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Index 493

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY

THE WAR WITH FRANCE TILL 1693

The Revolution of 1688 drew a line across the history of England, and marked the termination of the great struggle between King and Parliament. From that time forward it was settled beyond all dispute that when the two differed the last word was not to be with the king. Our sovereigns have ruled by a Parliamentary title, and the authority which conferred the Crown must always be superior in fact, if not in theory, to the Crown itself. Within Parliament the dominating body must necessarily be the House of Commons, which has the command of the purse. After 1688 the Crown, or the aristocracy, could only govern by securing the support, by means of pocket boroughs, by persuasion or corruption, of a majority of the Lower House. The navy, like the rest of the nation, was deeply affected by the change. From this time forward we hear little of the personal influence of the king. It was to the House of Commons that the navy appealed. Officers who wished to push their fortunes no longer thought of securing the goodwill of the sovereign or of a favourite. They became members of the House of Commons and earned promotion by serving a Parliamentary party. In one way the change was for the manifest good of the navy. It now had a master who might be unwilling to pay handsomely, but who both would and could pay whatever he chose to promise with a regularity far beyond the power of the king. In the years following the Revolution there were indeed complaints of wages in arrear and of necessities neglected. But this was only during the first period of strife. The increasing wealth of the nation supplied Parliament with ample means, and after a time the money was always regularly forthcoming. In another way the change was not so good. A great deal of party spirit was introduced into the navy, and there were times when Whig and Tory animosities interfered with the loyal discharge of duty.

The final victory of the tarpaulin element in the corps of naval officers brought with it both good and evil. The good lay in their seamanship. Even a bad seaman is better than an ignorant or careless landsman in command of a ship. The purely technical part of the navy's work, that which consisted in the mere handling of the vessel, was better done in the years following the Revolution than had been the case before, except during the Interregnum, when also the sailors had been the predominant element. The evil which came was of a kind not to be wholly attributed to the disappearance of the military officer from the higher ranks of the fleet. It was that there was a distinct fall in the purely military spirit, and as a navy is a fighting as well as a navigating force, this was a misfortune. When we speak of a fallen military spirit, it is not meant that there was any sinking in the mere courage of the service, but only that the naval officer as he became at the Revolution and as he remained till far into the eighteenth century, was first and foremost a seaman, and that he had a tendency to discharge the military side of his duty in blind obedience to various rules of thumb. Two reasons may be assigned for this. Times of revolution are very often followed by times of lassitude. The seventeenth century had been very stormy, and it was to be expected that the Englishman of the following generations would be a less daring and original man than his ancestor of the Civil War time. The sailors shared in the general deadening and commonplaceness of their age. It was only natural that men who went to sea as boys, and were never asked to be more than sailors, should not have tried to be more. Then it was the misfortune of the navy that just at a time when it was tending to stupidity in military conduct, it was called upon by authority to obey a set of hard and fast rules.

The great bulk of the officers who had served King James passed over to his successor. A few, indeed, followed the exiled king, and among them was Sir Roger Strickland, who as a Roman Catholic was disqualified for office. Captain David Lloyd also adhered to his master, and was very busy during the years next ensuing in endeavouring to shake the new allegiance of his former brother-officers. In this, however, he had no success. In spite of discontent, and although some naval officers endeavoured to provide for their own safety in case of a restoration by sending promises to King James, the navy as a whole remained loyal.

The war now beginning lasted with an interval of truce between 1697 and 1702, until the signing of the Peace of Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne. It was in reality one continuous war waged by Europe in self-defence, and by France for the purpose of establishing the predominance of the house of Bourbon. The naval part of this struggle is divided into two periods. During the first, which lasted to the close of 1793, the French king kept great fleets at sea. After that date the exhaustion of his treasury through the calls made upon it by the land war rendered him incapable of meeting the allies at sea with equal forces. He was driven by penury to lay up his ships, and the war on the side of France was conducted by privateers. In this second period the allied fleets still kept the sea, swept the French coast, and co-operated with the armies.

When hostilities began in 1689, the first object of the French was to give assistance to King James in Ireland. The first duty of the English was to defeat his efforts, and then to cover the passage of our own forces. The Dutch had to protect their own commerce and to co-operate with us in the general purposes of the war.

