Read Ebook: The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav Movement by Golder Frank Alfred Harper Samuel N Samuel Northrup Kerner Robert Joseph Petrunkevitch Alexander

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The intelligent public that has been watching the erratic courses which the Russian ship of state has been sailing during the last few years suspected that something was wrong with it, but not until after the March revolution did it become fully known what incompetent and irresponsible officers were in command. It was then learned that a great part of the time the Emperor was either drunk or doped, that the Empress was hysterical and on the verge of a mental breakdown, and that they were assisted by senile Sturmer, mentally unbalanced Protopopov, and profligate Rasputin, none of whom could read a compass nor lay out a course and steered the ship as they willed. All the passengers, first, second, and third class, grand dukes, intelligentsia, and laborers saw the danger and shouted warning but the officers neither saw nor heard. In order to save themselves and the vessel each class of passengers, quite independent of the other, resolved that at the first opportune moment it would throw the officers overboard and take charge of the ship; but while they were plotting the crew mutinied, arrested the officers, and left the ship to drift in sight of the breakers.

Nicholas Romanov is to blame for the plight of his country and for his own misfortunes. He was warned, he was given his chances, but he abused them all. When he entered on his reign he was popular and had the good will of his people with him. For some reason or other it was assumed that he was liberal minded and that under him the people would breathe a little more freely than under his autocratic father. This hope was so strong that it was unconsciously accepted as a fact. Stories were told that the Tsar fraternized with students and workmen and that he was determined to destroy the bureaucratic wall which kept the people from him. It was on the strength of this report that the Zemstvo of Tver petitioned him that in the future it might have direct access to him and have a say in the government. Here was a great opportunity but he turned it against himself. His reply was, "It has come to my attention that recently some people have been carried away by senseless dreams that the representatives of the zemstvos should take part in internal affairs. Let it be known to all that I shall guard the autocracy as firmly as did my father." This was his program and it deeply disappointed the people. On the top of this came the tragedy at Moscow on the day of his coronation when hundreds of people lost their lives in the attempt to obtain a loving cup which was promised them in commemoration of the event. Then followed the wholesale killing of the factory hands at Iaroslav, of the peasants in Kharkov, the miners on the Lena, and other such massacres and pogroms. Nicholas himself withdrew to his palaces and left the affairs of state in the hands of the court clique which dragged Russia into the Japanese war and brought on the revolution of 1905. Before it was over the Emperor promised a constitution but as soon as the disturbance was quelled he went back on his word.

It was known that he was weak and he now proved that he was also a liar. He dismissed one Duma after another, he created an upper house to act as a brake, he juggled with the electoral laws so that whereas according to the law of December 24, 1905 the working classes and the peasants were entitled to 68 per cent of the Duma's representation, by the law of June 14, 1907 they were allowed only 36 per cent, Poland's delegation was cut down from 37 to 12 per cent, Caucasus' from 29 to 9, Siberia's from 21 to 14, and Central Asia's from 23 to 1. In fact he did everything to make the Duma ineffective and a laughing stock. But that was not enough, his pride was hurt and he wanted to be revenged, and the number of people arrested, imprisoned, exiled, and executed for political crimes was greater than before.

The present war was declared by the Tsar but the people approved it because they hoped that the defeat of Germany would mean the defeat of the German reactionary influence in Russia, especially about the court, and a closer union with democratic England and France. I was present at the capital at the time that the war broke out and heard the cheers when the Emperor made the declaration. It seemed as if Nicholas by coming out against Germany had redeemed himself in the eyes of his people who were willing to wipe out the past, and give him another chance. During the first months of the war he was as popular as during the first weeks of his reign. It was not like the Japanese war when the soldiers refused service; in this German war, the men called to colors went without a murmur, they hoped that something good would come out of it. Offers of help from individuals as well as commercial and civic bodies poured in on the Government. The ministers said that everything was ready, that in a few months the Russians would be in Berlin. At first, all went well, but soon news came of the catastrophe in eastern Prussia, of the traitorous acts of the Minister of War, of the campaign in the Carpathians where the Russians were slaughtered like sheep because they had no guns, no ammunition, and no supplies. Again the poor people were betrayed and a cry of horror and vengeance went up as on January 9, 1905, Bloody Sunday. The Tsar would probably have been overthrown there and then had it not been for the war and the hatred of Germany. The liberals and patriots of all kinds thought that all was not yet lost and they went to work with a will, giving themselves, their money, their strength, and their lives, but they soon became convinced that it was all in vain so long as Rasputin, the Empress, and their clique ran the government.

