British commandant after taking formal possession of Fort de Chartres in October, 1765, was to announce to the inhabitants the contents of Gage's proclamation. It is only from this document that we know anything of the status of the individual inhabitants of Illinois. One of its leading features was a clause granting to the French the right of the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion "in the same manner as in Canada," which was the fulfillment on the part of the British government of the pledge stipulated in the IVth article of the treaty of Paris, containing the following clause: "Brittanick Majesty agrees to grant the liberty of the Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada; he will consequently give the most precise and effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion, according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit." This provision appertained to the whole western territory as well as to Canada proper. Prior to the treaty of cession the Illinois and Wabash settlements were subject to the jurisdiction of Louisiana, while approximately the country north of the Fortieth parallel had been within the limits of Canada. But in the treaty all the territory lying between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi river was described as a dependency of Canada. The government was thus commited to religious toleration within the whole extent of the ceded territory. This meant, however, that only the religious privileges of the church had been secured, for the clause in the treaty, "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit," meant that papal authority would not be tolerated within the British empire.

Other clauses provided that all the inhabitants of Illinois who had been subjects of the king of France, might if they so desired, sell their estates and retire with their effects to Louisiana. No restraint would be placed on their emigration, except for debt or on account of criminal processes. This was also a fulfillment of the pledges made in the treaty of Paris. All the inhabitants who desired to retain their estates and become subjects of Great Britain were guaranteed security for their persons and effects and liberty of trade. Finally they were commanded to take the oath of allegiance and fidelity to the crown in case they remained on British soil.

When Captain Sterling proceeded to Kaskaskia to post the proclamation and to administer the oaths of allegiance for which he was empowered by the commanding general, he was confronted by an unexpected movement on the part of the inhabitants. A petition was presented signed by the representative French of the village, asking for a respite of nine months in order that they might settle their affairs and decide whether they wished to remain under the British government or withdraw from the country. At first Sterling refused to grant the request. According to the terms of the Paris treaty the inhabitants of the ceded territory had been given eighteen months in which to withdraw, the time to be computed from the date of the exchange of ratifications. The limit had long since expired, and it was therefore beyond the power of Sterling or his superior General Gage to grant legally an extension of time. When, however, the commandant perceived that unless some concessions were granted, the village would be immediately depopulated, he extended the time to the first of March, 1766, with the provisions that a temporary oath of allegence be given, and that all desiring to leave the country should give in their names in advance. To this tentative proposition the French in Kaskaskia agreed on condition that Sterling forward to the commanding general a petition, in which they ask for the longer time. An officer was dispatched to the villages of Prairie du Rocher, St. Phillipe, and Cahokia where similar arrangements were made.

The machinery of civil government in operation under the French regime had become badly deranged during the French and Indian war and when the representatives of the English government entered the country affairs were in a chaotic state. The commandant of the English troops had of course no authority to govern the inhabitants. But he found himself face to face with conditions which made immediate action imperative. Practically the only civil officers Sterling found on the English side of the river were Joseph La Febevre, who acted as Judge, Attorney General and Guardian of the Royal Warehouse, and Joseph Labuxiere, was Clerk and Notary Public. But those men retired with St. Ange and the French soldiers to St. Louis shortly after the arrival of the English. This brought the whole governmental machinery to a standstill, and the English commander was forced to act. He determined to appoint a judge and after consulting the principal inhabitants of the villages, selected M. La Grange, who was intrusted "to decide all disputes according to the Laws and Customs of the Country," with liberty to appeal to the commandant in case the litigants were dissatisfied with his decision. The captains of militia seem to have retained their positions under the British, their duties being practically the same as in the French regime. Each village or parish had its captain who saw to the enforcement of decrees and other civil matters as well as looking after the local militia. The office of royal commissary continued and James Rumsey, a former officer in the English army was appointed to this position. But who was to continue the duties of the old French commandants with both his civil and military functions? Obviously the most logical person was the commanding officer of the English troops stationed at the fort, with the difference that the former held a special commission for the performance of these duties, while the latter had no such authorisation. A further and more fundamental difference lay in the fact that formerly the French had the right to appeal to the Superior Council at New Orleans, while apparently no such corresponding safeguard was given them by the new arrangement.