The news that the French king was about to supply his cousin with the means of passing over to Ireland reached London early in March. A squadron was prepared to sail for the purpose of intercepting Gabaret, but it started too late. Herbert, who went in command without resigning his place as First Commissioner of the Admiralty, did not reach Cork until the 17th of April. All he could do now was to intercept whatever further help the French might be sending to the assistance of the Jacobites. He knew that a force was preparing at Brest under the command of the Count of Ch?teaurenault. Not finding any sign of this expedition on the coast of Ireland, Herbert stood over to Brest. Either at this time, or shortly afterwards, he detached George Rooke with a small squadron to the west of Scotland, for the double purpose of rendering what help he could to the Protestants of Ulster and preventing the French from sending help to the Scottish Jacobites. The wind was easterly on the coast of France, and Herbert failed to reach Brest in time, or to approach it close enough to prevent Ch?teaurenault from sailing with a fleet of vessels of from 40 to 60 guns, 5 fireships, and a number of transports carrying 6000 soldiers. Finding that the French had escaped him, Herbert returned to the south coast of Ireland, and was off Cork on the 29th April. The French fleet were seen in the neighbourhood of Kinsale, and Herbert stood in to place himself between them and the coast. Ch?teaurenault made no attempt to land at Kinsale, but steered west for Bantry. At Baltimore, Herbert obtained information of his enemy's destination. He at once pursued, but on rounding Cape Clear caught sight of the Frenchmen heading for Bantry Bay. This was on the afternoon of the 30th of April. The day being far advanced, Herbert did not follow Ch?teaurenault at once, but lay to all the night. The force under his command is variously stated as nineteen and twenty-two ships of the line. The average size of the English ships was about the same as the French.

This estimate shows that the French took a modest view of what constituted success in naval operations. Ch?teaurenault, if he had pushed his attack home on Herbert, might have had some English prizes to show, and might have greatly encouraged the enemies of England, besides landing his soldiers and bringing off his transports. But he at least had some case. What is extraordinary, when we think what had been once the standard of the English navy, was that Herbert bragged of having gained a victory because he had not been routed by an enemy of slightly superior force, and that his countrymen, instead of laughing at him, or asking indignantly why he did not fight again, threw up their caps and huzzaed. The battle, and the praise given it, were melancholy signs of the poorness of spirit which had come over Englishmen since the Second Dutch War. It was the beginning of a dull method of doing work in the navy, happily never universal, but much too common, during the next half century or more. We see the French admiral intent on carrying out some operation other than attacking the English fleet, fighting a little, but with great care not to fight seriously. Opposite him is the English admiral, who has no idea that a decisive battle is possible unless the enemy is good enough to supply him with one, and perfectly ready to go off so soon as a few broken spars give him an excuse for saying enough has been done. Herbert went on from Scilly to Portsmouth. The king may not in his heart have thought much of the battle, but he knew the necessity of pleasing the naval officers and the great Tory party. He therefore professed himself satisfied, knighted two of the captains, John Ashby and Cloudesley Shovell, and made Herbert Earl of Torrington.

After the relief of Londonderry, Rooke had other important work to do in the Irish Sea. In August he covered the transport of Schomberg's army to Ireland, and co-operated in the capture of Carrickfergus. Then he cruised down the coast, threatening the towns held for King James, and landing where the enemy was not too strong to be attacked. As the autumn drew on, and his ships became foul, Rooke came round to the Downs, and his squadron was laid up for the winter. In the meantime, the Grand Fleet of combined English and Dutch had cruised in the Channel under the command of Herbert, who was joined by Edward Russell. They looked into Brest, and cruised at the mouth of the Channel, going every now and then into Torbay for provisions. There were many complaints of the want of beer. At last, when the autumn had begun, the Grand Fleet also came back, and was laid up. It was still not thought prudent to keep the great ships out late in the autumn.

The winter afforded the English Government an opportunity to prepare for a vigorous campaign, but it was neglected. The first joy over the Revolution was followed by a reaction. The two sections of the victorious party, the Whig and the Tory, began to quarrel and to struggle for predominance. These factions were nowhere more acutely felt than at the Admiralty. It is said by several authorities, and denied by nobody, that Herbert had fallen back into the dissolute habits of his early life. He was addicted to excesses which are ruinous to a man's nerve and energy. It is certain that the work of the Admiralty was so badly done that the French privateers were very successful against our trade. In the new establishment of pay, made in 1694, it was said that the increase of salary was given in order that the officers might no longer be able to make their poverty an excuse for not doing their duty. Given the moral level of the Restoration and the Revolution, it is not incredible that captains, who were sulky at the loss of their table money, did refuse to exert themselves in defence of the merchant ships unless they were bribed. The old complaints of bad rations, bad pay, and bad beer were loud in the fleet. At last it was found necessary to make a change at headquarters. The existing Board of Admiralty was dissolved, and replaced by another with the Earl of Pembroke at its head. Torrington was very indignant, and threatened to resign the command of the fleet in the Channel. He was pacified with gifts, and then showed his zeal as an officer by staying in London to enjoy himself. He afterwards said that he had warned the Government that a larger fleet must be prepared, but did not take the effectual step of insisting upon resigning unless he was supplied with sufficient force.