JOURNALIST: What are you going to do about it?

A. What shall I do? With these people there is nothing that can be done.

J. Have you said anything to the Tsar about it?

A. I have... but it does no good.

J. Why?

A. While you talk to him he pays attention, gets worked up, is eager to do something... but as soon as he leaves you he forgets about it. All kinds of pressure are brought to bear upon him, he is not a free man.

J. Is it true that the Tsarina has much influence?

A. It is only too true. Her influence is irresistible. What is worse she never comes out in the open. She interferes with everybody, but works behind their backs. You never can tell what she will do next. Every time she comes here she makes new trouble.

J. Do the ministers ever consult you?

Members of the royal family and the grand dukes urged the Tsar to change his course and not ruin the country and the dynasty but he, drugged by Dr. Badmaev and duped by Rasputin, Protopopov and Company, sent them all out of the capital with orders not to return until sent for. They became so desperate that they murdered Rasputin but the Empress remained and the government policy became more reactionary than ever and as Prince Iusupov said the country was drifting to destruction or to a state of anarchy. It was quite evident that the only way to save the country was through a revolution and it was merely a question whether it would come first from the top or from the bottom and when.

It is only since the political upheaval that the activities and plans of the grand dukes have become public, but the cry for a revolution on the part of the great mass of intelligent people was heard before and everywhere. On my return to Russia, in February, 1916, after an absence of a little more than two years, I noticed many changes but none greater than in the public opinion in regard to the administration. On the way across Siberia, I met with many Russians, some of whom were army officers, and one and all bitterly criticized the government for its mismanagement of the war, for the betrayal of Russia as they called it, for its incompetency, and general worthlessness. At the capital, it was the same, everywhere, street, car, and public places, the government was denounced; there was no attempt at concealment. In the archives where I worked, which are almost under the very nose of the imperial family, the criticism was as open as in private homes. In fact there was no exception. When mention was made of the Court, of Rasputin, and of the Empress, there was a kind of a painful smile; it was not a subject that self-respecting patriotic Russians liked to talk about in public or before strangers; it was like dirty linen that ought not to be hung out for public view.

There was reason enough and suffering enough to justify the complaining. Petrograd was overcrowded owing to the thousands of refugees who had been driven there, rooms and apartments were difficult to find and very expensive, and the cost of living had gone up so high that it was hard for the poor to make ends meet. It was almost impossible to get about in the city, as the war had reduced the number of cabs and the few that did business asked such exorbitant fares that only the rich could afford to ride in them. The street car situation was in a hopeless tangle. Even before the war there were not enough accommodations for the public, but since the opening of hostilities many of the cars had broken down and there were no mechanics to repair them and no new cars to replace them. At a time when the population increased, the transportation facilities decreased. Passengers poured into the cars like a stream, filled the seats, blocked the aisles, jammed the entrance, stood on the steps, hung on behind, and clung to anything that might bear them along. Difficult as it was to get into the car, it was worse to get out, and it is easier to imagine than to describe the pushing, swearing, tearing, and fighting that one witnessed. The railways were in an equally bad condition. One had to wait weeks for a ticket. Men and women were crowded into the same coup?s; the cars were packed so full of human beings that they suggested cattle cars, except that they were not so sanitary, for they contained people suffering from contagious diseases and were without fresh air.

The food situation was very serious. For many years, Russia had been the granary of Europe but during the winter of 1916-17 suffered from shortage of food. Passengers told how in southern Russia grain and flour were rotting and yet in northern Russia the inhabitants were starving owing to the breakdown of the transportation system. It was pointed out that while the railway officials refused to give cars for bringing in the necessities of life, yet articles of luxury, expensive fruits, and such things did come into the city--a state of affairs which meant, of course, that some one was grafting. Sugar could be obtained only by cards and in very limited quantities; flour could not be bought at all, and black, sour bread could often be had only by standing in long lines and for hours at a time. There were no shoes and people asked what became of the hides of the thousands of animals that were annually slaughtered and shot. It was said that these, like other things, were sold to Germany.

