Read Ebook: The German Fleet Being The Companion Volume to The Fleets At War and From Heligoland To Keeling Island by Hurd Archibald

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must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.

"For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet."

The Memorandum well repays study in the light of subsequent events. Almost at the moment of its publication Admiral von der Goltz, a former Chief of the Admiralstab, gave a less reserved exposition of German policy, thus reflecting the opinions held by the naval officers responsible for the character of the proposed expansion of the German Fleet.

"Let us consider," he said, "the case of a war against England. In spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country towards England, and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British nation towards all Continental Powers, and in particular against Germany. These are not Chauvinistic exaggerations, but the opinion of the whole of the people of Great Britain, who are jealous of our commercial development. If England should ever lose her mercantile supremacy on the seas, the decline of her naval dominion would only be a question of time, and she realizes the fact instinctively. Of course the British Government will make every effort to prevent the violent explosion of these sentiments, preferring peaceful competition to war. But how long can that last? Violence becomes a right to a people which fears for its existence.

"The opinion is generally held in this country that any resistance against England at sea would be impossible, and that all our naval preparations are but wasted efforts. It is time that this childish fear, which would put a stop to all our progress, should be pulled up by the roots and destroyed.

"At this moment we are almost defenceless against England at sea, but already we possess the beginnings of a weapon which statesmanship can put to a good use, and our chances of success in a war against England grow more favourable day by day.

"The maritime superiority of Great Britain, overwhelming now, will certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to scatter her forces all over the world. In the event of war in home waters, the greater part of the foreign squadrons would no doubt be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all the stations oversea could not be abandoned. On the other hand, the German Fleet, though much smaller, can remain concentrated in European waters.

"With the increases about to be made it will be in a position to measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in home waters ; but it should not be forgotten that the question of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellence of material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful preparation permitting rapid mobilization can ensure a momentary superiority."

With the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, Germany proceeded to develop a High-Sea Fleet--a naval force capable of going anywhere and doing anything. Hitherto her ships had represented in their design the domination of a coast-defence policy. She now entered upon the construction of ships of the first class. Naval construction was regularized, and forthwith proceeded with great rapidity. During the five years--1886 to 1890--no ship even nominally of the battleship class was launched. During 1891 to 1895 only four vessels, and between 1890 and 1900 only six vessels, and these all of relatively modest fighting power, were put in the water, but in 1901 no fewer than five first-class battleships were sent afloat.

At the time when the Navy Act of 1900 was passed Germany had just completed the five ships of the old Kaiser class, with a displacement of about 11,150 tons, and mounting four 9?4-inch guns of 40 calibre as battle weapons in association with a large number of secondary guns--eighteen pieces of 5?9 inches. The technical advisers of the German Admiralty at this date pinned their faith to a storm of projectiles from quick-firing guns, and in order that weights might be kept down and the ships might be restricted to dimensions to enable them to navigate the Kiel Canal, reliance was placed upon the 9?4-inch gun at a moment when in practically all the navies of the world a 12-inch weapon was being mounted.

The type of battleship design which was introduced with the passage of the Act of 1898, and which was yet in hand when the measure of 1900 was prepared, still combined a weak main armament of four 9?4-inch guns with an exceedingly heavy secondary armament and a complete armoured belt. Whereas British ships at this time, such as those of the Duncan class, were being given only partial belts, and these only 7 inches thick amidships, tapering off fore and aft, the German vessels received thicker belts extending over the whole length. Of this new design--known as the Wittelsbach class--five units were building when the 1900 Act was passed. They had a maximum coal capacity of 1,770 tons of coal, with 200 tons of oil, and were capable of steaming at a speed of about eighteen knots, thus reflecting the rise of German ambition for something more than a coast-defence fleet. The belts of these ships were 7?5 inches wide, with a thickness amidships of 8?9 inches, while the four 9?4-inch guns were protected with armour 9?8 inches thick, and the secondary turrets and casemates carrying the eighteen 5?9-inch guns were protected with armour 5?9 inches thick.