This disaster was the Battle of Beachy Head, which the French call the Battle of B?visier, a corruption of Pevensey Bay. As the year grew on, the English Government became aware that a large French force might soon be expected in the Channel. The crisis was a very dangerous one, since the king had sailed for Ireland with all the best troops. There were few left in England, and the discontent of the Jacobites was notorious. The naval preparations made to meet an enemy were insufficient. When Torrington was at last sent down to Portsmouth on the 28th May there were but thirty-two English ships and eighteen Dutch collected.

Tourville had sailed from Brest on the 13th of June. The reinforcements brought him by Ch?teaurenault raised his fleet to something over seventy ships of the line, with thirty fireships and some small craft. He sailed into the Channel, and his approach was first known to Torrington on the 22nd. The English admiral was completely surprised by the appearance of the enemy. At a later period, when his conduct was called into question, he endeavoured to throw the blame for his want of knowledge on the ministers, who, as he complained, had not sent him down till the last of May, when it was too late for him to station look-out ships off Brest. It does not, however, appear why he thought it necessary to stay in London till he was driven out by a special order. After the change in the Admiralty Board he had no official duties in the capital, and if he stayed there till he earned from the sailors the nickname of Lord Tarry-in-Town, it was presumably because he did not wish to leave. Even so, he was with the fleet on the 30th of May, and might have detached look-out ships to the mouth of the Channel. He said he did, and then immediately afterwards said he did not, because all his frigates were engaged in shipping Lord Pembroke's newly raised regiment of marines. The Dutch, to whom he entrusted the duty, without taking the trouble to see whether it were executed, were too busy shipping their stores to have leisure for anything else. The allied fleet, in fact, presented a picture of sloth and carelessness. When the enemy was known to be in the immediate neighbourhood, it weighed anchor, and dropped down to Dunnose. Here it was joined by two English and three Dutch ships of the line, which raised it to fifty-five. Torrington anchored and remained at anchor until the 25th. On that day he again weighed with the wind at N.E. and on the afternoon sighted the French to the south of the Isle of Wight. They were much scattered, and some of them were far to leeward. In such circumstances Monk would at once have attacked the enemy within striking distance in the hope of crippling him severely before he could be reinforced. Torrington drew his fleet into a line of battle and made towards the enemy. But he soon came to the conclusion that "they had enough in a body to have given us more than sufficient work." He could not understand why they had not attacked him. It is probable that they abstained because he was to windward and they were scattered. To Monk the fact that the enemy was shy would have been an extra reason for attacking. To Torrington it only suggested dismal reflections as to what might happen if the French became enterprising, and therefore he retired. During the 26th he worked back from the south of the Isle of Wight to the N.E. A letter which he wrote on this day to the Council is marked on every line with glee over the embarrassment the crisis was likely to cause to his political opponents. He did indeed say that he would watch the enemy, and get to westward of them if he could; but before this he had expressed his opinion that the best course was to fall back to the Gunfleet, and then the ships from the west might come up to Portsmouth, and join him over the "Flats," that is the shallows at the mouth of the Thames. The ships from the west were Killigrew's squadron. Torrington knew that they had been cruising and must be foul, and it was certainly within his knowledge that they were less numerous than his own fleet. Yet he proposed to subject them to the risk of passing the French fleet, which he thought too great to be run by himself. This was not how Tromp had behaved when he united the fleets of the Maas and the Texel in defiance of Monk at the end of the First Dutch War.

It would seem that there are two types of fighting man. The first when in presence of the enemy instinctively thinks, "How can I strike with the most effect." The great race are of this type. To it belong Blake and Monk, Hawke, Hood, Nelson, and their like, among our admirals; and, among our enemies, Tromp, De Ruyter, and Suffren. Then there is another kind of fighting man who may be brave enough personally, but who, when he is a commander, instinctively says, "How can I prevent the enemy from hurting me." This kind of leader has fortunately been rare with us at sea, but Herbert was of the race, and so was Byng. Such men are always looking over their shoulders, always making the most of the enemy's force, always exaggerating the defects of their own command. They seek for excuses to do nothing, and when they do come to the resolution to fight, the opposite determination to retreat forms itself underneath, as it were spontaneously. This was the natural tendency of Herbert as he had already shown in Bantry Bay, and it was strengthened by his wish to punish those political rivals in London who had refused to take his advice, and had turned him out of the Admiralty.

