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Translator: R. H. M. Elwes

Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them , but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object .

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.

N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. xiii.

>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God . God therefore possesses the attribute of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence . In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.

>>>>>Proof--God can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways, or can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is . Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications . Now God is one . Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of ideas is a mode of thought, that is a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently is not the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other part ; wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of any other. Thus they are caused by God, only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any other. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.

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I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from the preceding note.

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>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes ; thus it is caused by God, in so far only as he is a thinking thing. But not in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in God , not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing ; but the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence . If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also , and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd . Therefore &c. Q.E.D.

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At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived."

>>>>>Proof--The essence of man is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely , by the modes of thinking, of all which the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes must be in the same individual . Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing , must always necessarily exist; this would involve an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually existing. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God , in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is , in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; that is the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.

>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God in virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind: now we do possess the idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists . Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object ; but there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

>>>>>Proof--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute . Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

>>>>>Proof--Bodies are individual things , which are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest; thus each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely by another body, which other body is also in motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

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So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.

Definition--When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are 'in union,' and that together they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

>>>>>Proof--Bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance: that which constitutes the actuality of an individual consists in a union of bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and in respect of mode. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The same as for the last Lemma.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the individual is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we spoke of as its actual being.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma iv.

>>>>>Proof--The human body is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies. But the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body , which is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed ; therefore , the idea of the human body is composed of each of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body , wherefore their idea is also necessarily involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind regard this modification of the body --that is , it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body; therefore the mind will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named ; hence they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind will again take cognizance --that is , the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The mind imagines any given body, because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body; but the body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body , which is in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes ; this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is , the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications , and consequently the human body itself, and as actually existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God ; therefore there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind . Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing . But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q.E.D.

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