After the passage of the Navy Act of 1900 the 9?4-inch gun, as the battle weapon, was abandoned in favour of an 11-inch of 40 calibre, and the displacement of the new ships of the Deutschland class, as they are generically termed, although there are minor differences in the ten vessels, was nearly 13,000 tons. These ships really represented the entrance of Germany upon the high seas as a first-class naval Power, possessing vessels fit to lie in the line and to fight the men-of-war under any foreign flag. The new design may be contrasted with advantage with that of the Worth class which has already been described:

Deutschland Class.

Krupp, complete belt, about 7 feet wide, 8?9 inches amidships, tapering to 3?9 inches at ends; lower edge amidships, 6?7 inches; lower deck side amidships, 5?5 inches; main turrets and barbettes, 11 inches to 9?8 inches; secondary turrets, 6?7 inches; battery, 5?9 inches; conning-tower, 11?8 inches; s.t.--aft, 5?5 inches; deck, 2?9 inches on slopes, 1?6 inches on flat.

Four 11 inch in pairs in turrets, fore and aft; 14 6?7 inch , 10 in battery on main deck, 4 singly in turrets on upper deck; 12 3?4 inch ; 4 machine; torpedo tubes, 6 , 4 submerged, 1 bow, and 1 stern.

Simultaneously with the construction of these ten battleships, six armoured cruisers, ranging in displacement from 8,800 to about 11,000 tons, were laid down, and in 1906 a single clause amending the Act was passed increasing the foreign fleet by five armoured cruisers and the fleet reserve by one armoured cruiser, thus fulfilling in part the original programme of the Navy Department with which the Reichstag had interfered.

The entrance of this little ship into the British service was hailed in Germany with something approaching derision, and in the technical papers the futility of the submarine was urged with a wealth of argument. The little Holland boat, however, was merely the foundation from which the British authorities proceeded to develop a type of craft in keeping with the offensive r?le of the British Navy, and in 1906 submarines were being built for the British Fleet mounting two torpedo tubes on a displacement of about 300 tons, and possessing a surface speed of fourteen knots in combination with a submerged speed of ten knots. When it is added that these craft possessed a full speed radius of about 3,000 miles on the surface and were estimated to be able to travel 150 miles under water, it is not surprising that German naval opinion as to the advantages of the submarine underwent a sudden and dramatic change. Henceforth the submarine was to be treated by German naval officers with respect. Without the formality of any public announcement, either in the Reichstag or in the Press, an under-water boat was laid down at the Germania Yard at Kiel in 1906, and thenceforward an energetic policy of construction was pursued, although it was not until two years later that legislative provision was made for the building of this type of warship.

A very remarkable feature of German policy has been the persistency with which cruisers have been built even at a time when other naval Powers, including Great Britain, were inactive. As a matter of course, during the period when the German Government was content to provide a fleet mainly for the purposes of coast defence, great importance was attached to the efficiency and adequacy of the cruiser squadrons. At the time of the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, for instance, there were eighteen cruisers completed and nearly a dozen others in hand. Under the Act of that year provision was made to continue this policy while attaining a higher standard of battle strength. Even when, in 1908, legislative effect was given to the ambition of the Marine Office further to expedite battleship construction, in spite of the heavy cost involved by the transition from mixed armament ships to the all-big-gun ships of the Dreadnought era, the Reichstag was asked to stereotype the cruiser programme. The Act made provision for two light cruisers to be laid down annually, and in the measure passed in 1912 an addition of two "small cruisers" was made for the period 1912-1917. A notable contrast is provided by a study of Germany's action and the policy of the British Admiralty charged with the protection of a vast oversea trade and half the shipping of the world. During the later years of the last century and the first four years of the present century a persistent policy of construction was pursued both in armoured and protected cruisers, and then for several years there was a complete cessation of this form of shipbuilding activity. Other countries, Germany only excepted, either acting on their own initiative or accepting the lead of the British authorities also desisted from cruiser construction. The advance in the size and cost of large armoured ships threw heavy burdens upon the respective Exchequers, and no doubt the saving effected was a welcome relief at a moment when under every flag naval expenditure was advancing at an unparalleled rate. The result of the persistent policy adopted by Germany became apparent in 1911, when in modern swift cruisers suitable for scouting the two fleets were practically upon an equality. It was in these circumstances, faced by evidence of German progress in cruiser construction, that the British authorities again decided to embark upon the building of new squadrons of cruisers of small size and high speed--in fact, of considerably smaller size than the ships then in hand in Germany.