When his letter of the 26th reached the Council it was not unnaturally interpreted by them as indicating a wish to retire to the Gunfleet at once. This may have been a mistake, but an admiral who said that he had "heartily given God thanks" that the enemy declined battle, and added, "I shall not think myself very unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting," had no ground to complain if he was thought to be wanting in spirit. No member of the Council was more bitter against Herbert than his brother seaman Edward Russell, a rancorous man, and an extreme Whig. He was very probably moved by jealousy, but the queen and the civil members of the Council can hardly be severely blamed for not entirely trusting one admiral, when another admiral condemned him without stint. On general grounds the Council was justified in expecting more energy from Torrington. The danger was not that a great French army could land, this the queen's counsellors knew to be impossible, but that a small corps of French troops might be thrown on shore which could act as a rallying point to the partizans of King James. It was a great object to rouse the general patriotic feeling of the country, and there was no more effectual method of doing that than a battle. The case was one in which it was better to fight, and be beaten, than not to fight at all. A letter was written in the queen's name to Torrington. It was worded with no apparent want of confidence, and it left him free not to fight if he preferred; but it ordered him strictly not to lose sight of the French, to get to windward of them if he could, but to fight on the first advantage rather than to go to the Gunfleet.

The letter reached Torrington on the 29th of June. He called a council of war which agreed with him that it implied an order to fight on the first advantage. A previous council of war had confirmed his opinion that it was better not to fight. It may be laid down as a general rule that a council of war is a mere blind for the commander-in-chief. When it does not consist of his dependants it must still necessarily be full of his inferiors in rank, who have been trained by the habits of their life not to contradict the commanding officer. Besides, when he wants to fight, it looks cowardly to recommend retreat, and, when he wants to retreat, it looks like a reflection on his courage to insist upon fighting.

Fire began at nine o'clock when the Dutch ships under Admiral Cullemburg came into action with the French van. Owing to the inferiority of the allies in numbers there was a danger that as they could not stretch all along the line of the French fleet some of the ships in the French line would turn to windward, and put either the Dutch or the English, according to circumstances, between two fires. The danger was one which De Ruyter had had to face in the battles of 1672 and 1673, and he had provided for it by telling off a squadron to watch the enemy's van and had then thrown the bulk of his own force on the rear. It shows how useless experience is to naturally stupid men, that although all the senior officers present had served either with, or against, De Ruyter, none of them thought of following his example. All the allied leaders could do was to endeavour to get as near as they could to stretching themselves out to the same length as the enemy by sending the van down against the French van; by keeping the Red Division opposite the enemy's centre; and by leaving the attack on the rear to Sir Ralph Delaval. While they were bearing down, Herbert changed his mind once, or twice, as to the exact point of the enemy's line he wished to reach, and altered the course of his ship accordingly. The result was that Sir John Ashby became puzzled as to the intentions of his commander-in-chief, and finally ended by attaching himself to the Dutch. In the end Torrington placed himself opposite the rear of the French centre so that there came a gap between him and Ashby. Being afraid that the French would stand out of their own line, in order to pass through this opening, Herbert kept his ships a good distance from the enemy so that he might be the better placed to head off such as attended this movement. As the French began to move ahead slowly, just as the allies came down, the Dutch could not get abreast of the leading ship, and struck on them at the ninth.

The subsequent movements of Tourville may be dismissed in a few lines. He remained in the Channel until the early days of August, ranging at will up and down and of course paralysing commerce, but he did nothing more against our coast than burn the little town of Teignmouth in South Devon. There was nothing in fact that he could do. The Jacobite rising did not take place because he had no troops to land to help the country gentlemen, who were resolved not to move until they were secure against being attacked by the Government's forces before they were sufficiently organised to offer any resistance. In August Tourville returned quietly to Brest. There had been a furious outbreak of anger in the country against Torrington and a great movement of patriotism which was unspeakably to the advantage of King William's government. Yet when Torrington was brought to trial in December he was acquitted. The acquittal was intelligible. King William's victory at the Boyne, gained just after the battle of Beachy Head, had put the country into good humour, and the admiral's most bitter accusers were the Dutch who were not popular in England. But it was none the less a misfortune. Torrington had not done his utmost. His position indeed was a difficult one, but it was not worse than Monk's in 1666, or De Ruyter's in 1672, '73, and he had not behaved as these men had done. When a court martial could find no fault with his management it lowered the whole standard of conduct expected of an English naval officer. It showed that a man who leaned to the side of timidity would not be condemned by other officers. Then, too, the court, which could see nothing to blame in his feeble effort of attack on the 30th June, must have been composed of men of a lower level of intelligence than the sea chiefs, whether Dutch, or English of the previous wars. It laid the foundation of that pedantic adherence to the line and the practice of engaging from van to rear which afterwards led to the monstrous sentence on Admiral Mathews, to the helpless weakness of Byng, and to the stupidity of Graves. Perhaps the ugliest feature of the whole transaction was this, that the English excused Torrington very largely on the ground that the chief sufferers in the battle had been the Dutch. There was something very base in the code of honour of people who did not think it ignoble to throw the burden of battle on an ally.

