Read Ebook: Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept by Croce Benedetto Ainslie Douglas Translator

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Ebook has 273 lines and 121687 words, and 6 pages

FIRST PART

FIRST SECTION

THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT

THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

Concept and conceptual fictions--The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative--Conceptual fictions as representative without universality, or universals void of representations--Criticism of the doctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts--Posteriority of fictional concepts to true and proper concepts--Proper character of conceptual fictions--The practical end and mnemonic utility--Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with concepts--Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts.

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT

Expressivity--Universality--Concreteness--The concrete-universal and the formation of the pseudoconcepts--Empirical and abstract pseudoconcepts--The other characteristics of the pure concept--The origin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the concept--Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and the impossibility of demonstrating it--Prejudice concerning the nature of the demonstration--Prejudice relating to the representability of the concept--Protests of philosophers against this prejudice--Reason of their perpetual reappearance.

DISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT

Disputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism and nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract concepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical disputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept of the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and causes--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical nature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual intuition--Uniqueness of thought.

CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND

THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION

The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the concept--The series in abstract concepts.

OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts --Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle of sufficient reason.

SECOND SECTION

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT

Relation of the logical with the aesthetic form--The concept as expression--AEsthetic and aesthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of thought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction of subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and existence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the definition as fixed verbal formula.

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM

Identity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and thinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle term and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical judgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse of it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure concepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.

CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC

Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial justification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three logical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory of the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical character--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of Logistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic.

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION

Reaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the representations--The individual judgment; and its difference from the judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and intellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception or perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical judgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact and of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of knowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive of this error--Individual syllogisms.

INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION

Individual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and critique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical individual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process of empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as classification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative illusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility of direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration --Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called conversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and their abstractness.

THIRD SECTION

IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the individual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and material--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of abandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, and so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of representative and historical element in the definitive--The historical element in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition as answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and historical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition as also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of fact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false distinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and Aristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for abstract concepts and false for true concepts.

LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES

The demand for a complete table of the categories--This demand extraneous to Logic--Logical categories and real categories--Uniqueness of the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer logical, but real. Systems of categories--The Hegelian system of the categories, and other posterior systems--The logical order of the predicates or categories--Illusion as to the logical reality of this order--The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded upon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy--False distinction of Philosophy into two spheres--Metaphysic and Philosophy, rational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the confusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories--Philosophy and pure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism.

SECOND PART

PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

Summary of the results relating to the forms of knowledge--Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed forms--Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections to them--Empirical distinctions and their limits--Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the forms of knowledge--Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic as doctrine of the methods--Nature of our treatment of the forms of knowledge.

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of philosophy--Those which negate philosophy--Those which define it as science of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as science of norms; as doctrine of the categories--Exclusion of material definitions from philosophy--Idealism of every philosophy--Systematic character of philosophy--Philosophic significance and literary significance of the system--Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of the system--Genesis of the systematic prejudice, and rebellion against it--Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of their demand--Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and particular--Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy, distinct from particular philosophies.

HISTORY

History as individual judgment--The individual element and historical sources: relics and narrative--The intuitive faculty in historical research--The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Resemblance of history and art. Difference between history and art--The predicate or logical element in history--Vain attempts to eliminate it--Extension of historical predicates beyond the limits of mere existence--Asserted unsurmountable variance in judging and presenting historical facts and consequent demand for a history without judgment--Restriction of variance, and exclusion of apparent variances--Overcoming of variances by means of deep study of the concepts--Subjectivity and objectivity in history: their meaning--Historical judgments of value, and normal or neutral values. Critique--Various legitimate meanings of protests against historical subjectivity--The demand for a theory of historical factors--Impossibility of dividing history according to its intuitive and reflective elements--Empiricity of the division of the historical process into four stages--Divisions founded upon the historical object--Logical division according to the forms of the spirit--The empirical division of the representative material--Empirical concepts in history; and the false theory as to the function they fulfil there--Hence also the claim to reduce history to a natural science; and the thesis of the practical character of history--Distinction between historical facts and non-historical facts; and its empirical value--The professional prejudice and theory of the practical character of history.

IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY

Necessity of the historical element in philosophy--Historical quality of the culture required of the philosopher--Apparent objections--Communication of philosophy as changing of philosophy--Perpetuity of this changing--The overcoming and continuous progress of philosophy--Meaning of the eternity of philosophy--The concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, etc.; and its meaning--Philosophy as criticism and polemic--Identity of philosophy and history--Didactic divisions, and other reasons for the apparent duality--Note.

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