As usual the poorer classes suffered the most. The well-to-do sent their servants who after a time returned with bread; at the worst it was only an inconvenience, but the workman had no servants to run his errands. In the morning, the laborer left his home for his work with little or no breakfast, at noon there was no luncheon for him because his wife was standing in the bread or sugar line, and when he returned in the evening there may have been bread enough but little else. The wife was tired and discouraged, the children crying and hungry, and life became a burden.

We may say that the conditions in Russia were no worse than in France or Germany. This is doubtless true, but there is this difference: the people of France and Germany had confidence in their leaders and realized that they were doing the best that they could, while the Russians knew they could put no trust in their Government, that the suffering was unnecessary and was due to corruption, favoritism, and incompetency. The Russians have as much patriotism and patience as any other people, but when they saw themselves abused and imposed upon they had a right to complain.

In addition to the criticism of the Government the other favorite topic of conversation was the revolution that would come after the war. This was discussed as openly as the problems of war; the two were bound up together, first a successful ending of the war, and then a change in government.

The court circle was not ignorant of what was being said for the spies kept them fully informed. In conversation with a journalist two months before the outbreak of the revolution, the Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, a prot?g? of Rasputin, said that he was aware of the revolutionary propaganda and that he was ready to face any attempt that might be made to overthrow the government.

"I will not stop at anything," he remarked,... "the first thing that I shall do is to send them from the capital by the car loads. But I will strangle the revolution no matter what the cost may be." He had no doubt that he could handle the situation and he inspired those about him with the same confidence, particularly the Emperor whom he assured that the discontent was confined chiefly to the intelligentsia and to a small number of the gentry, and that the common people and the army were devoted to the autocracy.

To the question that arises why the revolution, which was expected after the war, came off before its conclusion, the answer is that the present revolution was not planned nor desired by any one of importance; it came as a surprise to all. It just happened. If some one must have the credit or blame, it is Protopopov who was at the time suspected of being queer mentally and who has since lost his reason entirely. He was so sure of himself and of his ability to put down the uprising and thereby show himself a real statesman that he concluded not to wait for the revolution to come in the ordinary course of events, but to hurry it a bit. Although there is no conclusive proof for this statement, there is plenty of convincing circumstantial evidence. We know that it was proposed to have the workmen of Petrograd strike on February 27, the day of the opening of the Duma, as a protest against the government; we know also that to meet this situation, the Minister of the Interior had placed machine guns in the garrets, in steeples, on housetops, and other such places where they could command the important streets and shoot down the mob. The rising did not take place because Miliukov, the great liberal leader, learned that the Government was behind this move and that preparations had been made to slaughter the unsuspecting workmen. He, therefore, addressed them in an open letter calling on them not to make any demonstration, and they did not. For the time being the strike was off, but the air was full of discontent and restlessness, and it was difficult to say when trouble would break out again. With this in view, a number of representatives of various organizations met to discuss the situation and to determine what attitude they should take and what counsel they should give to the labor leaders. Miliukov and a few others urged that all uprisings should be discouraged because they would interfere with the war, would cost the lives of many innocent persons, and would accomplish nothing. There were, however, others, especially Anisimov, who argued strongly in favor of a strike, saying that this was the opportune time to overthrow the present regime and to establish a democratic government. When the revolution came off and the papers of the secret police were seized, it was discovered that Anisimov, who urged the revolt, was the paid agent of the Government and was doubtless doing its bidding. This shows that the Government instigated and abetted the uprising. But this is not all the evidence. Between February 27 and the outbreak of the revolution men impersonating Miliukov went to the factories, calling on the workmen to rise against the Government. There is still another bit of evidence. In order to give the laboring classes cause for revolt, the food supply in the factory districts was reduced and many people suffered from hunger and in their desperation came out into the streets. During the revolutionary week little, if any, food came in, but immediately after it the soldiers found 250,000 "puds" of flour, enough to last Petrograd ten days, meat, besides other food hidden in police stations and elsewhere out of reach of the public. It has been said that the Government instigated the uprising in order to bring about a separate peace with Germany. No direct proof has as yet been produced to substantiate this charge, and the only testimony that I have bearing on this case is the statement made by commander-in-chief Alexeiev in a confidential interview with a journalist already quoted.