While Tourville was ranging the Channel the English government had fitted out a fresh armament. It was put under the combined command of Sir Richard Haddock, Sir John Ashby, and Admiral Killigrew. This fleet could, however, do little. The French were no longer at sea, and the great ships were laid up as usual before the beginning of autumn. Yet one good piece of service was done before the year was closed. Marlborough had suggested that an expedition might be sent to act against the partisans of King James in the south of Ireland. The scheme was approved by King William, and Marlborough sailed in September, under an escort of third and fourth rates commanded by the admirals. Cork was taken on the 29th September, and the bulk of the ships then returned to the Channel, leaving a few to co-operate with Marlborough in the attack on Kinsale. This completed the expedition. A separate squadron of ships had cruised during this year on the coast of Ireland, under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovell, and had co-operated in the taking of Duncannon.

The operations of 1691 were of a nature to confirm this belief. A powerful fleet was sent to sea by the allies under the command of Russell. Its movements throughout the summer were wearisome and unimportant. It went to and fro between May and the beginning of autumn. In the meantime Tourville was at sea with a fleet of eighty sail of the line. His cruise is rather a famous passage in French naval history. He contrived to keep the sea without allowing himself to be forced to battle--and at last, by making clever use of a shift of wind, managed to get into Brest untouched by the allied fleet. The pride of the French of the time with this achievement, and the satisfaction they have expressed at it since, are the condemnation of a navy, and a method of conducting war. Tourville was quite strong enough to fight the allies, yet his movements were directed to avoiding battle and to capturing merchant ships. As a matter of fact, he missed his great prize, the Smyrna convoy, and in the meantime Limerick, King James's last stronghold in Ireland, was taken, and the country thoroughly subdued. The great French fleet had preserved itself, but the King of France had lost an ally who kept up a useful diversion of the resources of England. A fighting force which makes it a principal object to avoid battle is doomed to defeat when it comes across an enemy who makes it a steady rule to fight. But the French never took the view that if you wish to use the sea you must drive your enemy off it, and if you want to do that you must smash him. In the dullest times the English navy has always understood that the beating of the French navy was the preliminary to everything else. The French government, which was much distressed by lack of money, was angry with Tourville for missing the convoy, and accused him of timidity.

The allied Dutch and English fleets were out early. Their Governments had a double motive for wasting no time. They were aware that an army of invasion, consisting in part of Irish regiments in the service of France, was being collected in Normandy for the invasion of England. In spite of many disappointments King James was still hopeful, and he had persuaded the King of France to make an effort to help the Jacobites in England. The army of invasion, some 30,000 strong, was collected in the C?tentin. They were quartered at La Hougue, on the eastern side of the C?tentin. Another object for which the allies had to provide was the safe return of the ships, Dutch and English, composing the Smyrna convoy. It was coming home under the protection of a squadron commanded by Sir Ralph Delaval. In order to discharge the double duty of covering the return of the convoy and watching the French, a detached squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Carter cruised on the coast from Brest to Cape La Hague, the north-westerly point of the C?tentin. Delaval brought his convoy back in March and then joined Carter on the coast of France. In later times the English navy would have prepared to prevent the concentration of the French fleet by cruising off Brest, but at the end of the seventeenth century our officers had not yet acquired that confidence in their vessels, and the vessels had not been so far perfected, as to make cruising in spring on so dangerous a coast as that about Brest appear practicable for the great ships. The grand fleet was not in fact fully ready for sea till May, when Russell called in the detached squadrons, and united his whole force at St. Helens.

There was another reason for bringing the fleet together. The Government had decided on making a demonstration. During the last few months, as indeed at all times in King William's reign, the Jacobite agents had been very busy. The great discontent undoubtedly existing among the naval officers, and partly due to the grievances as to their pay, had appeared to give the friends of the exiled king an opportunity. Captain David Lloyd had been running to and fro with great zeal. His old comrades were too much attached to him to betray him to the Government even when they were opposed to his party, and there were no doubt great numbers of English naval officers who were as well disposed as other Englishmen to restore the exiled king if only he would not be his own worst enemy. These men would not be shocked by arguments in his favour. As they had themselves been praised and in some cases rewarded for deserting King James, it would be unreasonable to expect that they should have been greatly offended when asked by an old brother officer to desert back to him from King William. The activity of Lloyd was perfectly well known to the English Government. He had spoken to Carter, who had immediately reported the whole of the conversation to the queen. Lloyd himself does not appear to have taken all the grumblings he heard among his brother seamen very seriously, and the Council of Regency was probably not very frightened. But it wisely decided to bring all doubts to the test. On the 15th May a letter drawn up in the queen's name by the Secretary, Nottingham, was sent down to the flag officers and captains of the fleet. In this letter the queen informed them that she had heard stories accusing them of disloyalty but she did not believe the accusations, and continued to repose the most complete confidence in their fidelity. This profession of a confidence it would have been wise to assume, even if it had not been sincerely felt, was at once communicated by Russell to his subordinates. It had the effect which had been hoped for. The fleet answered by unanimous expression of loyalty. An address expressing the perfect readiness of all the officers to venture their lives, with all imaginable "alacrity and resolution," in defence "of the Government and of the religion and liberty of the country and against all Popish invaders whatsoever," was drawn up and signed on behalf of the fleet by sixty-four flag officers and captains.

