Read Ebook: Ethics — Part 2 by Spinoza Benedictus De Elwes R H M Robert Harvey Monro Translator

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>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God ; therefore there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind . Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing . But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind ; and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The idea or knowledge of the mind follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is , since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore , the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature of the human body itself , that is , they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation , not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals , whose parts can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can communicate their motions to other bodies in another relation; therefore the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part . We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind ; therefore , the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God , in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines ; now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing. Therefore , in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner . But inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies ; they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes , whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

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>>>>>Proof--The duration of our body does not depend on its essence , nor on the absolute nature of God . But it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only . Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind; that is , this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity . As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects , therefore they are all true. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God ; external to God it cannot be or be conceived . Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words , that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind; consequently , we say that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false ; but falsity cannot consist in simple privation , neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--All ideas are in God , and in so far as they are referred to God are true and adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind ; therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity . Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the essence of B. Then it cannot without B either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate , both in so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body, which involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that is , the idea in God will necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind necessarily perceives A adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--If A be that, which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of A in God , both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve the property A , and therefore the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body; that is , in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

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XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words , that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.

>>>>>Proof--To knowledge of the first kind we have assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity . Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true . Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is , he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

>>>>>Proof--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind . Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A . But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is , the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly , must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly , namely , as they are in themselves--that is , not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary . Reason perceives this necessity of things truly--that is , as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions , which answer to things common to all, and which do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.

>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing . Now particular things cannot be conceived without God ; but, inasmuch as they have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of the attributes of those ideas--that is , the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part , will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas , from which it perceives itself and its own body and external bodies as actually existing; therefore it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought , therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions ; in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition; but it must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation cannot be made without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.

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>>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas . But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same ; therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images, words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things , so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse , and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error ; but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

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