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Ebook has 145 lines and 31221 words, and 3 pages

Preface 3

Introduction 5

Bibliography 99

Index 103

PREFACE

The importance of the study of the emotions in relation to human conduct is well understood. Just how consciousness behaves under the influence of the fundamental human emotions like fear and anger, is one of vital interest to the psychologist and educator. It has always been difficult to study the structural side of our emotions because of an inability to control voluntarily our emotions for purposes of introspection. The structure of emotions is primarily important in so far as structure may allow an interpretation of function. The study of the emotions has for the most part been limited to theoretical discussions based on the observations of normal and abnormal persons and on the casual introspection of individual authors. This work is an attempt to study systematically the emotion of anger in relation to the behavior of consciousness, the ideas and feelings associated in the development of anger, the reactive side of consciousness under the influence of anger, individual differences in behavior, manner of the disappearance and diminution of anger, devices used in the control and facilitation of the emotion, and the conscious after-effects including the inter-relation of anger and other feelings, emotions and attitudes which follow. The education of the emotions was first voiced by Aristotle who indicated that one of the aims of education should be to teach men to be angry aright.

R. F. R.

University of Maine

June 20, 1917

INTRODUCTION

The statement of Wundt and K?lpe concerning voluntary action, that its mere period of duration is but a small part of its psychological significance, may well be said of emotions. Wundt suggests the close relation between the emotion and volitional action. A volitional process that passes into an external act, he defines as an emotion which closes with a "pantomimetic" movement. Ach , in his experiments with the will, distinguishes in each experiment a fore, mid and after period. In our emotional experiences, it is true to a marked degree that we are predisposed and predetermined to a specific emotional excitement by temporary or permanent dispositions and attitudes.

METHODS. The method in the present study has been to observe anger introspectively as it appears in every-day life. Ten graduate students of Clark University and two persons outside of the University volunteered to observe their emotions for a period of at least three months and report to the writer each day from the notes of their introspections. These persons were asked to observe all instances of anger and fear no matter how minute. Only anger will be used in the present study. They were asked to observe the conscious fore-period before the emotion begins, the development of the emotion, the disappearance, the diminution and the consciousness after the emotion has disappeared, which is recognized as having been influenced by the emotion.

Historically, three methods have been used in studying the emotions. Casual individual introspection is the earliest and is consequently the basis for most of the literature. Bain and Ribot were among the first to employ this method extensively. Observations of the behavior of normal and abnormal persons have given some results. The questionnaire method used by Dr. Hall has shown the wide range of objective reactions and objects of anger.

No apology is offered for this study because of the uncontrolled conditions of introspection. Emotions are involuntary processes and consequently do not lend themselves to voluntary control necessary for laboratory technique. The emotion springs from an antecedent complex combined with a present idea. The fact that anger does not develop from a single experience but is a predetermined consciousness usually cumulative in character, makes voluntary origin difficult. Even when the individual is aware of the antecedent which tends to give rise to anger, the voluntary combination with a present idea is unsuccessful. A further difficulty in introspection is the tendency of the emotion to disappear as a result of the act of introspection. It occurs frequently in the data that a further development of the emotion is entirely cut off by introspection. However, attention to the situation giving rise to anger frequently reinstates the emotion, if the feeling background is intense enough. It was necessary to instruct the observers to allow their emotions to run their usual course and note the facts of behavior at convenient times. The purpose of this study is to investigate the behavior of consciousness in the development, expression and disappearance of anger. The observers were asked to direct their observation especially to the behavior side of consciousness. It is believed, that regardless of the necessary uncontrolled conditions of introspection, that a systematic observation of both mild and intense experiences of anger by a number of observers over an extended period of time will add to a better comprehension of the functional character of this one of the fundamental emotions.

MENTAL SITUATION STIMULATING ANGER

Professor Titchener states concerning emotions in general three essential factors for their formation. First, a series of ideas shall be interrupted by a vivid feeling; second, the feeling shall mirror a situation or incident in the outside world; and third, the feeling shall be enriched by organic sensations created by the course of bodily adjustment to the situation. It has been well agreed from casual introspection that the stimulus to an emotion is a total mental situation or predicament. It is evidently necessary in the psychology of the emotions that each emotion should be studied in connection with its predetermining mental situation giving rise to it. Anger because of its slowness to develop, lends itself more readily to a study of the situation from which it arises, than some other emotions.