These four points--the encouragement of a revolt by the secret agents, the impersonation of Miliukov, the concealment of food in the factory districts, the desire of a separate peace with Germany--make out a fairly good case to show that the Government was behind the disturbance. Aside from the reason already given for the desire of a separate peace, the other reason for the action of the ministry was this: It feared that the revolutionary movement, if permitted to take its natural course, would develop such strength that it could not be put down when it broke out, and, therefore, the Minister of the Interior decided to take it in hand and at the right moment crush it with such force that it would be a long time before it could raise its head again. Before it was over he hoped to drag in prominent members of the Duma and other revolutionary leaders, and make an end of them. This plan need not astonish us, for this method, in one form or another, had been made use of by the autocracy time and again. Protopopov overreached himself, his scheme miscarried, the soldiers about the capital went back on him, and the little comedy that he had staged in which he was to play the leading part became a tragedy and the shot which was intended for the revolution hit his royal master and brought autocracy to the ground. In view of the fact that Protopopov has since become insane, one wonders whether the man was mentally well balanced at the time that he was in office. But the Tsar has only himself to blame for his plight; he was warned against this nominee of Rasputin, but he would not take advice.

Early in the week of March 5-12, 1917, the trouble began in the factory districts. There were bread riots, car stoning, window smashing, and other such acts, which are more or less common and no one paid much attention to them. On Thursday, the disturbances spread to other parts of the city and crowds began to gather on the Nevski, but the throng was orderly and the police seemed to have little difficulty in keeping it on the move. Friday the crowd was more bold: it marched up and down the streets, calling for bread, singing revolutionary songs, and occasionally waving a red flag and quickly snatching it back again. This, too, did not make much impression for it is well known that in Russia strikes and disturbances have in view political as well as economic betterment. Late Friday afternoon, while I was walking on the Nevski, a company of mounted police and a large number of Cossacks dashed by on the way to disperse a procession that was coming towards me. When I came up to the Fontanka Bridge I noticed the crowd was gathered about the Cossacks; it patted the horses and cheered their riders, while the police were nowhere in sight. I listened to what was being said and heard that the police tried to use their whips and swords on the people and this angered the Cossacks so much that they attacked the police, killed the captain, and drove them all away. It was no secret that there was bad blood between the soldiers and the police; the former complained that while they were suffering and fighting at the front, the latter were having an easy time, enriching themselves by graft, and oppressing the soldiers' families. The soldiers and the strikers started out with one idea--hatred of the police. When the police had been dispersed, the Cossacks and soldiers begged the people to move on, but they, especially the young women students who were numerous, went up to them and pleaded with them to espouse their cause. "Comrades," they would say, "come over on our side, our cause is your cause." The rough, ignorant warriors were disturbed; they did not like their jobs, and in a kindly way begged the men and women to go home, but, as it did no good, for they massed again, the Cossacks rode in a body into their midst and kept turning and turning until the crowd was forced from the street onto the sidewalk. In the meantime, another company of Cossacks formed a line across the street, from wall to wall, and swept everybody before it into stores, courtyards, and other openings. Even this did not do much good, for as soon as the horsemen passed, the mob fell in behind and cheered the Cossacks. There was no roughness, but at the same time it was easy to see that the crowd did not yet know to what extent the army could be trusted.