Sterling did not long retain command of the post for in December he was superseded by Major Robert Farmer, his superior in rank, who arrived from Mobile with a detachment of the 34th regiment, after an eight months voyage. Their arrival was exceedingly welcome to Sterling and his men since they were becoming greatly embarrassed for lack of provisions, ammunition, and presents for the Indians. When they left Fort Pitt in August, it had not been thought necessary to transport more than sixty pounds of ammunition inasmuch as Fort de Chartres was expected to yield a sufficient supply, and both Gage and Sterling believed that Croghan, with his cargo of supplies, would be awaiting the arrival of the troops at the Illinois. Neither expectation was realized. Croghan was back in the colonies prior to Sterling's arrival at the post, and when the fort was transferred, it yielded neither ammunition nor other supplies in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the troops.

An assembly of three or four thousand Indians had been accustomed to gather at the fort each spring to receive annual gifts from the French. But the English had made no provisions for such a contingency, which, coupled with the weakness of the garrison and the recent hostility of the Indians, would probably lead to serious complications. A possible defection of the Indians, therefore, necessitated a large supply of military stores which it was possible to obtain from the French merchants in the villages. The latter agreed to furnish the soldiers with ammunition, on the condition that other provisions would also be purchased, for which the English alleged they charged an exorbitant price. Sterling was compelled to acquiesce, for the merchants had sent their goods across the river where he could not get at them.

The large supply of provisions which the colony had produced in former years seems to have decreased, at any rate it fell far short of the expectations of the English officers. One officer writes at this time that "they have indeed but little here, and are doing us a vast favor when they let us have a Gallon of French brandy at twenty Shillings Sterling, and as the price is not as yet regulated the Eatables is in the same proportion." The wealth of colony had been considerably impaired since the occupation on account of the exodus of a large number of French who disobeyed the order of Sterling that all who desired to withdraw should give in their names in advance. Taking their cattle, grain and effects across the ferries at Cahokia and Kaskaskia, they found homes at St. Louis and St. Genevieve on the Spanish side. Probably a large part of the emigrants left in the hope that in Louisiana they might still enjoy their ancient laws and privileges, and others from fear lest the Indians, who were now assuming a threatening attitude, might destroy their crops and homes.

The acute situation of the garrison brought on by the dearth of supplies continued through the winter and spring of 1765 and 1766. Farmer estimated that all the provisions available amounted to no more than fifty thousand pounds of flour and 1250 pounds of corn meal, upon which the garrison could barely subsist till the following July; and a portion of this stock would have to be given to the Indians, since representatives of the Indian department had not yet appeared. These circumstances obliged Major Farmer to send Sterling and his troops to New York by way of the Mississippi river and New Orleans instead of up the Ohio river in accordance with Gage's orders. In response to a series of urgent requests for assistance, Gage employed a force of Indians to transport a cargo to the Illinois, which reached Fort Chartres during the early summer of 1766, by which time also representatives of the English merchants at Philadelphia had arrived with large stores of supplies. Henceforth we hear nothing further of a shortage of provisions in the Illinois, for not only did the English merchants import large supplies from the East, but cargoes were brought up the Mississippi from New Orleans by the French; and for a time the English government itself transported the necessary provisions from Fort Pitt.

Late in the summer of 1766 Farmer was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Reid, who arrived during the summer from Mobile with another detachment of the thirty-fourth regiment. Reid soon became obnoxious to the people on account of his tyrannical acts, many of which have been recorded in Colonel George Morgan's letter book. His administration of affairs, however, continued over a period of two years. In 1768 he was relieved by Colonel John Wilkins who ruled the French for the next three years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Alvord, C. W., Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763. Mich. Pion. & Hist. Colls.

Bancroft, George, MSS Collection of, N. Y. Pub. Lib.

Beer, G. L., British Colonial Policy, New York, 1907.

Brown, Henry, Hist. of Ill., New York, 1844.

Butler, Mann, Hist. of Ky., Louisville, 1834.

Canadian Archives, Report concerning for the year 1906. Ottawa.

Chatham Papers, Pub. Rec. Office, London.

Franklin, Benjamin, Works of, Ed. by John Bigelow. 10 Vols. New York, 1888.

Share on: WhatsApp @Hash Facebook Tweet