An opportunity was speedily given to these officers to show that they could be as good as their word. A council of war decided to take the initiative against the French. A body of troops was to be landed at St. Malo, while the allied fleet was to lie to the westward of that place in order to provoke a battle. On the 18th May, Russell sailed from St. Helens, and on the following day when he was about twenty miles off Cape Barfleur, the easterly corner of the C?tentin, the look-out ships to the westward of the fleet made the signal for seeing the enemy. In fact, while the allies had been talking of invading France, Tourville had sailed from Brest with the intention of covering an invasion of England, and after suffering some delay from the weather had come so far. The two fleets now opposed to one another were divided as follows, and consisted of the elements shown on these lists:--

The list of the French fleet given by Monsieur Troude is as follows:--

When the French were signalled by the guns of the look-out ships at three o'clock on the morning of the 19th, the weather was foggy. Fearing that the enemy might stretch past him to northward, Russell signalled to the rear to tack and close the space between him and the coast of England. At four o'clock the mist lifted and the enemy were seen to the westward with their heads pointing to the south. As this showed that they had no intention of attempting to turn him on the north side Russell countermanded the order to the Rear or Blue Division. The allied fleet was not in order of battle but scattered some ahead, some to windward, and some to leeward of the admiral. The wind was blowing from the S.W., and the French therefore had the weather-gage. The line was formed at eight o'clock with the Dutch or White Squadron in the van, and to the south of the Red Squadron which formed the centre, then came the Blue Squadron farthest to the north. There must have been a distance of many miles between the first and last ship of this great fleet of ninety-nine sail, and the Blue Squadron was still to leeward. Having made his simple disposition to meet the attack Russell lay with his topsail to the mast waiting for the enemy to come on. With a resolution of character which shows his innate superiority to Herbert, Tourville charged home. He directed his attack on the centre of the allied line, telling off a few ships in his van and rear to watch the van and rear of the allies, and prevent them from doubling on his own fleet.

When the fleets were ordered to anchor, only a portion of the French was able to obey. Whether it was because they had slipped their cables on the previous night, and therefore could not anchor, or whether their anchors would not hold, it is certain that they were unable to stop themselves from being carried to the eastward towards the allies. The position then in the early hours of the 21st was this, one part of the French fleet was ahead, to the west another part was drifting eastward between the land and the allies. The best sailing ships of the White and Blue Squadrons were well ahead of Russell, who with the Red Squadron was furthest of all to the east. The inability of the ships immediately about him to anchor showed Tourville that it was useless to endeavour to keep his now divided fleet acting as one body any longer. If he summoned the ships to the west to his assistance he would bring the whole fleet into a trap between the land and the enemy, who was in overwhelming numbers. Since he could no longer exercise his powers as commander to any advantage there remained nothing for him but to abdicate. He therefore hauled down his flag of command from the main-topmast-head, as a signal that every captain was free to act as he thought best for the safety of his ship. The French fleet now split into fragments. One part, under the Chef d'escadre Pannetier made a push for the Channel between the coast of France and the island of Alderney. The easterly current of the flood-tide splits at Cape La Hague. While the main body flows up Channel a branch turns off, and runs with great speed between the west side of the C?tentin and the island of Alderney. This makes what we call the Race of Alderney, and the French the Raz Blanchard. The navigation is dangerous, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been avoided by the heavy ships, but circumstances only left the French a choice of evils, and they ran through the Race to seek refuge under the guns of St. Malo.

Russell pursued Tourville round Cape Barfleur. The French admiral ran as close as he could to La Hougue, with the thirteen vessels still about him. It was not until the evening of the 22nd, so light was the wind and so slow were the ships of that time amid tides and variable breezes, that Russell was able to anchor in the neighbourhood of the fugitives. On the 23rd he sent in the boats and fireships under Rooke, who burnt six of the enemy. On the 24th the work was completed by the destruction of the other seven. The French indeed were panic-stricken, and the resistance was trifling. Not more than ten men were killed in this piece of service, which if attempted against an alert and resolute enemy must needs have been very costly.