It is well known that there is little constancy in the outside situation, associated with the emotion of anger. What one will take as an insult, another will regard as a joke. With the same individual, what will at one time excite anger, will at another be scarcely noticed. We commonly say, referring to some incident, "There was nothing for him to be angry about," and the statement may be correct if the outside situation is viewed as the stimulus to the emotion. With the insane and hysterical, an observer is often baffled by the apparently harmless idea that will excite anger. The fact is, the situation stimulating anger is a psychic one. We fail in viewing our emotional life in the same manner as we do in observing our sensations. Whatever the outside conditions, it is the psychic situation as only a partial reflection of outside conditions, that is of primary importance. A few instances of the current views of the situation exciting anger may be given. What may be called a genetic view is illustrated in McDougall's statement, "The condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts." Dewey in his conception of instincts has pointed out that we are not angry when we are fighting successfully. Only when the pugnacious instinct is impeded does emotion arise. An introspective view may be taken from Bain , "When we have suffered harm at the hands of another, it leaves a sting in the violation of the sanctity of our feelings. This pre-supposes a sentiment of self regarding pride, the presence of which gives rise to the best developed form of anger." David Irons , who did some keen work in the analysis of the emotions, does not qualify his statement that anger appears only when we feel that we have been injured.

From the pathological side, F?r? and Magnan have described slow accumulation of anger in paranoiacs, which seems to re-enforce the casual introspective view stated above. These insane persons first believe they are persecuted. They suspect all about them. Even their very best friends are trying to injure their business or reputation. Gradually reactionary impulses begin and they themselves become the persecutors and concern themselves with the business of revenge. They find gratification in every sort of angry outburst,--insult, abuse, threat, murderous attack, irony, witticism, etc.

The same view has been advanced by Steinmetz in the observation of the behavior of primitive people. He holds that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises upon the experience of injury and its aim is to enhance self-feeling, which has been lowered by the injury suffered.

The next few pages will be devoted to an examination of the mental situations from which anger develops as found in the results of the introspections. About six hundred introspections from the various observers have been used for this study.

Feelings of irritation follow as a result of the thwarting of some desire or mental attitude and are consequently predetermined by the attitude of the moment. From this, anger develops for the most part, as a result of a series of stimuli, which have a cumulative effect. Each thwarting of the impulse intensifies the irritation until anger is developed. One or two failures may stimulate unpleasant feelings, which at the time are ignored; but with an increase of the number of stimuli, there is an accumulative effect in which the awareness of the previous failures becomes more intense than at the moment when they occurred. The following from B.'s observations will illustrate, "I was writing a letter to an important personage and was making special effort to write it neatly. I made an error and felt unpleasantly irritated. Still feeling quite unpleasant, I turned to look for my eraser and could not find it. I looked in several places. Each failure was followed by a sudden increase in intensity of unpleasant feelings." Finally B. found himself using defamatory language prolifically, giving expression to a rather well developed case of anger. One is usually aware in anger of this type, that the emotion is the cumulative effect of a number of previous stimuli. It appears from the reports, that if the mental predisposition is intense enough, one or two failures may suffice to excite anger. In general the stronger the predisposition, the less number of failures is required before anger is fully developed.

It is a common characteristic of the initial stage of anger, that although there is an awareness that the emotion is due to a series of irritating stimuli, the entire situation exciting the anger is ignored and the anger is referred to some person, frequently one recently associated in time. Thus objectified, anger seems to find a more ready expression. Anger is more successfully developed from a fore-period of irritation if the present predicament is in any way associated with a person or situation against which there is already an emotional disposition of dislike. A feeling of pleasurable satisfaction is often reported to follow the successful expression of anger after feelings of irritation.

Anger with a fore-period of irritation is common with all the subjects studied, but the manner in which the anger arises from these feelings is a matter of wide individual difference. They all get angry at objects when they act as hindrances. With B. and C., who live alone, this tendency is more marked. With all the persons studied, anger with a fore-period of irritation occurs more frequently against objects and situations than against persons. When persons are involved in anger of this type, they are usually those with whom there is close intimacy or with servants and children.