Sunday night was full of excitement and fear and there were not many who slept soundly. Firing was heard at different times but what it portended, none of us could tell. It became evident that the situation was becoming serious, yet we all felt that the Government could handle it. When I went out on the street Monday morning, the first thing I saw was the placard of the military commander announcing that unless the workmen went to the shops, they would be sent to the front the following day. Groups of people were talking excitedly and from them I learned that the Volynski regiment had revolted and had killed its officers, because the day before they had commanded the soldiers to shoot on the people. It seems that the soldiers returned home much excited over their deed and full of remorse. In the course of the night some of the revolutionary soldiers from the city upbraided them and they were greatly incensed with their officers and the Government. They, as well as other regiments, were particularly worked up over the report that hirelings of the secret police dressed in soldiers' uniforms went about firing on the crowd and that the new recruits, under penalty of death, were commanded to shoot on the people in the streets. When in the morning the officers congratulated the men on their deed of yesterday, they jumped on them and murdered them. I heard that other regiments had also revolted; but there were so many rumors afloat that it was not easy to know what to believe. About four in the afternoon, I started for home and found the Nevski full of frightened and nervous people, and hardly any soldiers. No one seemed to know what to expect. Sounds of shooting were heard and they were explained as the battle between the regiments that had revolted and those that had remained loyal. In the distance columns of smoke were seen and report had it that palaces were burning. Again it was difficult to know the truth. As I proceeded on my way, I was joined by the little minister of the British American Church, where I had attended services the day before, where he had prayed fervently for the Tsar and his family and asked God to put down the anarchists, and other lawless men. We were discussing the situation, not knowing exactly what to make of it. Perhaps the word revolution passed our lips but neither of us nor those about us took it seriously. Near the Liteiny a gate opened and about two dozen armed soldiers led by a petty officer stepped out and marched towards the center of the street. Immediately the crowd, excited and scared, scattered and ran for their lives but the soldiers motioned for them to stop and told them that they would not shoot. We left them, and proceeded on our way, trying as before to interpret what we saw. While in the midst of our discussion we were struck by a new and unfamiliar sound--tra-ta-ta, tra-ta-ta, and we instinctively knew that a machine gun was firing. In a flash the streets were cleared and my minister and I found ourselves sticking like posters against the wall. It was my first "baptism of fire" and I had enough presence of mind to observe its effect upon myself and others. Physically there was no effect for no one seemed hit. I tried to locate the gun and the man behind it, but did not succeed. When the firing ceased, I went on my way. As I neared the Nicholas station, there came rushing forth from around the corner a crowd of hoodlums and soldiers, with drawn swords, which they had taken from the officers, and such other weapons as they could pick up, shouting, "Down with the Government!" Then it dawned upon me that the revolution was on in earnest, that the anarchists of yesterday's prayer had become the heroes of a great cause. What struck me most of all was the kind of men and women who made this world event. I watched them during the week, and they seemed to be in great part boys and girls, hoodlums, students, poorly dressed men and women, without organization, plans, or leaders. It is difficult to analyze the various motives that brought them out into the street. Not one of the so-called revolutionists was seen, heard, shot, or wounded. When it was all over they appeared on the scene, rushing from Switzerland, the United States, France, and other parts of the world, to make speeches and to divide the spoils. It was a revolution without revolutionists, unless you call the soldiers that, but they were not consciously making a revolution, and when it was done, they were thoroughly surprised and frightened. There are a number of reasons why the Government collapsed so easily. It was not really overthrown but it toppled over like a rotten tree, and until it fell, the people did not realize how decayed it actually was. Its misconduct of the war, scandals like that of Rasputin, ministers such as Protopopov discredited and disgraced the dynasty and when the end came, it had few friends who shed tears.

Another important factor in helping the revolution was the large number of students and liberals who served in the army. To fill the ranks and to provide educated men for officers, it was necessary to call on university students, experts in various fields of engineering, all of whom, more or less, desired a liberal government. These men worked among the soldiers and officers with a view to creating a feeling of distrust in the Emperor, and the Government, and its incompetence and corruption gave plenty of material for the propagandists. Loyalty to the dynasty was undermined and as soon as one prop was removed, as soon as one company of soldiers went over, the others followed and the whole edifice came tumbling down.

Still another factor was the large number of new recruits that were stationed in the capital; they were as yet not well disciplined, obedience had not yet become a second nature to them. Many of them had come from the factories, some of them were personally acquainted with the men and women who were in the demonstrations and therefore would not fire on them. Had there been at the time in the city three or four old and well-disciplined regiments, or had the Cossacks who were on hand not interfered with the police, the uprising would have been crushed quickly and effectively as similar affairs had been before.