The battle pursuit and destruction spread over these five days, and included under the name of "La Hogue" make nearly the last passage of naval warfare of a brilliant decisive character which we shall meet for three-quarters of a century. The navy had work of vital importance to do, and a function of unusual importance to fulfil. But it was no longer to meet equal fleets at sea, except on rare occasions, and when it did its own method of fighting was dull. The French fleet very soon ceased to contend with the allies in the ocean and channel altogether, and in the Mediterranean its efforts were spasmodic. The great change has been attributed to the disaster of La Hogue, without sufficient reason. We have seen that the operations of the French in previous years had been very languid. Their weakness during the rest of the war was to be mainly attributed to the French king's want of money. His resources were overburdened by the war on land against the League of Augsburg, and he could not afford to fit out great fleets. But to our ancestors the importance of the battle of La Hogue was naturally a subject of high gratification. The material loss inflicted on King Louis was considerable, and the blow to his prestige greater still. They could feel that the Channel was now safe, not indeed from privateers, but from great fleets sent out to cover an invasion of England. Besides, after the spiritless straggling operations of the last three years, the resolution of Russell and the vigour of his pursuit were an immense change for the better.

The decline of the French navy was not immediately visible. An attempt to attack St. Malo at the close of 1692 was given up as hopeless, and the ships under Pannetier's command were able to make their way to Brest undisturbed. In 1693 the French even achieved a considerable measure of success, partly through their own good management, and partly by the help of mistakes of the English Government. Russell was no longer at sea. The shifting politics of the time, and his own position as one of the leaders of the Whig party, combined with the king's discovery of his intrigues with St. Germain to remove him from command. His place was taken by Killigrew, Delaval, and Shovell, who were combined in a joint commission as admiral. The practice of giving the command at sea to a committee was once more revived because the Government distrusted a single command. The result was to discredit for ever the appointment of several men to do work which most especially requires unity of will and authority.

EXPEDITIONS, CONVOY, AND THE PRIVATEERS

The second and larger division of the War of the League of Augsburg can be most conveniently dealt with by subjects rather than in chronological order. There were no great campaigns between equal forces of sufficient interest to be taken by themselves. Throughout all these years the overpowering fleets of the Alliance cruised unchecked on the sea, hemming France in, harassing her coast, annihilating her commerce, and rendering assistance to the armies operating against her. Detached squadrons issued from England year after year to attack the French possessions in the New World and defend our own. In the meantime, the efforts of France on the sea were ever more strictly confined to the cruises of her privateers.

The object before the allies when once they had vindicated their superiority on the ocean was to harass the French coast and to co-operate with the armies on shore wherever an opportunity presented itself. The first duty was done with more barbarism than success. In the November of 1693 a futile attack was made on St. Malo by Benbow. Infernal machines, invented by one Meesters, a Dutchman in the English service, were drifted in for the purpose of destroying the shipping. They exploded too soon, and did no harm to the enemy. This attack on St. Malo was both the beginning and the type of a kind of operation we adhered to till the middle of the eighteenth century. Good powder and shot, and the lives of men, were thrown away in one dab after another at this or the other point on the French coast. It was very rarely that the expedition succeeded in causing any serious destruction to the enemy. When it did, the harm inflicted on France was never enough to cripple her power, though the suffering caused to individuals was no doubt cruel. The English Government hardly ever showed itself capable of understanding that to assail unfortified towns does no good, and that fortified towns must be attacked with sufficient resources. To give more than a mere mention to such enterprises as these here would be to overestimate their importance altogether.

In 1694 this work of harassing the French was taken in hand, with results excellently calculated to show how a fleet ought to act, and how it ought not. Russell was at sea at a reasonably early date, with the intention to watch the Brest fleet and to endeavour to destroy that port itself. If the French fleet remained in the harbour the whole of his force would be needed for the purpose. If, however, Tourville had gone south a detachment might be left to deal with Brest, and Russell could go on. This recognition of the fact that the proper employment of an English fleet was to follow the enemy was perfectly sound in principle. So much cannot be said for the plan of attack on Brest. It might be a very advantageous thing to destroy the great French arsenal, but such a place was certain to be so strongly fortified as to be impregnable to the sudden attack of a mere flying column. Yet no greater force than can be fairly described by the name was put under the command of Tollemache. As a matter of fact the expedition was hopeless, for it had been betrayed to King Louis by some of King William's servants who were in communication with St. Germain. One of the traitors was the great Marlborough.

As early as the 19th May, Russell learnt that Tourville had already sailed for the south. Before starting in pursuit, the new Admiral of the Fleet was able to deliver one effectual stroke at the enemy. A large French convoy of merchant ships was lying in Berteaume Bay under the protection of one French man-of-war. Russell dispatched a light squadron under Captain Pritchard to destroy it. The work was thoroughly done, and was followed up by the destruction of a number of other vessels going south with provisions to Tourville. Then, on the 5th or 6th June, Russell sailed for the south, leaving Lord Berkeley to carry out the attack on Brest. On the 7th of June Berkeley entered the wide channel between the Pointe St. Mathieu and the Pointe du Raz, called the Iroise. The entrance to the Bay of Brest, named Le Goulet, or Gullet, is on the north-east corner of this channel. It is a narrow passage which leads into the land-locked Bay of Brest. The bay is shut off from the sea by a peninsula running south from the Goulet. The western side of this peninsula, after running due north and south, turns to the west with a curve to the end at the north, and forms the anchorage known as the Roads or Bay of Camaret.