The sentiment of justice may facilitate the development of anger arising from feelings of irritation. Irritable feelings may more readily develop into anger if a situation is associated in which fairness and justice are violated, although the point of justice may be far removed from the actual cause of the irritation. Under the influence of irritation, there is frequently a little more sensitiveness to injustice if the idea of unfairness can facilitate in the objective reference to the emotion. The following instance will illustrate. A. was walking along the street at night in an irritable state of mind in connection with a series of incidents just past. In this state of mind he came to a place where a new house was being built and the builders had left an accumulation of dirt on the sidewalk. When it rained, the water would collect making the walk bad. He had previously noted that they had made enough progress with the building that it was unnecessary to leave the dirt on the walk. "On this occasion," he states, "I now become quite indignant, and suddenly found myself in imagination telephoning the street commissioner in an angry attitude and tone of voice, telling him about the dirt and where the house was located, and ending with the sentence, 'It is an outrage to tax payers.'" But this did not fully satisfy his resentment. He imagined himself the next day walking up to the overseer of the construction gang and assuming a rather indignant air, telling him among other things that the way he had left the walk was an outrage to the public. On the other hand, the sense of justice may be ignored for the time if it does not aid expression. In some extreme cases the subject may assume a make-believe attitude and trump up reasons to suit his own ends regardless of the facts. The tendency is strong to give some justifiable expression to the present mental predicament. In such cases reason serves the purpose of feeling. All other mental processes may become subservient to the rising indignation till the point of anger is reached, but with the expression of anger, the illusion of fairness usually disappears. The behavior that seemed so commendable while angry may excite shame or regret after the emotion has been vented.

Any remark, suggestion, chance association, it may be, attitude of another or incident, which in any way lowers the sentiment of self-respect may stimulate anger. In this regard there is a wide individual difference with the persons studied and with the same person at different times. A trivial incident may lower the play of the self-regarding sentiment and consequently give rise to anger, while at other times a direct thrust at one's honor may be ignored. The personality of the offender, his social and intellectual standing, his general demeanor and attitude, play an important part in the entire emotional situation, but at times personality is ignored and a "chip is carried on the shoulder" for the chance passer-by.

While in the presence of a situation that lowers self-feeling, even though persons may not be connected with the situation, it is a common characteristic to refer the anger to some person. The bounds of justice may be, for the moment, overstepped. The dim awareness with some, that the person is not to be blamed, is ignored for the time, while the tendency is strongest in consciousness to give expression to the emotion. The individual differences here are quite marked. G. apparently has developed a habit of referring his anger to a principle, ignoring the personality. In many of his observations, persons were connected with a situation, but were neglected in his attention to the principle violated. A business man had told him an untruth causing him difficulty. G. states, "I was not angry at the man. That was his way of doing business." In the course of his emotional experience, his anger became rather intense, referring to the business ethics practiced. The degree in which the sense of justice is ignored under the influence of anger of this type is also a matter of wide individual difference.

BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Wundt has pointed out that there are two types of reaction to an emotion, what he calls outer and inner volitional acts. The first refers to the external bodily expression of an emotion and the latter to the mental behavior. In the study of the emotions, attention has for the most part been directed to the former. Darwin's study of the emotions in man and animals, early called attention to the finer physical expressions of each emotion, explaining them as instinctive habits which were formerly useful. Darwin's study partly paved the way for the James-Lange theory, which maintains that what we experience as an emotion is but the sensation of the instinctive physical expression.

The aim of this chapter is to study the mental behavior during the conscious period the anger exists. It is recognized that the motor and physical expressions is primary and fundamental. For that reason it has served so adequately in the objective study of the emotion. What we shall attempt to study is the mental behavior of persons under the influence of anger. Ethics tells us how we ought to act when angry, but psychology has neglected to find out how in reality consciousness does behave when the emotional excitement is on. David Iron's statement is still apropos. He writes, "The neglect of the reactive side of human consciousness is nowhere more conspicuous than in the case of the emotions."

The anger consciousness is characterized by heightened mental activity. A multiple number of images, attitudes, fluctuations of the emotional and feeling content appear in rapid succession till the emotion disappears. This statement is true for even the more tenuous instances of anger. In fact some of the milder experiences have the most marked changeableness of conscious content. Objectively there may be little activity, while simultaneously on the mental side, there is a wealth of processes which must be considered in the psychology of the emotions.

The initial reaction to anger is always of the attributive type. Whatever other reactions may follow in the course of the entire anger period, the attributive reaction in some form is characteristic of the early stage of the emotion. The contrary and indifferent types are secondary in point of time and occur after the initial hostile tendencies have been restrained. If an emotion of anger is made up entirely of the attributive type, which frequently occurs, and continues for any length of time, it is always noted that some of the reactions are more crude and unsocial and others are refined, disguised it may be, covered up, and when the emotion is most intense whether it be in the initial stage or elsewhere, the unsocial attributive tendencies are usually found at those places.