Yet one other factor contributed to the success of the revolution and that was the over-confidence of the Government. The soldiers had been loyal until now and it never occurred to those in power that they might not always be so. They made no special preparations other than placing machine guns on roofs. They did not even make use of the armored cars. When they realized that the army in the city could not be trusted, they called for troops from the front but they came too late.

From the point of view of the monarchy it was unfortunate that Protopopov sent the Emperor to the front after having secured from him a signed blank to dismiss the Duma; for if the Tsar had been at Tsarskoe Selo, he might have been prevailed upon to make some concessions and saved the dynasty for a time at least.

Strange to say, as evening came a kind of fear seized the population, particularly the more ignorant. It was difficult for them to shake off the terror of the old police; all the time that they were talking against the tsar they had a feeling that they were doing wrong, and that some one was denouncing them. It was hard for them to believe that all that they saw and heard during the day was real and that the old regime was powerless. Some one would start a rumor that a monarchist general with an army was marching on the city and that he would kill and burn. Early Friday evening, March 16, as I was walking down the street, soldiers ran by me shouting for every one to get under cover for several hundred police from Tsarskoe Selo were coming and that there would be street fighting. Frightened mothers grabbed their little ones and hurried home, storekeepers closed the shops, porters barricaded the gates, housewives extinguished the lights, and the streets became as dark and as silent as a cemetery. This lasted for an hour or more and then came more soldiers announcing that all was well, that the supposed policemen were revolutionary soldiers who had come to take the oath of allegiance.

The exultation reached its highest point when the first temporary government, with Prince Lvov at the head, was announced. Every one was pleased with the men selected, they were without doubt the ablest leaders of the country, men who had always fought for the cause of liberty and for the interests of the public. There was nothing but praise for them and assurances of support. The fact that there was a "pravitelstvo" calmed the people and they gradually went back to their old occupations, but as new men, with broader outlooks and with higher aspirations.

The taking of the oath of office by the new Ministry was the last act of that wonderful week to be unanimously approved by the people. When the temporary government attempted to govern it was interfered with by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; the cry was raised by the Socialist groups that it was they who had won the revolution and that they, therefore, should have all the power. Since then the country has become more and more divided against itself, love has turned into hate, joy into sorrow.

THE JUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT

If there are miracles in history, the Jugo-Slav movement is a miracle. It is the story of a nation which entered its new home in the Balkans in the seventh century and became divided geographically and politically, in faith and written language, and in economic and social life, until at last its spokesmen could truthfully say that it was divided into thirteen separate administrative units dependent upon fifteen legislative bodies. How did it come about that this evolution of twelve centuries, beginning with primeval unity and passing through a political, economic, and social decomposition of a most bewildering character, has once more arrived at national unity and is even now demanding the last step--political amalgamation? Is it a doctrine or a dream or is it a reality?

When the Jugo-Slavs first occupied the western half of the Balkan peninsula, they were one in speech, in social customs and ancestry, and were divided only into tribes. The Slovenes, who settled in the northern end of the west Balkan block, were not separated from their Croat and Serb kinsmen by the forces of geography, but rather by the course of political evolution. On the other hand, the Croats became separated from the Serbs by forces largely geographical, though partially economic and political, in nature.

The Slovenes gave way before the pressure of the Germans who swept through the Alps and down the Danube and forced the Slovene vojvodes to acknowledge their suzerainty and accept their religion. The Germans would doubtless have succeeded in obliterating them had not the Magyar invasion weakened their offensive. The Slovenes, however, were left a wrecked nationality whose fate became blended with that of the Habsburg possessions and who against the forces of geography--which firmly bound them to the Croats--were politically riveted to the Habsburg north. This division was therefore the result of forces created by man and changeable by him. The Croats settled in the northwestern half of the territory south of the Slovenes; the Serbs roughly in the southeastern part of it. Here geographical influences--the direction of the rivers and the Dinaric ridges--combined with divergent political and economic possibilities, produced a dualism. The Croats on the Save and its tributaries naturally expanded westward and aspired to closer connection with the sea where their struggle with the remnants of Roman civilization and a superior culture absorbed their energies. They developed out of their tribal state more quickly, while the Serbs, further inland and amid more difficult surroundings, developed more slowly. The people who lived along the Save aspired to control the Dalmatian coast which military and geographical authorities claim can best be held from the mainland. The people who lived in Montenegro or along the Morava, which was the gateway to the peninsula, would naturally expand south and east toward the other cultural center, Constantinople, and thus seek to dominate the Balkan peninsula. In both cases, the attraction proved too much for feudal kings and led to the formation of cosmopolitan empires instead of strong national monarchies.