But in battleship construction German policy has necessarily been less continuous and consistent. The war between Russia and Japan in the Far East, and the lessons which it taught to the naval world were destined to upset completely the theories upon which battleship and larger cruiser design in Germany had been based in the early years of the present century. The German naval authorities had persisted in attaching primary importance to the secondary gun, still believing in the moral and material effect of a storm of projectiles from numerous quick-firing guns. They were still proceeding with the construction of ships--battleships and large cruisers--embodying these ideas when a new Board of Admiralty in London, with Admiral Sir John--now Lord--Fisher as First Sea Lord, appointed a Committee to reconsider the design of British ships in the light of the information which the gunnery tests of the fleet and the struggle in the Far East had supplied.

Thanks to the British alliance with the Japanese, British officers, and British officers only, had been permitted to be present with the Japanese Fleet during the decisive battles of the war. With the advantage of the information thus obtained the designs of British ships were reconsidered. The report of this Committee was treated as confidential. In presenting the Navy Estimates for 1905 to the House of Commons, the Earl of Selborne, the First Lord, contented himself with making the following statement as to the work of this body, and of the new programme of construction:

"I may claim that the work of the Committee will enable the Board to ensure to the Navy the immediate benefit of the experience which is to be derived from the naval warfare between Russia and Japan, and of the resultant studies of the Naval Intelligence Department. I can however hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the public service to publish either the reference to the Committee or its report.

"It is proposed to begin during the financial year 1905-06: 1 battleship, 4 armoured cruisers, 5 ocean-going destroyers, 1 ocean-going destroyer of the experimental type, 12 coastal destroyers, 11 submarines.

It was stated unofficially that this new ship of the all-big-gun type rendered obsolescent practically all the battleships of the world with mixed armaments--that is with guns of varying size. The British naval authorities continued to maintain a discreet silence as to the character of the new vessels, and the design, as its main characteristics became known, was assailed with a good deal of criticism. The controversy was at its height when President Roosevelt called upon Commander Sims, the Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy, to make a report upon the advantages possessed by the all-big-gun ship of high speed and complete armour protection in view of the criticism of the British design of Admiral Mahan. Commander Sims, who had made a life-study of gunnery questions, prepared a long report describing the character of the revolution in design, and its influence upon the navies of the world. It is interesting to recall some passages from this report, which in its essential portions appeared in the proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, particularly as the British Admiralty have never considered it wise to enter upon a detailed defence of their policy. Commander Sims stated:

"Concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that is, discarding all smaller guns and designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns, these alone to be used in battle against other ships, I think it could be clearly shown that Captain Mahan is in error in concluding that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns ; and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the fact that much important information concerning the new methods of gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article.

"I may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build a man-of-war of any type whatever, having more than one calibre of gun in her main battery. In other words, it may be stated that the abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favour of the all-big-gun, one-calibre ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain fundamental principles of naval markmanship developed by gunnery officers.

"Therefore we have but to decide what the calibre for each class of ships should be, a decision which should present no special difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships or by the destruction or demoralization of their personnel.

"In this connection the following facts should first be clearly understood--namely:

"1. Turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. Instead of having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and officers are exposed to disablement there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side of the turret, and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armour plates, so arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets.

"2. On the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armour belt will be about eight feet above the water-line, and extending from end to end. The conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armour; and there being no intermediate battery , it follows that in battle all the gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire-control party aloft, will be behind heavy armour, and that, therefore, neither the ship or her personnel can be materially injured by small calibre guns.

"Considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun one-calibre ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their guns."