ATTRIBUTIVE REACTION

The anger consciousness in its development, especially in its initial stage is characterized by restraint. The subject is aware of hostile unlawful impulses that must be controlled. Its initial stage is usually reported as unpleasant. The second characteristic of the anger consciousness is reaction of some sort. What takes place on the mental side, is along the line of least resistance for the moment. Mental life is rather versatile in providing subjective reaction to anger. Motor and visual imagery play an important role involving lessened resistance. A third characteristic of the anger consciousness is what the Germans call "Verschiebung." The emotive tendency is inhibited. A substitution follows for the tendencies restrained. It may be purely subjective or only partly subjective. But the subject in the observation of his anger is fully aware that he would behave in some more drastic fashion if the restraint were off.

The cutting remarks are at times crude and abusive. The subject may swear at the offender. Persons who do not swear in actual life frequently do in imagination. In such imaginative verbal attacks the offender's bad qualities are displayed before him, at other times the same subject may resort to imagery, sarcasm, witticism or joking of a hostile nature. The motivation seems to be to imagine remarks that would humiliate the offender. The visual imagery of the astonished humble opponent is usual in these imaginary attacks. Crude and abusive remarks may at times seem entirely appropriate; at others, sarcasm and irascible joking seem more adequate. Sarcasm usually develops rather slowly with a period of restraint preceding it, unless it is ready made for the occasion. When the fitting sarcastic remark is found, it is usually accompanied by pleasantness in some degree. F. observes, "I could get no imaginative remark that would suit me at first, but after the emotion appeared several times in succession I suddenly discovered one and found myself saying it over and over again. It rather pleased me, I practiced it to get the right inflection and emphasis that I desired."

THE CONTRARY REACTION

The second general type of reaction to anger is what we have called contrary reaction. The subject suddenly reacts contrary to the emotive tendency of the emotion. He behaves contrary to what he actually wishes at the time. Religion and morals have idealized this type of behavior in its extreme form. "Turn the other cheek," "Love your enemy," "Do good to those that hate you," are exhortations of more than one religion. As compared with the type described above, relatively a small percent of the mental reactions under the influence of anger, as shown by the observations of all the subjects studied, are classed as the contrary reactive type, eighteen percent as compared with seventy one percent.

The contrary reaction is not so rich in versatile behavior as the one just described, in fact it is limited to a few set reactions. The subject suddenly reacts to a state of mind contrary to anger. It may take strong effort to make the change and the attitude is not heartily entered into at first and does not usually occur when the emotion is most intense, but after it is partly diminished, consequently it is usually delayed till a later stage of the emotion. If it appears in the initial stage it precludes a complete development of the emotion. Subject G. has apparently acquired the habit of championing, in the initial stage of the emotion, the offender's point of view and forestalling the development of anger against persons. His anger is attained most fully against objects and situations. He considers this due to his training in early childhood. E. has developed a partial habit of assuming an attitude of forgiveness toward the offender. C. and A. when in a quandary and unable to find other adequate means of expression, suddenly revert to the contrary reaction. It becomes a habitual device toward close and intimate friends or toward persons with whom it is necessary to get along. After the anger has gone so far, the subject suddenly assumes a friendly attitude as if there were no emotion.

THE INDIFFERENT REACTION

DISAPPEARANCE OF ANGER

The anger consciousness is one of variability and change. The emotion may disappear rather suddenly with the appearance of a new emotion or it may disappear gradually. There are usually fluctuating nodes of increasing and diminishing intensity accompanying the changing direction of attention, ideational behavior, and motor and mental activity in general. Attention again to the situation exciting anger tends to increase its intensity, if the situation from which it arises remains unchanged.

Any behavior, whether mental or motor, which changes the total mental situation from which anger originates, tends to modify the emotion itself. This total mental situation cannot remain unchanged long. The affective processes which have been aroused usually serve to redirect attention again and again to the situation exciting anger. The aim of angry behavior may be said to be three fold, referring to the total mental situation from which the three main types of anger arise; to enhance self-feeling which has been lowered; to get rid of the opposing obstacle to the continuity of associative processes; to recover from one's wounded sense of justice.

The total feeling situation becomes modified in the course of the disappearance or diminution of the emotion. Anger which springs from a fore-period of irritable feelings disappears by a different set of ideas than from anger arising from a fore-period of negative self-feeling.