The object of the expedition was to land in Camaret Bay, seize the peninsula on the western side of the harbour, and, using that as a basis of operations, open the entry to the bay to the fleet; and then destroy the arsenal of Brest. The French were on their guard; Camaret Bay was bristling with batteries and lined with troops. To go on was an act of folly, and so Carmarthen, who surveyed the bay, gave Tollemache to understand; but the soldier, though an exceedingly brave man and a good subordinate, was no general, and he was burning to distinguish himself. He urged the naval officers on, and among them he found an ally in Lord Berkeley. The result was that several ships were all but battered to pieces by the French cannon, and Tollemache landed at the southern corner of the bay with a few hundred men--an act of headlong folly which cost him his life, and sacrificed the lives of many others. Then the expedition came away.

There was a kind of wrong-headed magnanimity about the conduct of Tollemache which extorts a certain respect, but the succeeding operations are merely examples of how to combine the greatest possible malignity of intention with a high degree of ineptitude in the execution. Berkeley came back to St. Helens for refreshments, and then returned to the coast of France to take revenge. What he did was morally on a level with the desolation of the Palatinate, for which King Louis had been so bitterly reproached by his enemies, and it had this further disgrace attaching to it, that it was imbecile. The English fleet only bombarded Dieppe and Havre, killing a certain number of women, children, and unarmed men, and burning a few houses. Then it threatened La Hogue and Cherbourg. This done, it came back to St. Helens for refreshments. When invigorated by repose it returned to Dunkirk, and exploded more infernal machines to no purpose.

In 1695 it was the same story. We made a demonstration at St. Malo, then we burnt the little fishing town of Granvelle, and then we achieved another failure at Dunkirk. In the following year these feats were renewed at Calais and elsewhere, till the war died down and was brought to a pause by the truce called the Peace of Ryswick in 1697. When it was resumed, the Admiralty had learnt that these expeditions were forms of waste, and we hear little or nothing of them during the reign of Queen Anne. It is probable that Captain Pritchard did more harm to the enemy by destroying the convoy in Berteaume Bay than was inflicted in all these expeditions, and he did it at a thousandth part of the cost.

More legitimate and fruitful than these attacks on the French coast towns were other operations of the fleet, which may be classed under two heads. First are the cruises of what our ancestors called "The Grand Fleet"--that is to say, movements of great forces representing the bulk of our effective naval power in Europe. Then contemporary to, but apart from them, were the cruises of squadrons, designed to protect our own colonial possessions or menace those of the French. These two kinds of naval operations were so far independent of one another that it is not necessary to tell them together. Again, many of them were so barren in results that it is superfluous to tell them in detail. Yet the mere fact that they took place shows the magnitude, the persistence, and the coherence of our efforts to make full use of the fleet. It has seemed to me most advisable to set them both forth briefly in parallel columns, and give particular accounts of the more notable among them afterwards.

Grand Fleets Small Squadrons

The year of Beachy Head. December 1689 to May 1690.--Captain Lawrence Wright to the West Indies, with ten ships and three small vessels. Contemporary with this cruise was the expedition of Sir W. Phipps from New England against Nova Scotia, then a French colony, and Quebec.

Year of Russell's first command 12th December 1690 to August in the Channel. 1691.--Captain Ralph Wren to the West Indies. He died of fever, and many of his men with him. The squadron was brought home by Boteler.

Year of La Hogue. In 1692 there was no colonial expedition.

Disaster of Rooke's convoy. January to August 1693.--Cruise of Sir F. Wheeler to the West Indies, with twelve sail and three fireships.

Russell in Channel. Goes to sea January to September 1695.--Captain in May. Sails for Mediterranean Robert Wilmot to West Indies, with in June. Enters Mediterranean in five ships and one fireship. Wilmot July. Operations on coast of died of fever, and one vessel was Catalonia. Winters at Cadiz. lost for want of hands. Goes up Mediterranean again in March 1695. Returns to England in November of that year.

April 1696 to October 1697.--Cruise of Vice-Admiral Nevil to West Indies. This squadron was almost totally destroyed by fever--only one captain returned.

There was now a break of four years, due to the truce which followed the Peace of Ryswick, 20th September 1697.

Grand Fleets Small Squadrons

September 1701.--Benbow to the West Indies, where he died on the 4th November 1702 of wounds received in action with Du Casse. The command passed to Whetstone.

June to November 1702.--Rooke's July to October 1702.--Sir John Leake cruise to Cadiz, and attack on attacks French in Newfoundland. treasure ships at Vigo, in co-operation with the Dutch.

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