In the same paper Commander Sims explained the principal tactical qualities that are desirable in a fleet--namely, compactness of the battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit--that is, its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and space with safety to its units. Proceeding to elaborate his views, Commander Sims stated:

"For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to be equally skilful, with the exception of the Commanders-in-Chief, whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been so drilled as to be able to manoeuvre with precision and safety while maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other fleet requires.

"This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:

"1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certain important manoeuvres in about one-half the time and one half the space required for similar manoeuvres of the long fleet.

"2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these.

"It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions--that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills.

"Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in manoeuvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and manoeuvring qualities. For example, the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.

"If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire--the loss of these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present size."

Finally, this officer added:

"If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns, it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to advantage without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed largely by the length of the ship--which increases slowly with the displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a German publication. I do not remember the displacement used by the author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000 tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a 20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns.

"It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.

"Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ... 'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand.

" ... The inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods of training belongs exclusively to Captain Percy Scott, Director of Naval Practice of the British Navy, who has, I believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy, as early as 1892. As soon as the above facts gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient."

No sooner was the true inwardness of the Dreadnought policy realized than the German authorities began the preparation of a new German Navy Act. It was eventually decided that the best

This point is an important one. Between 1897 and 1904, Great Britain laid down 27 battleships and 35 armoured cruisers--a total of 62 armoured ships in eight years, or an average of 7?75 ships a year. In this period Germany built 16 battleships and 5 armoured cruisers, or 21 armoured ships--equal to an average of 2?62 ships a year. In 1905 the Admiralty determined to cease building armoured cruisers. In that year they laid down 4 "capital ships"--all of them Dreadnoughts; in the next two years 3 annually, and in 1908, 2 ships only. While the British authorities abandoned the building of armoured cruisers, Germany decided to accelerate her battleship construction, and she also decided that all the "large cruisers" specified in her Law should be swift Dreadnoughts, and thus from 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers, she rose to an establishment of 58 battleships.

At the end of 1911, when it was imagined that the German programme would fall from 4 large ships annually to 2 ships, a new Navy Bill was produced. Incidentally this measure added to the establishment 3 battleships and 2 unarmoured cruisers, and made provision for the construction of a maximum of 72 submarines.

The significance of the successive changes in shipbuilding policy in Germany, reflecting in an ascending scale the naval ambitions of the Marineamt, may be realised from the following summary, showing the establishment of large armoured ships fixed under successive measures:

Under the operation of German naval legislation, it was determined to provide sixty-one large armoured ships of maximum power, all of them less than twenty years old. The Act did not specify the character of the vessels of the various classes to be laid down. It was elastic in this respect. It left to the Marine Office complete freedom in the matter of design; but, on the other hand, it tied effectually the hands of the Reichstag, and it could not, except it repealed the Navy Law, reduce in any year the number of keels to be laid down. There could be no reduction in the output of naval material until a new Navy Law had been passed. This is a point which was frequently forgotten in England.

But the notable feature of the Navy Act passed by the Reichstag in 1912 was not the additions to the shipbuilding programme, though these were notable, but the steps taken to increase the instant readiness of the fleet for war. Prior to the passage of this measure it had been the practice in the British Navy to maintain only about half the men-of-war of various classes on a war footing, relegating the remainder to reserves representing various stages of preparedness for action. The German Navy Act of 1912 set up an entirely new standard with a view to obtaining the maximum advantage from a conscript service, where the pay is low, in competition with a voluntary service, such as obtains in the British Fleet, with very much higher rates of pay. In the speech which he delivered in Committee in the House of Commons on July 22nd, 1912, Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, gave a lucid explanation of the essential features of this German Navy Act. He said:

"The main feature of that Law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is an important feature. The main feature is the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be available, immediately available, at all seasons of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle-fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended Law, the active battle-fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers; in the near future that active fleet will consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and, whereas at present owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this Law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available.

"Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers--or torpedo-boats, as they are called in Germany--instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144. Three-quarters of a million pounds had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the building of submarines. The new Law adds a quarter of a million to this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent years. Seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of the Law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four with full permanent crews.

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