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Read Ebook: A History of Greek Economic Thought by Trever Albert Augustus
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Ebook has 1736 lines and 69809 words, and 35 pages
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Thuc. ii. 40. 1; i. 70. 8; ii. 40. 2; etc.
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Thuc. i. 2.
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VALUE
Strictly speaking, Plato's contribution to a theory of economic value and a definition of wealth is practically nil. In his discussion of just price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange value. He implies that, since goods exchange according to definite proportions, they should have a common quality capable of measurement, and that just price corresponds to this. He offers no suggestion as to the nature of this quality, except that, in stating that "the artisan knows what the value of his product is," he seems to be thinking of labor, or cost of production, as the chief element in value.
In other passages, he insists on the doctrine taught previously by Democritus, and later by Xenophon and other philosophers, that so-called goods depend for their value upon the ability of the possessor to use them rightly. This idea is represented in modern thought especially by Ruskin. The theory is, of course, true of absolute value, and, in a sense, even of economic value, in that "all exchangeableness of a commodity depends upon the sum of capacity for its use." It cannot be made a criterion of economic value, though the allied idea, implied by Plato and urged by Ruskin, that the innate quality of the thing, its capacity for good or harm, is a real element in economic value, is being recognized today. This is evident in the increasing hostility toward such so-called commodities as opium and intoxicating liquors. Since we have begun to define political economy in terms of human life rather than in terms of property, Ruskin's definition of wealth is more acceptable: "the things which the nature of humanity has rendered in all ages, and must render in all ages to come ... the objects of legitimate desire."
WEALTH
Plato has much to say of wealth, though he deals with it strictly from the standpoint of the moralist. We look in vain for a clear definition, or for a consistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods. His terms are ???????, used of both material and spiritual wealth; ???????, often interpreted literally of "useful things," as the basis of the subjective doctrine of value discussed above; ???????, "possessions," and such words as ?????? and ????????. His use of these terms, especially the first, is ambiguous. At times he means material goods only; again, like Ruskin, he includes every human good, intellectual and moral as well; again he means "excessive wealth." As a result of his conception of value, he includes in material wealth all those objects that depend for their worth upon wise use and character in the possessor. Material wealth is regularly placed last by Plato, as inferior to all other goods of soul or body, a mere means, and not an end in itself, for virtue does not come from property, but property and all other goods from virtue. Material goods should be the last thing in one's thought, and the fact that people universally put them first is the cause of many ills to state and individual alike. Wealth is not blind, if only it follows wisdom. The things usually called goods are not rightly so named, unless the possessor be just and worthy. To the base, on the other hand, they are the greatest evil. In all of this, Plato is the forerunner of Ruskin, with his characteristic assertions: "Only so much as one can use is wealth, beyond that is illth"; and "Wealth depends also on vital power in the possessor."
Plato especially inveighs against excessive wealth and luxury. Men are urged not to lay up riches for their children, since great wealth is of no use to them or the state. The prime object of good legislation should not be, as is commonly supposed, to make the state as rich as possible, since excessive wealth and luxury decrease productive efficiency, are incompatible with the highest character or happiness, being based on both unjust acquisition and unjust expenditure , produce degeneration in individual and nation, and are the direct cause of war and civic strife. Were it feasible, he would prefer to go back to the simpler life of earlier times, before luxury and the inordinate desire for riches had so dominated all society. Of course he realizes that such a return is impossible, but he has little hope of any other escape from the evils. He is thus led to express the belief that the fewer wants the better, a doctrine common also to Ruskin, Carlyle, and Thoreau.
However, Plato has no prejudice against moderate wealth. His sermons are directed against excessive commercialism, which puts money before the human interest, thereby causing injustice, degenerate luxury, vicious extremes of wealth and poverty, political graft, individual inefficiency, and wars both within and without the state. Though his philosophy leads to asceticism, and his attitude toward wealth seems, on the surface, to breathe this spirit, yet Plato is not an ascetic in his doctrine of wealth, as is often wrongly asserted. He describes the true attitude as that which partakes of both pleasures and pains, not shunning, but mastering them. He recognizes an assured competency to be practically a prerequisite for the development of the good life, while, on the other hand, he considers poverty to be an evil only second to excessive wealth.
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