The kingdoms of Croatia and Serbia thus parted company politically. The former became a separate kingdom attached to Hungary in 1102 and to the Habsburg dynasty in 1527, while the Serbs began their expansion under the Nemanja dynasty late in the twelfth century and almost realized the dominion over the Balkans under Stephen Duan in the fourteenth century.

This political, geographical, and economic dualism became still greater when in 1219 the Serbs cast their lot with orthodoxy. The Croats, like the Slovenes, adopted Roman Catholicism, the Latin alphabet, and the culture of Rome. The Serbs accepted Greek Orthodoxy, the Cyrillic alphabet, and the culture of Constantinople.

The Slovenes became a part of the Austrian possessions of the Habsburgs; the Croats fell under the dominion of the Hungarian crown and the republic of Venice; and the Serbs succumbed to the Turks by the middle of the fifteenth century. The loss of political independence brought with it ultimately the loss of the native nobility, the sole guardians of the constitutional and historical rights of the nations down into the nineteenth century in central Europe. In addition, many towns were Germanized and the middle class disappeared. The Jugo-Slavs, like the Czecho-Slovaks, appeared in modern times as a nation which had lost its native nobility and had been reduced to a disarmed, untutored, and enserfed peasantry. In the absence of these leaders, the nation turned to its clergy who in order to retain their hold on the peasantry must needs ever remain national. But here again the misfortune which awaited the Jugo-Slavs was that historically three religions had taken deep root, the Catholic among the Slovenes and Croats, and the Mohammedan and Orthodox among the Serbs. We may therefore conclude the first half of the historical evolution of the Jugo-Slavs with the observation that political, economic, social, and geographical divisions led to their downfall as a nation and that if they ever desired to become one, each one of these chasms would have to be bridged. A solution for each of these problems--the most difficult which ever faced a nation--would have to be found; meanwhile the policy of the four masters, the German, Venetian, Magyar, and Turk, would always be "divide and rule," in other words, to perpetuate the divergencies.

The history of the evolution of the Jugo-Slavs from the sixteenth to the twentieth century has been an effort to find the means of melting down these differences until finally one--nationalism--accomplished the purpose. Unity came first in the imagination and the mind, next in literature and speech, and finally in political action. The four hundred years beginning with the fifteenth and ending with the eighteenth century will be remembered by the Jugo-Slavs as the age of humiliation. Only Slavicized Ragusa and indomitable Montenegro kept alive the imagination of the nation which was brought back to life by the half-religious, half-national Slovene poets of the sixteenth century, by the Ragusan epic poet , by the incessant demands of successive diets of the ever-weakening Croatia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the progressive and zealous Serbs of Hungary, who ever since the fifteenth century in increasing numbers made their home there, refugees from the oppression of the Turk, but who ever longed to push out from the frontier and rebuild Serbia anew. , a Croat Catholic Dalmatian priest, a firm believer in Jugo-Slav and Slavic unity in general, appealed to the rising Russian empire to help save dying Slavdom.

The revolution of 1848 demonstrated still further the friendly relations of these potential rivals as national unifiers. For the first time, the Croats and Serbs publicly fraternized and showed that the seemingly insurmountable barrier of religious difference tended to disappear in the struggle for national independence. In this sense the events of 1848--when the hand of the foreign master was for the while taken away--have given confident hope to those who believe that Jugo-Slav differences are soluble. Jelai, Ban of Croatia, the idol of the Serbo-Croats, was proclaimed dictator and supported by the Croatian Diet at Zagreb and the Serbian assembly at Karlovac . The Serb Patriarch Rajai and the young and gifted Stratimirovi, provisional administrator of the Serb Vojvodina, attended the Croatian Diet and the High Mass where Bishop Oegovi sang the Te Deum in Old Slavic. After Gaj, Rajai, and Stratimirovi had failed at Vienna and Pressburg to bend the dynasty or the defiant Kossuth, Jelai was empowered to defend the monarchy and bring back the historical rights of the Triune Kingdom and the Serb Vojvodina. The dynasty and the monarchy survived, but Jugo-Slav hopes and the promises they had received were unfulfilled or soon withdrawn, as for instance the Vojvodina in 1861. Absolutism reigned supreme from 1849 to 1860.