Pleasantness is an important condition in the diminution of anger. There are but few instances that show no pleasantness in some degree somewhere in the reactive stage of the emotion. The pleasantness ranges from momentary mild relief to active delight. Periods of restraint during anger are periods of unpleasantness. Periods of lessened restraint are accompanied by relief or pleasantness. Two periods in the development of anger are most unpleasant. The entire cumulative development of anger is unpleasant. It is a frequent observation in the immediate fore-period, "I wanted to get angry at somebody or something, I felt I would feel better if I did." Often during the active stage of anger, there are found one or more periods of unpleasant inhibition and restraint. This is often a stage of experiment in imagination, foreseeing unpleasant results of too drastic behavior, inhibiting, choosing and selecting in the effort to discover some reaction which may successfully meet the emotional crisis of the moment. There are cases of anger with all the persons studied, which do not get beyond this inhibitive unpleasant stage. Anger may be almost entirely unpleasant or mostly pleasant. Some persons have a greater mental versatility than others in finding a successful expression to anger, consequently they have relatively a greater proportion of pleasantness. Under the influence of fatigue, the ability for successful expression is lessened and there is a correspondingly increased tendency to emotive excitation and decreased emotional control.

When a fully successful reaction is not found, anger dies hard. It may become necessary to attend to something else voluntarily for self protection. Anger disappearing unsuccessfully tends to recur again and again, it may be. Its reappearance frequently allows the unpleasant initial stage to be shortened or dropped entirely leaving a mildly pleasant experience.

Anger disappears suddenly and pleasantly if the subject can gain the subjective end of the emotion. Subject J. observes in the case of an anger arising from a feeling of irritation, "At this moment I felt pleased, my anger now disappeared leaving a pleasant after-effect." A case from A. will illustrate further. A. got on the wrong street car. The conductor refused to allow him to get off at his corner of the street. He observes he was angry, not because he was hindered from getting off, but because of the insulting attitude and remark of the conductor, who said in a hostile manner, "Why did you not pay attention to what I said, this car does not stop, you will have to go on." A. then became angry and demanded in rather severe language to have the car stopped. At this point the conductor changed his attitude and stopped with no further words. A. observes, "As I stepped off I had a distinct feeling of pleasantness. I felt I had been victorious. I was no longer angry. Sensations were still present in chest, arm and leg muscles but these were now pleasant. Upon recalling the incident, I had not the least resentment against the conductor. On the whole, I now felt glad the incident had occurred."

The imaginal humiliation and trouble coming to the offender, also increases the feeling of pleasantness and diminishes for the moment the anger. The imaginative verbal or physical attacks usually allow a subject to come out victor. What D. observes is typical. "I imagined he was stunned by my attack, and the result pleased me; that satisfied my anger."

A contemplated victory gives pleasure and diminishes anger even before the victory is attained. The emotion disappears on assuming a positive determined mental attitude, it may pass off in vehement resolution as to further behavior. In fact, one may begin and finish his fight through the medium of ideas and have no enthusiasm left for the actual encounter.

Anger diminishes and disappears more frequently in the change of attention than by any other one condition. A pause in the midst of anger to attend to one's mental behavior affords a diminution of the affective process. It is often reported as amusing when a subject suddenly ceases attending to the situation exciting the emotion and observes his mental behavior; laughter at this point is often reported. Close attention to the act of managing the irritating or humiliating incident, allows a rather gradual diminution of anger. Anger does not arise when the subject is rigidly attending to the damage done, but only when he begins to feel the damage as humiliating, irritating or as contrary to justice. One subject hums or sings when angry. A joke or witticism will break the crust of conscious tension allowing the attention to be distracted elsewhere.

The subject may suddenly assume an apathetic attitude toward the whole incident and kill the emotion at least temporarily. The mental situation from which anger arises, is one contrary to indifference, in fact, the lack of indifference is one of the essential characteristics of the fore-condition of anger, and consequently when this attitude is present, anger is cut off.

A resolution or a settled judgment has a relieving effect. Whenever the subject comes to a definite conclusion whether it refers to the emotional situation or a contemplated mode of behavior toward the offender, there is reported a sudden drop in the intensity of the emotion, even though the attitude is but a tentative and temporary one. The reason for this is evidently that such a mental attitude is contrary to the immediate mental situation from which anger arises. Anger springs from the fact that there is lacking a definite mental attitude as to what should be done during the reactive stage of the emotion. One of the most efficient controls is to have a well planned reaction to meet the emotional crisis before it appears; when the injury occurs, if there is a preparedness as to what should be done, even though the response is but a subjective one purely attitudinal in its nature, anger fails to develop to its intense stage.

SUCCESSFUL DISAPPEARANCE

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