This disappointment led the Croats and Serbs to try cooperation with the Magyars, who under De?k and E?tv?s appeared to be anxious to conciliate the non-Magyars in those uncertain years which began in 1859 and ended in dualism. Austria lacked a great statesman, and the Prusso-Austrian rivalry led the fearful and impatient Francis Joseph into the Compromise of 1867. It was a work of haste and expediency and bound with it the fate of the dynasty. Thereafter, the German minority in Austria and the Magyar minority in Hungary were the decisive factors in the problems confronting the Jugo-Slavs. Dalmatia was handed over to Austria; Croatia, by a compromise, which it has never really accepted, to Hungary.

The Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary and Hungary and Croatia opened in 1868 a period which ended in 1905--it was a period, on the one hand of the greatest decay and decomposition in the political life of the Jugo-Slavs, and, on the other, of the greatest literary and intellectual unity as shaped by Bishop Strossmayer and Peter II and Nicholas of Montenegro.

Bishop Strossmayer and the Slovene, Croat, and Serb academies, matica, and learned societies, as well as men of literature, spoke, wrote, and pleaded for unity in this period, in vain. But they and the universities of Prague and Zagreb produced a younger generation which later took up the fight for national unity and which abandoned individual political foibles and looked over the boundaries of their provinces for inspiration.

Among the Slovenes, politics degenerated into the struggle for minor concessions from the court at Vienna in regard to the Slovene language and schools, while political parties multiplied freely through personal and social differences. The lines which bound them to their kinsmen in the south were weakest during this period.

The Croats found themselves no match for the astute Magyars who resorted to packed diets, gerrymandering, bribery, and forgery. The Compromise of 1868 was as decisive as the murder of the farsighted Prince Michael of Serbia in that year. It will be remembered that, in spite of his many faults, he had made an agreement with Montenegro for the ultimate merging of their states and, after allying himself with Rumania, had carried out an agreement with the Bulgarian committee for the amalgamation of Bulgaria with Serbia, thus obtaining a commanding influence in the Balkans. With his death, Serbia fell into the hands of Milan and Alexander, whose weak and erratically despotic reigns ushered in an era in Serbian history from which she emerged in 1903, through the assassination and the extinction of the last of the Obrenovics, a country without a good name, a nation which, through no special fault of its own, had become degraded.

It was in the midst of this political decay that the Bosnians revolted in 1875 and that Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, and Rumania became involved in the Russo-Turkish war. Space forbids but the most hasty survey of the occupation and administration by Austria of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by virtue of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.

The occupation of Bosnia led to the first real quarrels in modern times between Croat and Serb, for the former wanted Bosnia in Greater Croatia in order to have connection with Dalmatia; the latter wished it annexed to Greater Serbia, because it was Serbian. Magyar and German, further, quarreled as to the status of Bosnia and left it unsettled. But one thing was settled by the occupation in 1879 and the annexation in 1908. Neither Greater Croatia nor Greater Serbia were any longer truly possible as a final solution, only a Jugo-Slavia. The Greater Croatia received a mortal blow by the addition of Serbs up to more than one third of the number of Croats in Austria-Hungary, and Serbia faced the future either as a vassal or as a territory which must be annexed. From that time until the present the Habsburg monarchy, largely owing to the predominance of the Magyars in Croatia, adopted a policy of prevention--Jugo-Slav nationality was to be prevented. Viewed in that light the rule of Count Khuen-Hed?rvry, Ban of Croatia from 1883 to 1903, in which time, according to Croats, he corrupted a whole generation, turned Serb against Croat, and played out the radical demands of the party of Starevi and Frank, is intelligible. The policy of Count Khuen, which was based on corruption and forgery, on press-muzzling and career-exploding, has since been imitated, and its imitation has been largely responsible for this war.

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